Mmm, I'm in agreement with PT more often than not. The basis tenet of her piece, that eventually the Iranians (indeed if you wait long enough, everyone) will have nuclear weapons is true enough.
But you could equally well argue from that that we bloody well ought to do something about it now, before their North Korea-like invulnerability arrives, or that we ought to do our utmost to change the regime and make sure no other similar regime comes to power before they do get the nukes.
And the implication of her comment that Israel's nuclear weapons point at Tehran, ie that they are offensive in nature, is pure garbage.
Two weeks ago, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) voted to refer the matter of Iran's nuclear program to the U.N. Security Council. There is plenty to like about the IAEA resolution, starting with the large majority it commanded among the organization's member states--even the usually recalcitrant Russians and Chinese signed on. Moreover, the strong text refers to Iran's "many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply" with Nuclear Proliferation Treaty agreements; asserts an "absence of confidence that Iran's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes"; and notes Tehran's "history of concealment" regarding its nuclear activities. In other words, the resolution states publicly and unambiguously what everyone has long known: that Iran has been lying about its nuclear program.
Yet the resolution also contains a key flaw: At the insistence of Egypt, and with the backing of the European Union, the text contains a clause calling for the creation of "a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery"--a pointed jab at the region's only nuclear power, Israel. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and the American delegation tried unsuccessfully to block the clause, rightly fearing that it could be used as anti-Israel propaganda and would provide an excuse for Iran to sidestep its obligations in the future. "The Americans are worried that once it is there, it will stay there forever and allow the Iranians to hide behind it," one ambassador told The New York Times. Indeed, in the court of world opinion, easily inflamed by anti-Israel rhetoric and no less easily swayed by fuzzy talk about a nuclear-free Middle East, the clause gives Iran a powerful rhetorical weapon. If it remains committed to proceeding with a nuclear program, Tehran can claim the need to deter Israel's nuclear weapons. It could make a reasonable and "generous" offer to refrain from developing nuclear weapons if only Israel would unilaterally eliminate its weapons. And when Israel refuses, Iran can claim that it is Israel standing in the way of a nuclear-free regional utopia. Moreover, as fear of a nuclear Iran intensifies, this language will open the door for Israel's critics in the BBC and like-minded organs in Europe to blame the Jewish state for any threat that Iran may pose to the continent. It could shift the focus of attention at the United Nations from Iran's weapons to those of the one stable democracy in the Middle East--and thereby fragment the coalition of countries seeking to prevent Tehran from acquiring nuclear arms.
But the clause is not merely bad geopolitical strategy; it is also the height of hypocrisy. Two of the governments that backed the language were Britain and France; and it was only a quarter of a century ago, during the battle over missile deployments in Europe, that those countries found themselves in a situation almost exactly analogous to Israel's role in the Iran debate. The stance taken by London and Paris then was the correct one--and the exact opposite of the position they have forced on Israel now.
Between 1981 and 1983, the United States and the Soviet Union conducted Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force negotiations in Geneva. Throughout this time, Moscow insisted that the nuclear arsenals of Britain and France be included in the balance of forces to be discussed--a proposal that London and Paris adamantly opposed. Including British and French weapons in their calculus allowed the Soviets to claim that a balance of forces existed in Europe even after they had deployed several hundred SS-20s pointed at the western half of the continent. Had British and French weapons been counted in the intermediate range nuclear balance, the Soviets could have proposed to dismantle their SS-20 arsenal if only Britain and France would eliminate their own nuclear deterrents. Aware that the slogan of a "nuclear-free Europe" might lead to demands for their unilateral nuclear disarmament, the British and French governments persistently rejected this Soviet negotiating ploy.
Follow the link at the top to read the whole article. (Requires registration.)
3 comments:
Mmm, I'm in agreement with PT more often than not. The basis tenet of her piece, that eventually the Iranians (indeed if you wait long enough, everyone) will have nuclear weapons is true enough.
But you could equally well argue from that that we bloody well ought to do something about it now, before their North Korea-like invulnerability arrives, or that we ought to do our utmost to change the regime and make sure no other similar regime comes to power before they do get the nukes.
And the implication of her comment that Israel's nuclear weapons point at Tehran, ie that they are offensive in nature, is pure garbage.
V. interesting historical comparison in TNR. Worth keeping in mind some of the predictions and seeing if they come true...
THE HYPOCRISY OF BRITAIN AND FRANCE.
Memory Loss
by Jeffrey Herf
Two weeks ago, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) voted to refer the matter of Iran's nuclear program to the U.N. Security Council. There is plenty to like about the IAEA resolution, starting with the large majority it commanded among the organization's member states--even the usually recalcitrant Russians and Chinese signed on. Moreover, the strong text refers to Iran's "many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply" with Nuclear Proliferation Treaty agreements; asserts an "absence of confidence that Iran's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes"; and notes Tehran's "history of concealment" regarding its nuclear activities. In other words, the resolution states publicly and unambiguously what everyone has long known: that Iran has been lying about its nuclear program.
Yet the resolution also contains a key flaw: At the insistence of Egypt, and with the backing of the European Union, the text contains a clause calling for the creation of "a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery"--a pointed jab at the region's only nuclear power, Israel. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and the American delegation tried unsuccessfully to block the clause, rightly fearing that it could be used as anti-Israel propaganda and would provide an excuse for Iran to sidestep its obligations in the future. "The Americans are worried that once it is there, it will stay there forever and allow the Iranians to hide behind it," one ambassador told The New York Times. Indeed, in the court of world opinion, easily inflamed by anti-Israel rhetoric and no less easily swayed by fuzzy talk about a nuclear-free Middle East, the clause gives Iran a powerful rhetorical weapon. If it remains committed to proceeding with a nuclear program, Tehran can claim the need to deter Israel's nuclear weapons. It could make a reasonable and "generous" offer to refrain from developing nuclear weapons if only Israel would unilaterally eliminate its weapons. And when Israel refuses, Iran can claim that it is Israel standing in the way of a nuclear-free regional utopia. Moreover, as fear of a nuclear Iran intensifies, this language will open the door for Israel's critics in the BBC and like-minded organs in Europe to blame the Jewish state for any threat that Iran may pose to the continent. It could shift the focus of attention at the United Nations from Iran's weapons to those of the one stable democracy in the Middle East--and thereby fragment the coalition of countries seeking to prevent Tehran from acquiring nuclear arms.
But the clause is not merely bad geopolitical strategy; it is also the height of hypocrisy. Two of the governments that backed the language were Britain and France; and it was only a quarter of a century ago, during the battle over missile deployments in Europe, that those countries found themselves in a situation almost exactly analogous to Israel's role in the Iran debate. The stance taken by London and Paris then was the correct one--and the exact opposite of the position they have forced on Israel now.
Between 1981 and 1983, the United States and the Soviet Union conducted Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force negotiations in Geneva. Throughout this time, Moscow insisted that the nuclear arsenals of Britain and France be included in the balance of forces to be discussed--a proposal that London and Paris adamantly opposed. Including British and French weapons in their calculus allowed the Soviets to claim that a balance of forces existed in Europe even after they had deployed several hundred SS-20s pointed at the western half of the continent. Had British and French weapons been counted in the intermediate range nuclear balance, the Soviets could have proposed to dismantle their SS-20 arsenal if only Britain and France would eliminate their own nuclear deterrents. Aware that the slogan of a "nuclear-free Europe" might lead to demands for their unilateral nuclear disarmament, the British and French governments persistently rejected this Soviet negotiating ploy.
Follow the link at the top to read the whole article. (Requires registration.)
France says Iran has secret nuclear arms programme
Reuters
Feb 16, 2006
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