Thursday, November 12, 2009

'The fake threat from Afghanistan': Peter Hitchens

A rather long blog posting from Peter Hitchens on why the bogus threat to the UK from Afghanistan:

The fake threat from Afghanistan, and do eagles really drop tortoises on people's heads?

A number of correspondents took me up on my (though I say it myself) refreshingly frank admission that I don't know what will happen in Afghanistan if (or rather when) we leave that country, and by implication that I don't think that outcome, whatever it may be, will make much difference to us anyway.

Edward Doyle made a number of statements and assertions which I would ask him to substantiate. First, he refers to something called 'Al Qaeda', on the assumption that there exists a defined, centralised organisation going under this name. Can he tell me: a) where I can find AQ's statement of aims, as opposed to baseless journalistic and political assertions of what those aims are; b)where and when it was founded, and by whom; c) how does it raise and where does it bank or store its funds, and how and to whom does it disburse them? d) what specific aims, methods, etc allow an analyst to decide whether an Islamist terror group is or is not affiliated to AQ, as in ‘such and such an action “bears all the hallmarks of Al Qaeda” ‘. What precisely are these 'hallmarks'? In what way are they different from the modus operandi of any fanatical Islamist terror group, and what reason do we have to assume that they are linked, except in the vaguest sense, with the actions of any other such group, Islamist fanatics existing in places as distant and different as Bosnia, Leeds and the Philippines, and often being from differing and even hostile types of Islam? e) what its political front organisation is, and how we can tell objectively that statements or actions attributed to AQ by journalists or intelligence organisations or governments are in fact connected with it?

Just asking.

Mr Doyle then says that AQ has 'relocated to Somalia'. From where did it do this? How does he know? Who relocated? What does he think about the people who claim it is in fact in Pakistan's tribal areas? Are they mistaken? If so, on what basis are we to judge between him and those who disagree with him, and decide that he knows better. Or does it just depend on which paper he read most recently?

I really don't know what the increased use of the burqa (or more often in this country the hijab and niqab) has to do with this. It is undoubtedly so (the burqa is also almost universal in those parts of Afghanistan we claim to have liberated from Taliban oppression, I might add). That seems to me to have more to do with a general revival of the stricter versions of Sunni Islam promoted by Saudi Arabia during the last 30 years.

And then there's this statement: ‘To be sure, Afghanistan won't turn into a Westminster look-a-like democracy. But it could function in its own way as one, bringing stability to that part of Asia and the prospect of economic development. All this might lead to far better influences being exported from the region.’

Really? How, exactly? This is an enormous 'but if', around about the size of the Himalayas. Yet he skips lightly over it as if it were a sand-castle. Mr Doyle is arguing that men - his neighbours and mine - should be sent to fight and die for a cause. The burden's on him to show good reasons for this. This is a wishful and wholly unrealistic claim of the type I've mentioned before, which falls into the category I've previously mocked, that of ‘With a ladder and some glasses, you could see the Hackney Marshes, if it wasn't for the houses in between’. Indeed you could, if you had the ladder and the glasses, and it wasn't for the houses. But you haven't, and the houses are there. So you can't.

For example, if Afghanistan functions 'in its own way' which is as a village-based patriarchal clan system, then it won't be a parliamentary democracy. The two are mutually exclusive. See the recent laughable 'elections'.

He then says, quite reasonably: ’There is a real danger, in at least some parts of Britain, that they come to resemble Northern Ireland - opposed community groups with totally different values living cheek-by-jowl, presided over by a liberal elite who understand neither (and of course allowing the BNP to get a foothold all the while).’

But he follows this with a complete non sequitur: ‘Afghanistan is not a liberal war. It's about establishing or maintaining community cohesion over here.’

I am sorry. I simply and genuinely do not understand the connection. I cannot reply to Mr Doyle's reasoning, by which he presumably links his fear for the Ulsterisation of Britain and his belief that our military presence in Afghanistan will prevent this. I cannot reply to it because he appears to have left it out. Has he left it out because he forgot to put it in? Or has he left it out (as I rather suspect) because he has no idea what the connection is? If so, let me reassure him. Nor have I. But in that case, what is his point?

I am asked if anyone has ever been killed as a result of an eagle dropping a tortoise on his head. The Greek classical dramatist Aeschylus is said, by some accounts, to have died in this rather unpleasant and annoying (in that it is so unlikely and rather ridiculous) way. But I am not sure where the database is, that gives statistics on this risk in the present day. When I say that I am as likely to die by this method as I am to die by the hand of a terrorist, I am simply making a point that we are much too scared of terrorists, and that most of us are at no risk whatever of being killed or hurt by terrorist attacks, to which we over-react unreasonably and ludicrously. Compare the stoical response of the British population to the much greater risk from German bombing raids and guided missiles.

Dermot Doyle meanwhile rebukes me as follows: ’We would let so many people down, if we abandoned them to the uncertainty of a future controlled by a bunch of medieval hairy savages, with more wives than teeth, and the eventual consequences for ourselves. Islamic terrorism apart, the single issue of Taliban treatment of females of all ages is worthy of our intervention. We surely cannot sit back and allow a repeat of what we saw in Afghanistan, after the Russian propped regime collapsed.’

It is amusing to see him using the same excuse for our intervention in Afghanistan (emancipation of women) as was employed by Leonid Brezhnev's USSR in the 1970s, for their equally doomed intervention. It is also based on a misunderstanding of reality. Mr Doyle should look into the treatment of women in the non-Taliban areas of Afghanistan (including NGO-infested Kabul) run by our current 'friends', the corrupt and violent warlords who control the country under the figurehead presidency of Hamid Karzai. It does not differ much from the treatment of women under our former 'friends', the Mujahidin whom we financed and armed in their war against the 'progressive' Soviets, and whom we now call 'The Taleban' or 'Al Qaeda'. (People should get hold of the profane but clever and disturbing film Charlie Wilson's War to see the contradictory mess we have got ourselves into with our fantasies of intervention in this part of the world).

The age of imperialism is over. I might regret that, and in fact often do, but it is so. It is none of my business, even if I had the power to do anything about it, how other people wish to order their countries. Unselfishness and neighbourliness are of no worth if they are not effective. As the other Mr Doyle rightly points out, we have more urgent concerns, not being addressed, close to home (where charity begins). What's more, those aims would be achievable, if we tried, whereas cleaning up Afghanistan will be as easy as draining the Pacific with a teaspoon. Do these advocates of war ever look at a map, and see how tiny our presence is, in what is a small part of this rather large country? Do they notice how much of our time is spent in first taking, then abandoning, then retaking the same places?

We intervene in these countries not to do good, but to make ourselves feel good about ourselves. This is why I recommend idealists, who think they can liberate the womenfolk of Afghanistan, to form a volunteer international brigade and go and do it themselves. Actually, only two political figures have ever succeeded in de-Islamising any society. One was Kemal Ataturk, whose work in Turkey is now being busily undone by the AK party, with Western support. The other was Josef Stalin, who banned the veil and brought female equality across Central Asia and the Caucasus. Both men were utterly ruthless. Both, in the long term, failed in their objective. Do we wish to follow their examples? Do we think we shall succeed where they ultimately failed?

In a charming and civilised post, Tom Bumstead says that a linking organisation can be identified which connects terrorist actions in Britain with Afghanistan. Well, I'd subject such claims to the questions I ask above about 'Al Qaeda'. Those in the intelligence business both love constructing these spider's webs (usually post facto) and often need them to get the US government to finance and support their work (this is the fundamental reason behind the adoption of the name 'Al Qaeda' by American intelligence organisations). But let us assume that Mr Bumstead's connections are correct. He goes on: ‘Every real attack on the UK has a link with this group and the UK will not be safe from this particular threat until Al Mujahiroun has been shut down in the UK and in Afghanistan/Pakistan. You ask why a British presence in Helmand is required - the answer is that now that Pakistan is no longer so safe a haven for terrorism as it once was - Afghanistan could take its place unless protected. The forces of civilization need to be on both sides of the border to make this area safe. There is no other area in the world which could breed this kind of terrorism - this is not an idealistic swing in the dark against evil - it is surgically precise.’

Did you spot the sleight of hand? Yes, Mr Bumstead has rather cleverly invented a country . It is called ‘Afghanistan/Pakistan’. It is necessary for his argument because, if there are such 'training camps' and if they are important, and if they do play a role in terrorist actions in this country (an argument for another time) then the trouble is that they are in Pakistan, a member (I think, currently, though this comes and goes) of the Commonwealth with which we have diplomatic relations, and with which we are not at war, and to which we gave independence in 1947. We're not sending British troops there, I think. Pakistan is also incidentally a nuclear power, and would not take kindly to our invading it. Further, Pakistan was also until recently under the control of a military dictator, Pervez Musharraf, who we appear to have helped to destabilise (again in the name of 'democracy') in favour of a government which seems far less capable of controlling such things than he was. But that's by the way.

By pretending that Afghanistan and Pakistan are the same country, Mr Bumstead hopes to avoid my question, which he knows perfectly well is coming: ’How does the presence of our troops in Helmand province in Afghanistan in any way influence the existence or operation of Islamist training camps a long way away in Pakistan, a different country? Helmand, according to my map, is a good deal closer to Iran than it is to South Waziristan, the scene of Pakistan's battles with the Taleban (alias the Pashtuns). And that battle is all about the (British Imperial) misplacing of the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, leaving large numbers of Pashtuns in a country they don't want to be in, a problem worsened in recent years by the many Pashtun refugees from the Russo-Afghan war, who have settled in Pakistan and so wield political influence there. I need from him simple, easy-to-follow factual explanations as to how this process - of British troops in Helmand preventing terror attacks on Britain - works. I can't make it out myself. And, once again, the burden of proof must rest on those who propose and defend this very bloody and costly military action. I don't have to prove it's futile (though 95 percent of military operations are) .They have to prove it's rational and effective.

One small non-Afghan point. A person styling himself 'Geraint' writes: ’Mr Hitchens's logic is rather faulty. He says the Tories should be destroyed but then says that the obvious successors like UKIP or the English Democrats are Cravat and Blazer brigade or too small. Yet a party starting from scratch would suffer the exact same problems. Besides which he lambasts UKIP yet at the same time praised Norman Tebbit for telling people to go vote for them at the Euro elections. Which is it Mr Hitchens you cannot have it both ways!’

I dealt with this only last week (Google the November 5 posting ‘Please stop trying to get me to endorse UKIP’. Or find it in the archives). UKIP is not 'the “obvious successor” ' to the Tories. As long as the Tories remain unsplit, no serious rival can develop. Any new party will be built out of the ruins of the Tories, and will have to win a large part of the vote which the Tories have hitherto counted upon. It will not be 'starting from scratch'. It will be reordering the conservative forces in this country which exist, but are currently trapped in impotence, or reduced to abstention. They are either too disillusioned to vote, or they are chained by habit and misplaced loyalty to the Useless Tories. That loyalty can only be shaken by a further Tory failure at the election, a real possibility (The last Tory score in the polls was 39 percent, of 67 percent of the electorate, which in reality means the support of about 25 percent of voters as a whole).

6 comments:

Scott said...

Unless we develop a comprehensive South Asia strategy, the most we can hope for is a temporary peace in Afghanistan.

What would such a strategy look like? Well, at the very least it requires some moderation of the strategic competition between India and Pakistan.

Without attention to this aspect of the problem, we really are only playing around at the edges of the conflict.

For more, see http://bit.ly/3vYHPk

JP said...

Superb from Hitchens. Those interested in his Al-Qaeda comments will find more in this older thread.

He's quite right too about the sloppy blurring of the distinction between Afghanistan and Pakistan, though I suspect there may yet be a defensible argument that begins "we should be bloody worried about a nuclear armed Pakistan going fully Islamist" and ends with "so we need Western military forces in Afghanistan". Not saying I could rustle the argument up myself in 10 seconds flat, though ;-)

JP said...

We are far too sentimental about ‘our boys’
The Times
December 12, 2009
Matthew Parris

We must drop the flowery language about sacrifice. British soldiers aren’t conscripts; they volunteer to risk their lives

...As the military situation [in Afghanistan] has deteriorated this year, I’ve been struggling to accommodate some hard truths I think I see. The first is that America has been unwise in leading her allies into this Afghan war; and we British unwise to push ourselves forward for the particular task that we undertook in Helmand. That was a serious and avoidable mistake and will in due course deserve inquiry. I suspect that an up-and-at-’em element in our military leadership, still smarting from Basra, played its part; with a trigger-happy Defence Secretary (John Reid) and a supine and ill-briefed Cabinet in supporting roles.

The second is that having got ourselves into this mess, we cannot now quit without tremendous damage to our alliance with the United States. It would be against our national interest to break that bond.

The third is that Nato/Isaf’s mission in Afghanistan will, nevertheless, probably end in failure. I think we know this, and in time the Americans will come to accept it too.

The fourth follows, and try as I might I cannot avoid it: that in the year ahead some of our servicemen and women are going to die in a cause we already suspect to be doomed, except in terms of keeping faith with the United States.

My struggle has been to admit this to myself, and accept that there is not one of these propositions I can honestly duck. I must accept the logic of where they point: that we are sending people to die in a military cause that our leaders know is probably lost and that this could be the right thing to do.

How can I reconcile myself to this? ... In an epoch of small wars in confusing and ambiguous causes, and with a fully professional military, we should not be emotionally ramping up what armed conflict is sometimes about. We are using the Second World War language of national survival and conscripted soldiers — “our boys” — to discuss what ought to be discussed as a limited operation, of an optional nature, in support of an important ally, using professional service-people working in their chosen career. There is not a single conscript in the British Armed Forces.

This is not a fight for our very existence, our whole way of life, all that is dear to us. It is not a race against time to forestall carnage on our streets at home. The pro-war brigade should cease talking up the stakes in these overblown terms.

The anti-war brigade, meanwhile, should drop the unreasonable claim that war-fighting can only be justified as a battle for survival. That is not how British foreign and military policy works. the Second World War was the exception, not the paradigm.

...

Every death, of course, as the Prime Minister likes to remind Parliament at Prime Minister’s Questions each Wednesday, is a personal tragedy. And it is true that in the first nine years of this century we have lost many hundreds of service personnel, killed in action.

We have also lost a comparable number of employees in the farming and construction industries — about 90 last year, also killed, if you will, in action. But we do not define these trades in terms of death or sacrifice; we do not count the coffins; they do not come to one place. Viewed over the last half century and in coolly statistical terms, a young person’s decision to sign up for the Armed Forces has not invited a greater career risk of death or serious injury than the decision to sign up for a career in railway lineside track maintenance.

...

We too should learn to be more sanguine. If we, the people, were a little less sentimental about a war like this latest one, perhaps those we elect might risk more honesty about its prospects and its purposes.

JP said...

Armed forces bishop says sorry for praising Taliban
BBC News
14 December 2009

The new bishop to the armed forces has apologised over comments he made about how the Taliban could be admired for their "conviction to their faith".

Andy said...

Labour MP Eric Joyce writes an interesting blog on the need for the UK to assert it's own interests not just the US's in the war in Afghanistan (which is code for getting our troops out.)

"I’ve said in previous posts, and in the House of Commons, that we in Labour need to rethink our position on key aspects of Foreign and Defence Policy. Trident and Afghanistan are uppermost in many people’s minds, yet our approach to those issues remains sluggish – indeed we are presently in danger of being outflanked by the Government on at least one of those issues. The resignation of the UK’s envoy to Afghanistan, Sir Sherard Cowper Coles, and the sacking of General McChrystal, this week are both important events. Essentially, the McChrystal assumptions about Afghanistan make too much play of the military and too little of the diplomatic and political. These assumptions drive the US policy which President Obama is committed to. We in the UK remain wedded to a policy, if we can really call it that, of waiting to see what the United States tells us to do next. Crucially, though, David Cameron is quietly making it clear that he expects some kind of modest early change in the level or nature of our commitment next year and a lot more the year after that. Liam Fox, the Defence Secretary, has also been careful to sound ambivalent about the current state of play. Labour, meanwhile, is committed to our pre-election stance to the extent that we show no appetite at all for new thinking. In truth, on foreign and defence policy our position is more conservative than the Conservatives and that is a fundamentally bad place for us to be.

On Trident replacement, not really a Defence issue at at all but rather a cold national strategic and political one, the Lib Dems and Tories remain determined to leave our nuclear deterrent out of the Strategic Defence Review. Their official justification is that we voted to replace the old subs back in 2007 and the matter should rest there. No-one at all truly thinks this is a serious attempt to justify an otherwise inexplicable decision to leave our largest strategic defence asset out of a strategic review of defence. Of course, the argument presented by the government at face value would mean little else would change with the new government, since many things have been voted on since 2007. And that would be nonsensical. So, of course, we are left to assume that the government is afraid of the geopolitical implications of a decision by the UK to look seriously at its nuclear deterrent. But why is Labour afraid? Is it really correct to assume that a call to include Trident replacement in the Defence Review would lead the public to assume that Labour had returned to the desperate days of the early 1980s? That’s the assumption under which we are operating at present. And it’s so terribly flawed. A sensible call to look carefully at Trident replacement, and indeed at our present strategy on Afghanistan, would be welcomed by the great majority of people, I think. They want to see us look for the best ways of protecting people and the best ways of spending public money – not obsessing about the cold war context of 30 years ago.

We in Labour should commission our own Defence Review – one which includes Trident. We should be prepared think imaginatively and boldly about our foreign and defence policies, including – most pressingly – Afghanistan. I sense that some important players agree with that now, and if the argument gathers pace then Labour and the nation can only benefit."

JP said...

Great article!

What would Byzantium do?
Edward Luttwak
Prospect Issue 167
27th January 2010
If the west really wants to fix Afghanistan, it should learn from an ancient, brutal empire

Even by the shortest reckoning, the Byzantine empire survived for eight centuries (from the fourth to the twelfth). …[Their] ancient techniques centred on a single, paradoxical principle: do everything possible to raise, equip and train the best possible army and navy; then do everything possible to use them as little as possible.

With Afghanistan, the west faces a simple strategic calculus: too costly to stay in, too risky to leave. A Byzantine response would be, first to withdraw the west’s scarce, expensive troops, and arm local proxies instead. This was the standard remedy for turbulent, worthless lands where no taxes could be collected, but which were to be denied to enemies: an improvement over the Romans’ fondness for battles of attrition and annihilation.

In Afghanistan, a banal case of divide and rule is impossible. There is no unitary nation to divide. This is well suited to a Byzantine strategy, which would aim not to rule Afghanistan, but to stop the Taliban from doing so. Little persuasion would be needed to co-opt allies. The Shia Hazara distrust the Taliban, who view them as heretics deserving death, while the country’s Tajiks and Uzbeks, who can be as extreme in religion as the Taliban, would not want to be ruled by them either.

The Byzantines would use diplomacy to deal with Afghanistan’s diverse neighbours. They once even persuaded a rival empire to split the cost of guarding strategic border passes, so both could keep invaders out. Today Uzbekistan, which is just across the river from Afghanistan, and its patron Russia, which is just beyond, have every reason to keep the Taliban at bay, given their internal struggles against armed Islamists. Accordingly, the Byzantines would demand from Russia and Uzbekistan the weapons and ammunition that were needed to arm the Tajiks, Hazara and Uzbeks in Afghanistan.

Most Pakistanis, too, have had their fill of Islamists—during the last election, in 2008, in the supposedly most Islamic northwest, the major Islamist party won just 3 per cent of the vote. Pakistan is more liberal than we think: one of its most popular television talk shows has major political guests, despite being hosted by a transvestite (with a not unpleasant singing voice). But when it comes to meddling in Afghanistan, the ideologically Islamic Pakistani officer caste is firmly in charge, ignoring the preferences of the country’s voters. So Pakistan will continue to do everything in its power to sabotage any possible Byzantine solutions and strengthen the Taliban. …

The Byzantines would employ a standard technique to neutralise the inevitable Pakistani counter-move. In their day the arrival of a new class of enemy—mounted archers, for instance, or new empires attacking their eastern flank—prompted long-range diplomatic expeditions, deep into their foes’ backyard, to find other powers that might be induced to come and take them on. In one case, an envoy perilously travelled 3,000 miles into what is now China, and persuaded a previously unknown monarch to send forces to attack their rival empire of Persia.

….

India would furiously protest the remedy of leaving Afghanistan to the locals. But if America goes Byzantine, and withdraws, India will have no choice but to increase its own efforts to resist the Taliban. US-Indian relations in the aftermath? Some passing unpleasantness, no doubt, with aggrieved complaints heard politely and cheerfully ignored. But the solid force of common interests—and, of course, Beijing’s curious revival of the major territorial dispute over the new Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh—would force the Indian hand.

An abandoned Afghanistan, even with a low equilibrium of violence, would not be a pretty spectacle. Then again, it is far from a being one now. …