I posted a piece by Hitchens on Dresden, where he responds to defenders of the British bombing. Here, for anyone interested, is the original piece by Peter Hitchens, which provoked his readers to rally to justify the bombardments.
"Among the Dead Cities
Last weekend was the 65th anniversary of the RAF and USAAF bombing of Dresden. I was impressed to see that residents of that lovely city formed a human chain to prevent a demonstration by neo-Nazis, trying to equate the bombing with the Holocaust. Appalling as the bombing was, it was an act of war taken against an aggressor nation, not the same as the deliberate, cold-blooded industrial slaughter of Europe's Jews, a unique crime (which I hope will remain unique and is often falsely compared with lesser horrors by irresponsible propagandists of many kinds).
The citizens of modern Dresden, which has now at least partly recovered from the destruction, and also from nearly 50 years of Communist vandalism and stupidity, are a credit to the German Federal Republic, which has made immense efforts to build a free, law-governed society out of the ruins of Hitler's Reich, and doesn't get enough credit for its success. No, it's not a perfect society (its attitude to home schooling is insupportable, for instance). But it is a very creditable one. Perhaps now we can see (in Iraq and Afghanistan, for instance) how badly such attempts to build freedom out of the rubble of tyranny can fail or falter, we should pay more attention to the German success.
Apart from anything else, anyone who seeks to excuse or minimise or diminish the Holocaust may have the effect of making a repeat of it more likely, however unintentionally. That is why the 'revisionist' arguments of some German historians, who seek to equate Holocaust and bombing, ought to be resisted.
Even so, I think we have to admit that the bombing of civilian targets by the RAF during World War Two was wrong. We can say this without in any way impugning the undoubted courage of the young men who flew in the bombing missions - and who suffered appalling casualties while doing so. But their commanders, and the politicians who knew full well what was going on, cannot be let off.
I have just read A. C. Grayling's powerful book ‘Among the Dead Cities’ (you will have to read it yourself to find out where this startling and disturbing phrase comes from). I think its case against the bombing of German civilians is unanswerable. He deals with all the standard arguments of those who justify it, pointing out that all of these would be a better argument for what the RAF largely didn't do - that is, accurate bombing of industrial, economic and military targets. One of the few missions where careful targeting was involved was the rightly famous 'Dambusters' raid, though that did inevitably cause some severe civilian casualties, many of them slave workers from defeated allied nations. Another was the bombing of the missile factory at Peenemunde. Such bombing, which was also tackled by the USAAF, also at great cost in young lives, did in fact have a much greater effect on the German ability to wage war than the bombing of civilians. The Americans, by the way, did bomb civilians in Japan, another dubious episode.
Many other issues flow from this, including the validity of the 'finest hour' and 'glorious struggle' views of the Second World War, which seem to me (who once believed them entirely) to grow more threadbare by the year. And I know that many people would simply rather not think about the matter for this very reason. The market for accounts of the Hamburg firestorm is pretty limited in Britain. That's a pity. We need to know what was done in our name, and in my view to be horrified by it, so that we can be sure we are not again reduced to this barbaric and - as it happens - ineffectual form of warfare.
It is my suspicion that the moral shrivelling of Britain since 1945, the increased violence and delinquency, the readiness to accept the abortion massacre, the general coarsening of culture and the growth of callousness have at least something to do with our willingness to shrug off - or even defend - Arthur Harris's deliberate 'de-housing' of German civilians. The British people in 1939, told of what would be done in their name within six years, would have been incredulous and astonished. I am glad at least that people such as Bishop George Bell of Chichester raised powerful voices against it at the time, at some cost to themselves. We owe it to them to revisit the argument."
Wednesday, February 24, 2010
Peter Hitchens on the bombing of Dresden
A very interesting post from Hitchens where he responds to readers of his blog who have posted comments in defence of the British bombing of Dresden.
"Now to the bombing of Dresden. I am accused of hindsight. Well, I personally can have no other sort of sight in this case, since I was born more than six years after the Dresden events. I hope I should have had the courage to object at the time. Others certainly did. There were notable voices raised against the indiscriminate bombing of German civilians at the time, particularly by the most impressive and courageous George Bell, then Bishop of Chichester and (until he raised his voice) likely to have become a very distinguished Archbishop of Canterbury. Bell was a powerful intellect, not a naive sentimentalist, and had maintained good contacts with the anti-Hitler resistance in Germany since before the war.
As A.C. Grayling says in his book (p.181) ‘George Bell's attitude to the conduct of the war was not a function of other-wordly innocence. He knew rather better than most what was at stake in Nazi Germany. Before the outbreak of hostilities in 1939, he was active in helping people of Jewish origin gain asylum in Britain, and he had maintained contact with people engaged in opposition to Hitler.’
Bell called what the RAF was doing 'obliteration bombing'. He had supporters in both the Lords and the Commons, including Richard Stokes MP and the then Marquess of Salisbury. Others opposed the decision to engage in this sort of bombing on the grounds that it would do little to end the war, would draw valuable resources away from the decisive battle against the U-boats, and would cost horrendous numbers of lives (an interesting insight is given into this in C.P. Snow's novel 'The Light and the Dark' in which (spoiler warning) a brilliant academic who was at one time sympathetic to the Nazis eventually joins the RAF as a bomber pilot and (knowing full well that this fate is virtually certain) is killed while bombing Berlin. Snow wrote from personal knowledge of the debate, as a senior scientific civil servant. He was horrified at the losses, comparable to those on the Somme in 1916, and it is plain from his account that many experts argued against the Harris campaign, on the grounds of the casualties, which by their nature destroyed the lives of some of the country's best young men, and the military futility of the action.
In answer to 'Roy,' and Michael Williamson, Grayling also notes a surprising (to some) lack of enthusiasm for the bombing of German civilians by British civilians who had themselves been subjected to this uniquely horrible form of attack. When a British pacifist , Vera Brittain, wrote a book attacking the bombing, it was most savagely denounced in the USA, a country which had at that time never experienced aerial attack on civilians. I should stress here that I have little time for Miss Brittain, whose silly attitude between the wars contributed to calls for British military weakness in the 1930s and so helped lead to a war in which we felt the need to resort to bombing.
George Orwell, who justified bombing during the war, wrote after touring the scenes of destruction in Germany when the war was over: ‘To walk through the ruined cities of Germany is to feel an actual doubt about the continuity of civilization.’
And I should say here that the destruction visited on Germany by British bombs was immeasurably greater than that suffered by British cities. Even the famous raid on Coventry was small by the standards of Harris's thousand bomber raids (600 people died in the Coventry raid. This would be equalled or exceeded in many British raids which nobody has heard of - Stuttgart, April 1943, Dortmund, twice in May 1943, Wuppertal, 3,400 dead in May 1943, 1,800 dead in a second raid soon afterwards, Dusseldorf, 1,292 dead, June 1943, Krefeld, 1056 dead, June 1943, Hamburg, 1,500 dead, July 1943, then two days later, 35,000 dead in the firestorm of 'Operation Gomorrah' - these are a mere selection from the catalogue of carnage). Nothing Germany ever did compared with 'Operation Gomorrah', which destroyed the houses and people of much of Hamburg, or the Dresden raid, in which the numbers of dead are not known but were probably around 25,000. As many as 20,000 may have died in Pforzheim a few days later. There was no German equivalent of the Lancaster bomber.
And 'Roy' should note that most Germans, while they still remained free from secret-police terror (under which even he might have found himself voting for someone he didn't like. Can he be sure he wouldn't have?) did not vote for Hitler, and that the principal opposition to him (and the last brave voice raised in the Reichstag against him before the darkness fell, that of Otto Wels) came from the Social Democratic Party, whose support was concentrated in the close-packed working-class housing which Harris destroyed. What were these poor people supposed to do to avoid the supposed 'justice' of Arthur Harris's incendiaries and high explosives? Emigrate in protest?
'Brian T' says: ‘As far as I know, the people who prevented the demonstration in Dresden were not peaceful residents of the city, but violent left-wing extremists.’ He does not know very far in that case. Such extremists were present, mainly in the area round the Neustadt Station (used for the deportation of Jews to the death camps) which is some way from, and on the other side of the Elbe from, the historic centre. One might expect such people to be present. But, in a report which can be found with ease on the English site of 'Der Spiegel', and also from the account in the International Herald Tribune, it is clear that the human chain was composed of ordinary citizens. Their action was applauded by the city's Christian Democrat Mayor, and by civilised people all over Germany. Why, I wonder, would anyone want to give a different impression?
Mr Barnes's curious remarks on the Holocaust (15th February, 6.52 pm) are worth serious study, despite being partly incoherent. I shall certainly read his future contributions more closely, in the light of this one.
James Shaw (among others) dismisses as 'nonsense' my argument that: 'It is my suspicion that the moral shrivelling of Britain since 1945, the increased violence and delinquency, the readiness to accept the abortion massacre, the general coarsening of culture and the growth of callousness have at least something to do with our willingness to shrug off - or even defend - Arthur Harris's deliberate 'de-housing' of German civilians.'
I think he has missed my point. He can explain whether this was accidental or deliberate. I am obviously not offering a direct line between Arthur Harris and the 1967 Abortion Act, nor (as he fails to note) is abortion my only example of the effects of the wartime demoralisation of Britain. If I were, his instances would be of some value. But I am not. I am saying that such actions helped to coarsen and brutalise a nation which was formerly notable for its gentleness, kindness and Christian charity.
Other countries started from different places and came under different influences. Sweden, which enthusiastically sterilised some of its citizens before 1939, may have other reasons for its demoralisation, rooted in its enthusiastic worldly utopianism. Few would question that the Spanish Civil War, with its legacy of horror and unrestrained brutality, has poisoned that country for generations, and also associated the Catholic Church with the discredited Franco tyranny.
He also makes two other remarks which I find irritating and rather low: ‘Presumably you would have rather that the RAF had allowed German industry production to peak even higher, and take a terrible toll on the Russian front.’
Well, if he had made any attempt to study my argument, let alone to read Professor Grayling's book, or even studied the subject marginally, he would know that the effect of bombing German civilians on German industry was startlingly small, especially in comparison to the awful losses of our young men, and the hecatombs of German dead.
People were angry and defiant, rather than demoralised. Germany remained able to restore basic services in its bombed cities until a very late stage in the war. Its air defences by night were frighteningly effective, as any Lancaster veteran can recount - not all that much less effective than by day. And the factories were untouched except by accident. The main damage to German industry was done by the accurate daylight bombing of the USAAF, especially its attacks on oil installations rather late in the war. The Americans sacrificed bomb load for protection, and developed, as we could have done, long-range escort fighters which made such bombing practicable. Harris didn't like being asked to do this, and resisted his Army colleagues' demands for help in attacking transport targets in the run-up to D-Day. When he did assent, the attack was highly effective. A policy of bombing industrial targets by day under fighter escort would also have absorbed just as much, if not more, of the German war effort as did the indefensible alternative of killing women and children in their homes, by indiscriminate carpet-bombing.
Mr Shaw adds: ‘It's also worth remembering that the British government only came to the conclusion that the bombing of German cities would work after examining the effect of German bombing on British cities.’
Did it? What is his evidence for this claim? He seems very assured, verging on the smug. Has he any reason to feel so? British civilian morale did not break during the London Blitz or after the Coventry massacre. So why should the Germans behave differently? (They didn't either, as it turned out). The main reason for the de-housing policy was that we couldn't hit proper targets by night. The devastating Butt Report (look it up) demonstrated that Bomber Command's night attacks were mostly dropping bombs on German cows, if they were lucky. The reason for attacking big cities, rather than industrial or military targets, was because they could reliably hit them by night.
The bombing of civilians from the air may have appeased Stalin a little and given the British people the (wrong) impression that they were doing serious damage to Hitler's war effort. But it squandered valuable young lives, and was a poor substitute for direct engagement with the enemy on the ground, the only way in which wars are won.
This we were unable to do because our army in 1940 had been so small and weak that it had been abruptly ejected from continental Europe at Dunkirk (which was, by the way, a defeat, not a victory). It could not get back there for many years and then at horrendous cost in lives, invasion from the sea being a terribly bloody form of fighting. No wonder Churchill (who could not forget the disaster of his attempted landings at Gallipoli) hesitated so long. The bombing's only good effects, the diversion of strength from the Eastern front, could have been achieved by American-style accurate daylight attacks, with well-armed bombers under fighter escort, which would have been morally defensible while simultaneously doing real damage to the Nazi war effort. I doubt if the casualties on our side would have been much worse, either. Admit it. Bombing civilians deliberately was both wrong and ineffectual, and robbed us of much moral authority. Its roots lie in British weakness, brainless pacifism and dumb diplomacy during the 1920s and 1930s. It is time we recognised it.'
"Now to the bombing of Dresden. I am accused of hindsight. Well, I personally can have no other sort of sight in this case, since I was born more than six years after the Dresden events. I hope I should have had the courage to object at the time. Others certainly did. There were notable voices raised against the indiscriminate bombing of German civilians at the time, particularly by the most impressive and courageous George Bell, then Bishop of Chichester and (until he raised his voice) likely to have become a very distinguished Archbishop of Canterbury. Bell was a powerful intellect, not a naive sentimentalist, and had maintained good contacts with the anti-Hitler resistance in Germany since before the war.
As A.C. Grayling says in his book (p.181) ‘George Bell's attitude to the conduct of the war was not a function of other-wordly innocence. He knew rather better than most what was at stake in Nazi Germany. Before the outbreak of hostilities in 1939, he was active in helping people of Jewish origin gain asylum in Britain, and he had maintained contact with people engaged in opposition to Hitler.’
Bell called what the RAF was doing 'obliteration bombing'. He had supporters in both the Lords and the Commons, including Richard Stokes MP and the then Marquess of Salisbury. Others opposed the decision to engage in this sort of bombing on the grounds that it would do little to end the war, would draw valuable resources away from the decisive battle against the U-boats, and would cost horrendous numbers of lives (an interesting insight is given into this in C.P. Snow's novel 'The Light and the Dark' in which (spoiler warning) a brilliant academic who was at one time sympathetic to the Nazis eventually joins the RAF as a bomber pilot and (knowing full well that this fate is virtually certain) is killed while bombing Berlin. Snow wrote from personal knowledge of the debate, as a senior scientific civil servant. He was horrified at the losses, comparable to those on the Somme in 1916, and it is plain from his account that many experts argued against the Harris campaign, on the grounds of the casualties, which by their nature destroyed the lives of some of the country's best young men, and the military futility of the action.
In answer to 'Roy,' and Michael Williamson, Grayling also notes a surprising (to some) lack of enthusiasm for the bombing of German civilians by British civilians who had themselves been subjected to this uniquely horrible form of attack. When a British pacifist , Vera Brittain, wrote a book attacking the bombing, it was most savagely denounced in the USA, a country which had at that time never experienced aerial attack on civilians. I should stress here that I have little time for Miss Brittain, whose silly attitude between the wars contributed to calls for British military weakness in the 1930s and so helped lead to a war in which we felt the need to resort to bombing.
George Orwell, who justified bombing during the war, wrote after touring the scenes of destruction in Germany when the war was over: ‘To walk through the ruined cities of Germany is to feel an actual doubt about the continuity of civilization.’
And I should say here that the destruction visited on Germany by British bombs was immeasurably greater than that suffered by British cities. Even the famous raid on Coventry was small by the standards of Harris's thousand bomber raids (600 people died in the Coventry raid. This would be equalled or exceeded in many British raids which nobody has heard of - Stuttgart, April 1943, Dortmund, twice in May 1943, Wuppertal, 3,400 dead in May 1943, 1,800 dead in a second raid soon afterwards, Dusseldorf, 1,292 dead, June 1943, Krefeld, 1056 dead, June 1943, Hamburg, 1,500 dead, July 1943, then two days later, 35,000 dead in the firestorm of 'Operation Gomorrah' - these are a mere selection from the catalogue of carnage). Nothing Germany ever did compared with 'Operation Gomorrah', which destroyed the houses and people of much of Hamburg, or the Dresden raid, in which the numbers of dead are not known but were probably around 25,000. As many as 20,000 may have died in Pforzheim a few days later. There was no German equivalent of the Lancaster bomber.
And 'Roy' should note that most Germans, while they still remained free from secret-police terror (under which even he might have found himself voting for someone he didn't like. Can he be sure he wouldn't have?) did not vote for Hitler, and that the principal opposition to him (and the last brave voice raised in the Reichstag against him before the darkness fell, that of Otto Wels) came from the Social Democratic Party, whose support was concentrated in the close-packed working-class housing which Harris destroyed. What were these poor people supposed to do to avoid the supposed 'justice' of Arthur Harris's incendiaries and high explosives? Emigrate in protest?
'Brian T' says: ‘As far as I know, the people who prevented the demonstration in Dresden were not peaceful residents of the city, but violent left-wing extremists.’ He does not know very far in that case. Such extremists were present, mainly in the area round the Neustadt Station (used for the deportation of Jews to the death camps) which is some way from, and on the other side of the Elbe from, the historic centre. One might expect such people to be present. But, in a report which can be found with ease on the English site of 'Der Spiegel', and also from the account in the International Herald Tribune, it is clear that the human chain was composed of ordinary citizens. Their action was applauded by the city's Christian Democrat Mayor, and by civilised people all over Germany. Why, I wonder, would anyone want to give a different impression?
Mr Barnes's curious remarks on the Holocaust (15th February, 6.52 pm) are worth serious study, despite being partly incoherent. I shall certainly read his future contributions more closely, in the light of this one.
James Shaw (among others) dismisses as 'nonsense' my argument that: 'It is my suspicion that the moral shrivelling of Britain since 1945, the increased violence and delinquency, the readiness to accept the abortion massacre, the general coarsening of culture and the growth of callousness have at least something to do with our willingness to shrug off - or even defend - Arthur Harris's deliberate 'de-housing' of German civilians.'
I think he has missed my point. He can explain whether this was accidental or deliberate. I am obviously not offering a direct line between Arthur Harris and the 1967 Abortion Act, nor (as he fails to note) is abortion my only example of the effects of the wartime demoralisation of Britain. If I were, his instances would be of some value. But I am not. I am saying that such actions helped to coarsen and brutalise a nation which was formerly notable for its gentleness, kindness and Christian charity.
Other countries started from different places and came under different influences. Sweden, which enthusiastically sterilised some of its citizens before 1939, may have other reasons for its demoralisation, rooted in its enthusiastic worldly utopianism. Few would question that the Spanish Civil War, with its legacy of horror and unrestrained brutality, has poisoned that country for generations, and also associated the Catholic Church with the discredited Franco tyranny.
He also makes two other remarks which I find irritating and rather low: ‘Presumably you would have rather that the RAF had allowed German industry production to peak even higher, and take a terrible toll on the Russian front.’
Well, if he had made any attempt to study my argument, let alone to read Professor Grayling's book, or even studied the subject marginally, he would know that the effect of bombing German civilians on German industry was startlingly small, especially in comparison to the awful losses of our young men, and the hecatombs of German dead.
People were angry and defiant, rather than demoralised. Germany remained able to restore basic services in its bombed cities until a very late stage in the war. Its air defences by night were frighteningly effective, as any Lancaster veteran can recount - not all that much less effective than by day. And the factories were untouched except by accident. The main damage to German industry was done by the accurate daylight bombing of the USAAF, especially its attacks on oil installations rather late in the war. The Americans sacrificed bomb load for protection, and developed, as we could have done, long-range escort fighters which made such bombing practicable. Harris didn't like being asked to do this, and resisted his Army colleagues' demands for help in attacking transport targets in the run-up to D-Day. When he did assent, the attack was highly effective. A policy of bombing industrial targets by day under fighter escort would also have absorbed just as much, if not more, of the German war effort as did the indefensible alternative of killing women and children in their homes, by indiscriminate carpet-bombing.
Mr Shaw adds: ‘It's also worth remembering that the British government only came to the conclusion that the bombing of German cities would work after examining the effect of German bombing on British cities.’
Did it? What is his evidence for this claim? He seems very assured, verging on the smug. Has he any reason to feel so? British civilian morale did not break during the London Blitz or after the Coventry massacre. So why should the Germans behave differently? (They didn't either, as it turned out). The main reason for the de-housing policy was that we couldn't hit proper targets by night. The devastating Butt Report (look it up) demonstrated that Bomber Command's night attacks were mostly dropping bombs on German cows, if they were lucky. The reason for attacking big cities, rather than industrial or military targets, was because they could reliably hit them by night.
The bombing of civilians from the air may have appeased Stalin a little and given the British people the (wrong) impression that they were doing serious damage to Hitler's war effort. But it squandered valuable young lives, and was a poor substitute for direct engagement with the enemy on the ground, the only way in which wars are won.
This we were unable to do because our army in 1940 had been so small and weak that it had been abruptly ejected from continental Europe at Dunkirk (which was, by the way, a defeat, not a victory). It could not get back there for many years and then at horrendous cost in lives, invasion from the sea being a terribly bloody form of fighting. No wonder Churchill (who could not forget the disaster of his attempted landings at Gallipoli) hesitated so long. The bombing's only good effects, the diversion of strength from the Eastern front, could have been achieved by American-style accurate daylight attacks, with well-armed bombers under fighter escort, which would have been morally defensible while simultaneously doing real damage to the Nazi war effort. I doubt if the casualties on our side would have been much worse, either. Admit it. Bombing civilians deliberately was both wrong and ineffectual, and robbed us of much moral authority. Its roots lie in British weakness, brainless pacifism and dumb diplomacy during the 1920s and 1930s. It is time we recognised it.'
cold weather puts the freeze on the economy
Interesting
observation from economist Blogger Stefan Karllson:
'Freezing Weather Freezes Economies
Last month, I told you about how unusually cold weather was a factor increasing the probability of a "double dip" recession in the U.K.
Now we are seeing more examples of how the cold winter in the northern part of the northern Hemisphere is reducing economic activity.
The U.S. payroll employment number for February will likely be negatively affected by the blizzards that struck much of the North East United States, while the German ifo-index fell as cold weather reduced both retail sales and construction activity. Meanwhile, much of the Swedish rail system (and to a lesser extent some car/truck and air traffic) was paralyzed by extreme cold and large amounts of snow, something which will likely negatively affect many business activities.
If only we had more "global warming"....
Aside from that, another interesting observation one could make is that this makes "seasonal adjustments" more problematic. While I think "seasonal adjustments" makes sense in principle (assuming the absence of below mentioned practical problems), it is often a lot more problematic than many people think in practice applied to actual statistics.
Here we have a clearly seasonal (in the northern hemisphere, cold- and snow related problems only arise during the last and the first months of the year) factor depressing economic activity, yet because the severity of this seasonal factors varies from different years, the standard statistical method of historical averages will easily become misleading. If it was possible, one should let the factor vary from different years instead, but the risk is that this could allow statisticians to make arbitrary judgments, possibly influenced by political factors. Finding a way to objectively assess the different seasonal effect each year is something which aspiring statisticians should think about.'
observation from economist Blogger Stefan Karllson:
'Freezing Weather Freezes Economies
Last month, I told you about how unusually cold weather was a factor increasing the probability of a "double dip" recession in the U.K.
Now we are seeing more examples of how the cold winter in the northern part of the northern Hemisphere is reducing economic activity.
The U.S. payroll employment number for February will likely be negatively affected by the blizzards that struck much of the North East United States, while the German ifo-index fell as cold weather reduced both retail sales and construction activity. Meanwhile, much of the Swedish rail system (and to a lesser extent some car/truck and air traffic) was paralyzed by extreme cold and large amounts of snow, something which will likely negatively affect many business activities.
If only we had more "global warming"....
Aside from that, another interesting observation one could make is that this makes "seasonal adjustments" more problematic. While I think "seasonal adjustments" makes sense in principle (assuming the absence of below mentioned practical problems), it is often a lot more problematic than many people think in practice applied to actual statistics.
Here we have a clearly seasonal (in the northern hemisphere, cold- and snow related problems only arise during the last and the first months of the year) factor depressing economic activity, yet because the severity of this seasonal factors varies from different years, the standard statistical method of historical averages will easily become misleading. If it was possible, one should let the factor vary from different years instead, but the risk is that this could allow statisticians to make arbitrary judgments, possibly influenced by political factors. Finding a way to objectively assess the different seasonal effect each year is something which aspiring statisticians should think about.'
Monday, February 22, 2010
Human progress happens at 4% per year
I had to blog this with a headline like that!
Progress in Usability: Fast or Slow?
Jakob Nielsen's Alertbox
February 22, 2010:
...
Stephen Moore and Julian L. Simon wrote a book called It's Getting Better All the Time that summarizes improvements in 100 different fields across the 20th century. Following are some of their statistics (all from the United States):
Progress in Usability: Fast or Slow?
Jakob Nielsen's Alertbox
February 22, 2010:
...
Stephen Moore and Julian L. Simon wrote a book called It's Getting Better All the Time that summarizes improvements in 100 different fields across the 20th century. Following are some of their statistics (all from the United States):
- Infant mortality: 100 per 1,000 births in 1915, dropping to 9 in 1998. Improvement rate: 3% per year.
- Children without dental cavities: 26% in 1971, increasing to 55% in 1988.
Improvement rate: 5% per year. - People showering or bathing daily during winter: 29% in 1950, increasing to 75% in 1999. Improvement rate: 2% per year.
- Time worked to buy a chicken (at an average worker's salary): 2 hours in 1920, dropping to 15 minutes in 1999. Improvement rate: 3% per year.
- S&P stock market index: 6 in 1900, growing to 1,400 by 1999. Improvement rate: 6% per year. (As it turns out, 1999 was a bubble year, and the S&P later dropped, but for the sake of the long-term analysis, I'm sticking with the book's 20th century data.)
- Toy sales: $2 billion in 1921 (adjusted to 1998 dollars), growing to $45 billion in 1998. Improvement rate: 4% per year.
- Farm productivity, sacks of onions per acre: 200 in 1950, increasing to 800 in 1999. Improvement rate: 3% per year.
- Deaths caused by Chicago heat waves: 10,000 in 1901, dropping to 300 in 1995. Improvement rate: 4% per year.
- Airplane speed: 37 miles per hour in 1905 (Wright brothers Flyer III), increasing to 2,070 miles per hour in 1965 (Lockheed YF-12A). Improvement rate: 7% per year.
Israel accused over death of Hamas' Mahmoud Mabhouh in Dubai
Can you imagine BBC coverage of the killing in Dubai - supposedly by Mossad - of senior Hamas operative Mahmoud Mabhouh including pictures of babies and children killed by Mabhouh-sourced rockets? No, I can't either, but there are a couple at Tom Gross's blog.
Personally I hope Mossad did do it, but that the exposure of the operatives (if such it be) was not a hideous cock-up, but either no such thing, or planned that way.
-------------
Is Israel the only suspect over Dubai death?
Tom Gross
February 18, 2010
* Dubai death may have the support of many actors
* Did the Saudis have a hand? Did British intelligence?
* Few weeping over death of Hamas master terrorist
* There’s much we don’t know about Mabhouh’s death, so it’s unwise to jump to conclusions
...
* There seems a very real possibility that Israel is being set up. Airlines keep detailed passenger records these days and anyone could have got the flight manifestos of British and other passport holders who have flown to Israel in the past and then used these names in a deliberate attempt to point the finger of blame at Israel.
* The Dubai authorities have provided no forensic evidence that points to Israel, only a series of photos and videos of random hotel guests who may or may not all know each other. In any event, the persons shown in these photos and videos are not shown committing any crime. It would be very easy to frame Israel, using the identities of six randomly-chosen Israelis based on flight manifestos. This could have been done by anyone – and especially by persons who wanted to avoid being suspected of this action by blaming the Israelis and diverting attention from the real perpetrators.
...
* Many governments wanted Mabhouh out of the way, not only Israel. Sources confirm to me that the missiles Mabhouh was procuring from the Iranians had the capability of hitting central Tel Aviv, and were Hamas to use such missiles later this year, the Israeli response might lead to a region-wide conflagration, which many Western and Arab governments want to avoid.
* If Israel was responsible – and that is a very big if – it would be an indication of how strongly Israel feels it is being left with few other options in protecting its citizens from deadly threats. All the governments that have supported the Goldstone report have in effect told Israel that it cannot defend itself when attacked by missiles from Gaza in future, missiles that put over five million people at risk, so it would not be surprising if Israel decided it has no choice but to try and prevent those missiles reaching Gaza at an earlier stage in the supply chain.
...
* Indeed it is not even clear that those nine photographs that the Dubai authorities have released to the media actually portray real people. (Have they been heavily retouched, for example? Is each one a composite of several faces?) They have been shown repeatedly in news broadcasts and plastered on the front page of newspapers around the world in the last 48 hours, not a single person has come forward to say they recognize any of them, even from high school days, despite front page headlines such as Israel’s Ma’ariv newspaper saying “If you recognize any of these people, call us”.
* Unlike the anti-Israeli elements of the Western media that have rushed to blame Israel (creating a public furor and thereby forcing the hands of the British, Irish and French governments to summon their respective Israeli ambassadors), the Arab media are suggesting that the truth is far more complicated.
For example, the Arab world’s leading and arguably its most reliable newspaper, Al Sharq Alawsat, runs these stories:
* UAE Tipped Jordan of Palestinian Suspects whilst they were in the Air – Sources
* Palestinian Dubai Murder Suspects are Hamas Members – Palestinian Security Official
more...
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BBC broadcast: 'One million Jews help Mossad'
Telegraph Blogs
Douglas Murray
February 18th, 2010
Amid all the excitable nonsense being talked about dead Hamas commander Mahmoud al-Mabhouh I think the BBC has topped the lot. In an interview broadcast on Radio 4’s PM programme last night broadcast (at 17:35 mins) one interviewee explained that up to one million Jews worldwide might be on hand to assist Mossad in executions. That would mean about one in every dozen Jewish people worldwide is a secret assistant to assassins.
Now I must have more than a dozen or so Jewish friends. So which is it? Maybe I know two? It makes you think doesn’t it?
more...
-------------
Mossad Passport Affair: A Stick to Beat Israel?
Honest Reporting
22/02/10
Personally I hope Mossad did do it, but that the exposure of the operatives (if such it be) was not a hideous cock-up, but either no such thing, or planned that way.
-------------
Is Israel the only suspect over Dubai death?
Tom Gross
February 18, 2010
* Dubai death may have the support of many actors
* Did the Saudis have a hand? Did British intelligence?
* Few weeping over death of Hamas master terrorist
* There’s much we don’t know about Mabhouh’s death, so it’s unwise to jump to conclusions
...
* There seems a very real possibility that Israel is being set up. Airlines keep detailed passenger records these days and anyone could have got the flight manifestos of British and other passport holders who have flown to Israel in the past and then used these names in a deliberate attempt to point the finger of blame at Israel.
* The Dubai authorities have provided no forensic evidence that points to Israel, only a series of photos and videos of random hotel guests who may or may not all know each other. In any event, the persons shown in these photos and videos are not shown committing any crime. It would be very easy to frame Israel, using the identities of six randomly-chosen Israelis based on flight manifestos. This could have been done by anyone – and especially by persons who wanted to avoid being suspected of this action by blaming the Israelis and diverting attention from the real perpetrators.
...
* Many governments wanted Mabhouh out of the way, not only Israel. Sources confirm to me that the missiles Mabhouh was procuring from the Iranians had the capability of hitting central Tel Aviv, and were Hamas to use such missiles later this year, the Israeli response might lead to a region-wide conflagration, which many Western and Arab governments want to avoid.
* If Israel was responsible – and that is a very big if – it would be an indication of how strongly Israel feels it is being left with few other options in protecting its citizens from deadly threats. All the governments that have supported the Goldstone report have in effect told Israel that it cannot defend itself when attacked by missiles from Gaza in future, missiles that put over five million people at risk, so it would not be surprising if Israel decided it has no choice but to try and prevent those missiles reaching Gaza at an earlier stage in the supply chain.
...
* Indeed it is not even clear that those nine photographs that the Dubai authorities have released to the media actually portray real people. (Have they been heavily retouched, for example? Is each one a composite of several faces?) They have been shown repeatedly in news broadcasts and plastered on the front page of newspapers around the world in the last 48 hours, not a single person has come forward to say they recognize any of them, even from high school days, despite front page headlines such as Israel’s Ma’ariv newspaper saying “If you recognize any of these people, call us”.
* Unlike the anti-Israeli elements of the Western media that have rushed to blame Israel (creating a public furor and thereby forcing the hands of the British, Irish and French governments to summon their respective Israeli ambassadors), the Arab media are suggesting that the truth is far more complicated.
For example, the Arab world’s leading and arguably its most reliable newspaper, Al Sharq Alawsat, runs these stories:
* UAE Tipped Jordan of Palestinian Suspects whilst they were in the Air – Sources
* Palestinian Dubai Murder Suspects are Hamas Members – Palestinian Security Official
more...
-------------
BBC broadcast: 'One million Jews help Mossad'
Telegraph Blogs
Douglas Murray
February 18th, 2010
Amid all the excitable nonsense being talked about dead Hamas commander Mahmoud al-Mabhouh I think the BBC has topped the lot. In an interview broadcast on Radio 4’s PM programme last night broadcast (at 17:35 mins) one interviewee explained that up to one million Jews worldwide might be on hand to assist Mossad in executions. That would mean about one in every dozen Jewish people worldwide is a secret assistant to assassins.
Now I must have more than a dozen or so Jewish friends. So which is it? Maybe I know two? It makes you think doesn’t it?
more...
-------------
Mossad Passport Affair: A Stick to Beat Israel?
Honest Reporting
22/02/10
Saturday, January 30, 2010
Obama is right to bash the bankers - discuss
Obama is right to bash the bankers
Intelligence Squared Debate
29 Jan 2010
PRO
VOLCKER AND OBAMA’S REFORM HITS THE BULLS EYE: IT DIRECTLY TACKLES THE INHERENT DANGER
There’s a clear economic logic in insuring that from now on the basic utility aspects of banking – making ordinary loans to businesses and households and managing the nation’s payment system – is kept quite separate from the casino aspects of banking – all those credit default swaps, synthetic derivatives and special purpose vehicles which make up the hugely profitable but risky “proprietary trading arms” of the big banks. It was those "proprietary" activities that fuelled the bonanza in all those super dodgy mortgage-backed securities that led to the credit crunch of 2008. The new ban on insured, deposit-taking banks engaging in proprietary trading is a good first step on the road to total separation of these two activities.
THE REFORM IS GROUNDED IN THE LESSONS OF HISTORY
Between 1933 and the 1980s, finance was remarkably stable – and this was an era when the spheres of banking were kept safely separate by the Glass-Steagall Act in the USA and by various rules and regulations in the City of London. But then, when free-market Thatcher abolished the separations in London in 1986 and Clinton put the last nails into the coffin of Glass-Steagall in the late 90s, it was farewell stability; hello financial crisis. So even if economists find it hard to explain precisely why the separation worked, we should trust the historical evidence: the separation did work and Volcker's plans are a welcome return to responsible thinking.
THE REFORM RESTORES CRUCIAL ELEMENTS OF ACCOUNTABILITY AND CONTROL
Finance in the first decade of the 21st century had become too complicated to control; indeed, the sheer complexity of deregulated finance was a big part of what led to the crisis. Financial firms had lots of competing regulators with no one quite knowing what activity should be regulated where. What deregulation should have taught us is that financiers are endlessly creative at finding new ways to take gambles, and that we need protection from that sort of creativity. That’s where the ban on proprietary trading comes in: it returns us to some kind of transparency. By splitting proprietary and deposit-taking functions, regulators know who should be doing what, and keeping financiers to the rules becomes possible once again. In fact, Obama could go further in reestablishing transparency and insist on full disclosure of derivatives positions – something that would have really helped in spotting how much trouble Lehman's collapse was going to cause.
PUTTING A SIZE LIMIT ON BANKS IS AN ESSENTIAL ANTIDOTE TO THE "TOO BIG TO FAIL" PROBLEM
The terrible thing about big banks is that they can hold the whole economy hostage: "bail-us out or we'll sink you" is their basic message. And you can be sure that once they know they're in that position of strength, they'll use it...by taking on the sorts of risks you do when you know that failure goes unpunished. Obama's plan proposes to extend the size limits that already apply to deposit-taking banks to other parts of the financial system. With a well-implemented size limit, the government should be able to stare down the "let-me-fail-if-you-dare" threat that was used to such effect by Wall Street in 2008.
BANKS SHOULD BE SMALLER ANYWAY
Banks are pretty clearly too big and insufficiently competitive - how else can you explain the $1.2 trillion in "excess" profits that the sector has made in the last decade according to Deutsche Bank? Nor is it true that giant global businesses need to rely on giant global banks. That notion is "pure poppycock", says The EpicureanDealMaker blog, which is written by a New York banker in mergers and acquisitions. As he points out, "institutional clients make a point of using more than one investment or commercial bank for virtually all their financial transactions, no matter what they are. In fact, the bigger the deal, the more banks the customer usually uses. This is because banking clients want to make sure none of these oligopolist bastards has an exclusive right to grab the client by the short and curlies."
THE LEVY IS A GOOD WAY TO KEEP BANKS' RISK-TAKING UNDER SOME SORT OF CONTROL
Now that the casino aspects of banking are to be separated out, it seems an inspired idea to have a pop at the casino – especially since the casino operators have benefited so much from taxpayer bailouts. It’s good to think the taxpayer is getting some return, and good to know that the levy, by being based on the amount banks have lent above some minimum threshold, is designed to be more expensive the more risk a bank has taken on. More money for the taxpayer and less risk-taking by banks – what on earth is wrong with that? The only problem is that the levy does not go far enough: at 0.15% of assets above $50bn, it is designed only to recoup over many years the amount spent on bailouts, whereas it should be a permanent part of the landscape.
THIS ISN'T POPULISM, IT'S DEMOCRACY IN ACTION
The financial industry lobbied furiously during the boom-time to be allowed to carry on with their risky lending practices, and they have spent hundreds of millions on lobbying since then to make sure the gravy-train does not stop. The finance industry currently employs three lobbyists for every member of Congress. Along with the healthcare lobby, it is the biggest, best funded and most powerful group in Washington. Obama is at last getting tough with them – a long overdue reassertion that the good of all should be prioritised over the pay-packets of the few. Even if it took a defeat in Massachusetts to get Obama back on track, this is a splendid example of democracy at work.
CON
OBAMA’S REFORM MISSES THE TARGET ALTOGETHER
Proprietary trading by deposit-taking banks had little or nothing to do with the present crisis. The crisis came from the US mortgage market, which was the most heavily regulated part of the finance industry. The fund managers who bought the overly-complex securitised mortgage products could still have done so whether they acted as arms of deposit taking banks or not. In fact, the main source of the trouble had little to do with the big banks anyway: Lehman Brothers was not that big; Northern Rock in the UK was a small mortgage lender with no proprietary trading operations whatsoever.
THERE WAS A MUCH BETTER WAY OF ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM, ONE THAT WOULD ACTUALLY WORK
The root cause of the present crisis shouldn't be guessed at by making spurious comparisons with earlier historical eras. It was quite obvious: financial firms were able to take on too much risk, and didn’t have sufficient resources to cover it. The simple solution is to regulate leverage – that is, limit the amount that banks can lend out to a strict percentage of their safe, liquid assets. Even better, follow the proposal put forward by Britain’s Lord Turner, and grant central banks the power to vary the permitted leverage, tightening the limits at times when credit looks as if it may be getting out of control.
LIKE ALL POPULIST POLICY, THIS REFORM SOUNDS GREAT BUT CAN'T ACTUALLY BE IMPLEMENTED
There are just too many activities that a bank performs for its deposit clients or its borrowers that are indistinguishable from prop trading. When a bank trades a security for a client, it will hold that security for some period of time. When it makes a market, it needs to provide liquidity in this or that instrument and so expose itself to market movements. When it offers a fixed rate loan or a mortgage, it insures itself against exposure to interest rate movements with a derivative. In all this, how can a regulator tell what is prop trading and what is sound banking? You'll always be able to dress up the first as the second. Nomi Prins, a former director at Goldman Sachs, says that the way banks shift money from one part of their business to another is so opaque that the ban on proprietary trading will be impossible to police. "Bank of America, for example, has its fixed income, currency and commodities trading figures merged together, making it impossible to see the contribution of Merrill Lynch’s sizeable trading activities, as well as the line between proprietary and possibly customer-oriented trading." Making rules you can't police adds to the regulatory confusion that got us into this trouble in the first place. And anyway, it'll just push the banks to do their proprietary trading elsewhere: London, Singapore and Geneva just can't wait.
LARGE BANKS ARE POSITIVELY SAFER THAN SMALL BANKS
Obama wants to limit the size of all financial institutions. But the Great Depression saw linked runs on hundreds of small banks. Indeed, one of the real problems during a financial crisis is that no one knows if a counterparty will be good for their money. The more transactions happen within a single firm, the less uncertainty there is. The European-style "universal banks" like Deutsche Bank and Societe Generale combine deposit-taking, investment, trading, advisory and even insurance roles. They have been more resilient to crisis than specialised and quite small operations like Lehman Brothers. It all points to Obama's populism: design a plan that bashes the foreigners, undermines global solutions and appeals to stereotypes of the big bad corporation.
A GLOBAL ECONOMY CAN’T DO WITHOUT BIG BANKS
Even if a giant corporation spreads some of the financial risk between financial institutions, they still want to be dealing with major global banks. When Kraft Foods looks to raise $7 billion of debt to finance its takeover of Cadbury's, you can't expect it to have to go cap in hand to hundreds of small deposit-taking institutions to put a loan together. Business on a global scale is efficient and the path to economic growth everywhere. You need smoothly running capital markets to oil the wheels of globalisation, and artificial barriers to bank size will put a break on prosperity for all.
THE LEVY WILL BE CIRCUMVENTED - IT JUST MAKES MONEY FOR CORPORATE TAX LAWYERS
The levy is going to be based on banks' total US assets. But it is a simple matter for legal departments of banks to make assets appear where in the world they want. If Goldman Sachs in the US lends a hedge fund shares in Kraft Foods for the hedge fund to short them, that'll appear as a taxable asset under the levy. But assets and income can be moved around - a Goldman Sachs vehicle in the British Virgin Islands can enter the lending agreement with the hedge fund and no tax will be incurred. The levy just throws money at lawyers and reduces transparency. What is needed is a global regulatory system that does away with this wasteful game of cat and mouse.
OF COURSE IT'S POPULISM: OBAMA DESPERATELY NEEDED A BIT OF PUBLIC THEATRE
Obama’s first year in office has been a bit of a disaster: his healthcare plans have gone nowhere, unemployment has reached its highest for a quarter of a century, his approval rating has plummeted to around 50%. Then there was this January’s electoral humiliation, deep in supposedly Democrat territory, when an unknown Republican won Ted Kennedy’s old Senate seat in Massachusetts. So, with November’s mid-term elections fast approaching. Obama needed a media stunt which would appeal to working-class Americans, and take the focus off his failures. This populist assault on the money men of Wall St was just the ticket, especially with JP Morgan and Goldman Sachs reporting huge profits and bonus pools again. Indeed, Goldman delayed announcing record results until the day the Obama plan was announced, so diverting attention away from its embarrassment of wealth. In reality, we should actually be saluting the restoration of bank profits as the great achievement of the last few years and recognizing that a big part of repairing bank profitability has come from their proprietary trading desks. Which is why one might worry about Obama’s populist assault, were it not obvious that the administration isn’t really serious about getting tough. It’s shadow punching. Timothy Geithner, the Treasury Secretary, has on many occasions flatly repudiated the stated ambitions of the plan’s architect, Paul Volcker. Ben Bernanke, the Wall Street-friendly chairman of the central bank, looks certain to be reappointed. This is exactly how you'd expect an administration to behave when it was trying to say to Wall Street: "don't worry - we're just appeasing the mob".
Intelligence Squared Debate
29 Jan 2010
PRO
VOLCKER AND OBAMA’S REFORM HITS THE BULLS EYE: IT DIRECTLY TACKLES THE INHERENT DANGER
There’s a clear economic logic in insuring that from now on the basic utility aspects of banking – making ordinary loans to businesses and households and managing the nation’s payment system – is kept quite separate from the casino aspects of banking – all those credit default swaps, synthetic derivatives and special purpose vehicles which make up the hugely profitable but risky “proprietary trading arms” of the big banks. It was those "proprietary" activities that fuelled the bonanza in all those super dodgy mortgage-backed securities that led to the credit crunch of 2008. The new ban on insured, deposit-taking banks engaging in proprietary trading is a good first step on the road to total separation of these two activities.
THE REFORM IS GROUNDED IN THE LESSONS OF HISTORY
Between 1933 and the 1980s, finance was remarkably stable – and this was an era when the spheres of banking were kept safely separate by the Glass-Steagall Act in the USA and by various rules and regulations in the City of London. But then, when free-market Thatcher abolished the separations in London in 1986 and Clinton put the last nails into the coffin of Glass-Steagall in the late 90s, it was farewell stability; hello financial crisis. So even if economists find it hard to explain precisely why the separation worked, we should trust the historical evidence: the separation did work and Volcker's plans are a welcome return to responsible thinking.
THE REFORM RESTORES CRUCIAL ELEMENTS OF ACCOUNTABILITY AND CONTROL
Finance in the first decade of the 21st century had become too complicated to control; indeed, the sheer complexity of deregulated finance was a big part of what led to the crisis. Financial firms had lots of competing regulators with no one quite knowing what activity should be regulated where. What deregulation should have taught us is that financiers are endlessly creative at finding new ways to take gambles, and that we need protection from that sort of creativity. That’s where the ban on proprietary trading comes in: it returns us to some kind of transparency. By splitting proprietary and deposit-taking functions, regulators know who should be doing what, and keeping financiers to the rules becomes possible once again. In fact, Obama could go further in reestablishing transparency and insist on full disclosure of derivatives positions – something that would have really helped in spotting how much trouble Lehman's collapse was going to cause.
PUTTING A SIZE LIMIT ON BANKS IS AN ESSENTIAL ANTIDOTE TO THE "TOO BIG TO FAIL" PROBLEM
The terrible thing about big banks is that they can hold the whole economy hostage: "bail-us out or we'll sink you" is their basic message. And you can be sure that once they know they're in that position of strength, they'll use it...by taking on the sorts of risks you do when you know that failure goes unpunished. Obama's plan proposes to extend the size limits that already apply to deposit-taking banks to other parts of the financial system. With a well-implemented size limit, the government should be able to stare down the "let-me-fail-if-you-dare" threat that was used to such effect by Wall Street in 2008.
BANKS SHOULD BE SMALLER ANYWAY
Banks are pretty clearly too big and insufficiently competitive - how else can you explain the $1.2 trillion in "excess" profits that the sector has made in the last decade according to Deutsche Bank? Nor is it true that giant global businesses need to rely on giant global banks. That notion is "pure poppycock", says The EpicureanDealMaker blog, which is written by a New York banker in mergers and acquisitions. As he points out, "institutional clients make a point of using more than one investment or commercial bank for virtually all their financial transactions, no matter what they are. In fact, the bigger the deal, the more banks the customer usually uses. This is because banking clients want to make sure none of these oligopolist bastards has an exclusive right to grab the client by the short and curlies."
THE LEVY IS A GOOD WAY TO KEEP BANKS' RISK-TAKING UNDER SOME SORT OF CONTROL
Now that the casino aspects of banking are to be separated out, it seems an inspired idea to have a pop at the casino – especially since the casino operators have benefited so much from taxpayer bailouts. It’s good to think the taxpayer is getting some return, and good to know that the levy, by being based on the amount banks have lent above some minimum threshold, is designed to be more expensive the more risk a bank has taken on. More money for the taxpayer and less risk-taking by banks – what on earth is wrong with that? The only problem is that the levy does not go far enough: at 0.15% of assets above $50bn, it is designed only to recoup over many years the amount spent on bailouts, whereas it should be a permanent part of the landscape.
THIS ISN'T POPULISM, IT'S DEMOCRACY IN ACTION
The financial industry lobbied furiously during the boom-time to be allowed to carry on with their risky lending practices, and they have spent hundreds of millions on lobbying since then to make sure the gravy-train does not stop. The finance industry currently employs three lobbyists for every member of Congress. Along with the healthcare lobby, it is the biggest, best funded and most powerful group in Washington. Obama is at last getting tough with them – a long overdue reassertion that the good of all should be prioritised over the pay-packets of the few. Even if it took a defeat in Massachusetts to get Obama back on track, this is a splendid example of democracy at work.
CON
OBAMA’S REFORM MISSES THE TARGET ALTOGETHER
Proprietary trading by deposit-taking banks had little or nothing to do with the present crisis. The crisis came from the US mortgage market, which was the most heavily regulated part of the finance industry. The fund managers who bought the overly-complex securitised mortgage products could still have done so whether they acted as arms of deposit taking banks or not. In fact, the main source of the trouble had little to do with the big banks anyway: Lehman Brothers was not that big; Northern Rock in the UK was a small mortgage lender with no proprietary trading operations whatsoever.
THERE WAS A MUCH BETTER WAY OF ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM, ONE THAT WOULD ACTUALLY WORK
The root cause of the present crisis shouldn't be guessed at by making spurious comparisons with earlier historical eras. It was quite obvious: financial firms were able to take on too much risk, and didn’t have sufficient resources to cover it. The simple solution is to regulate leverage – that is, limit the amount that banks can lend out to a strict percentage of their safe, liquid assets. Even better, follow the proposal put forward by Britain’s Lord Turner, and grant central banks the power to vary the permitted leverage, tightening the limits at times when credit looks as if it may be getting out of control.
LIKE ALL POPULIST POLICY, THIS REFORM SOUNDS GREAT BUT CAN'T ACTUALLY BE IMPLEMENTED
There are just too many activities that a bank performs for its deposit clients or its borrowers that are indistinguishable from prop trading. When a bank trades a security for a client, it will hold that security for some period of time. When it makes a market, it needs to provide liquidity in this or that instrument and so expose itself to market movements. When it offers a fixed rate loan or a mortgage, it insures itself against exposure to interest rate movements with a derivative. In all this, how can a regulator tell what is prop trading and what is sound banking? You'll always be able to dress up the first as the second. Nomi Prins, a former director at Goldman Sachs, says that the way banks shift money from one part of their business to another is so opaque that the ban on proprietary trading will be impossible to police. "Bank of America, for example, has its fixed income, currency and commodities trading figures merged together, making it impossible to see the contribution of Merrill Lynch’s sizeable trading activities, as well as the line between proprietary and possibly customer-oriented trading." Making rules you can't police adds to the regulatory confusion that got us into this trouble in the first place. And anyway, it'll just push the banks to do their proprietary trading elsewhere: London, Singapore and Geneva just can't wait.
LARGE BANKS ARE POSITIVELY SAFER THAN SMALL BANKS
Obama wants to limit the size of all financial institutions. But the Great Depression saw linked runs on hundreds of small banks. Indeed, one of the real problems during a financial crisis is that no one knows if a counterparty will be good for their money. The more transactions happen within a single firm, the less uncertainty there is. The European-style "universal banks" like Deutsche Bank and Societe Generale combine deposit-taking, investment, trading, advisory and even insurance roles. They have been more resilient to crisis than specialised and quite small operations like Lehman Brothers. It all points to Obama's populism: design a plan that bashes the foreigners, undermines global solutions and appeals to stereotypes of the big bad corporation.
A GLOBAL ECONOMY CAN’T DO WITHOUT BIG BANKS
Even if a giant corporation spreads some of the financial risk between financial institutions, they still want to be dealing with major global banks. When Kraft Foods looks to raise $7 billion of debt to finance its takeover of Cadbury's, you can't expect it to have to go cap in hand to hundreds of small deposit-taking institutions to put a loan together. Business on a global scale is efficient and the path to economic growth everywhere. You need smoothly running capital markets to oil the wheels of globalisation, and artificial barriers to bank size will put a break on prosperity for all.
THE LEVY WILL BE CIRCUMVENTED - IT JUST MAKES MONEY FOR CORPORATE TAX LAWYERS
The levy is going to be based on banks' total US assets. But it is a simple matter for legal departments of banks to make assets appear where in the world they want. If Goldman Sachs in the US lends a hedge fund shares in Kraft Foods for the hedge fund to short them, that'll appear as a taxable asset under the levy. But assets and income can be moved around - a Goldman Sachs vehicle in the British Virgin Islands can enter the lending agreement with the hedge fund and no tax will be incurred. The levy just throws money at lawyers and reduces transparency. What is needed is a global regulatory system that does away with this wasteful game of cat and mouse.
OF COURSE IT'S POPULISM: OBAMA DESPERATELY NEEDED A BIT OF PUBLIC THEATRE
Obama’s first year in office has been a bit of a disaster: his healthcare plans have gone nowhere, unemployment has reached its highest for a quarter of a century, his approval rating has plummeted to around 50%. Then there was this January’s electoral humiliation, deep in supposedly Democrat territory, when an unknown Republican won Ted Kennedy’s old Senate seat in Massachusetts. So, with November’s mid-term elections fast approaching. Obama needed a media stunt which would appeal to working-class Americans, and take the focus off his failures. This populist assault on the money men of Wall St was just the ticket, especially with JP Morgan and Goldman Sachs reporting huge profits and bonus pools again. Indeed, Goldman delayed announcing record results until the day the Obama plan was announced, so diverting attention away from its embarrassment of wealth. In reality, we should actually be saluting the restoration of bank profits as the great achievement of the last few years and recognizing that a big part of repairing bank profitability has come from their proprietary trading desks. Which is why one might worry about Obama’s populist assault, were it not obvious that the administration isn’t really serious about getting tough. It’s shadow punching. Timothy Geithner, the Treasury Secretary, has on many occasions flatly repudiated the stated ambitions of the plan’s architect, Paul Volcker. Ben Bernanke, the Wall Street-friendly chairman of the central bank, looks certain to be reappointed. This is exactly how you'd expect an administration to behave when it was trying to say to Wall Street: "don't worry - we're just appeasing the mob".
Friday, January 15, 2010
Gladwell! Pinker! Fight! Fight!
Gladwell and Pinker have a polite falling out:
http://gladwell.typepad.com/gladwellcom/2009/11/pinker-on-what-the-dog-saw.html
http://gladwell.typepad.com/gladwellcom/2009/11/pinker-on-what-the-dog-saw.html
Monday, January 11, 2010
Oops - Oliver Stoned does it again!
'Talking to critics, Stone, a three-times Oscar winner, explained that Hitler had been “an easy scapegoat throughout history” and that his new series would put things into their proper context. “We can't judge people as only 'bad' or 'good'. [Hitler] is the product of a series of actions,” he noted. “It's cause and effect.”
Stalin, that other product of events, would also be subject of a “more factual representation”, Stone added.
Now, joking aside, there are two things that are grim about this. The first is the obvious gripe about gross moral relativism. It seems to me to be fairly clear that moral absolutes do exist, and herding off millions of people to gas chambers or gulags puts you beyond them.
Secondly, it is shocking that Stone feels it necessary to explain that history needs context – as though this fact has escaped his less beady-eyed peers. Ian Kershaw, whose superlative biography of Hitler is divided into two volumes, the first entitled “Hubris: 1889-1936” may feel he has spotted the link, as Stone so eloquently puts it, between “cause and effect”.
If America really does need enlightening on this fact then we are all in trouble. But in the meantime, Stone’s real achievement is to have said something so banal and yet so offensive.'
Article here
Stalin, that other product of events, would also be subject of a “more factual representation”, Stone added.
Now, joking aside, there are two things that are grim about this. The first is the obvious gripe about gross moral relativism. It seems to me to be fairly clear that moral absolutes do exist, and herding off millions of people to gas chambers or gulags puts you beyond them.
Secondly, it is shocking that Stone feels it necessary to explain that history needs context – as though this fact has escaped his less beady-eyed peers. Ian Kershaw, whose superlative biography of Hitler is divided into two volumes, the first entitled “Hubris: 1889-1936” may feel he has spotted the link, as Stone so eloquently puts it, between “cause and effect”.
If America really does need enlightening on this fact then we are all in trouble. But in the meantime, Stone’s real achievement is to have said something so banal and yet so offensive.'
Article here
Thursday, January 07, 2010
Provocative processions
Oliver kamm on Wootton Bassett and the battle of Cable Street:
"Padraig Reidy of Index on Censorship, an invaluable free-speech pressure group, comments on the proposed march by an Islamist buffoon, Anjem Choudary, and his supporters in Wootton Bassett. He concludes:
"Support for free expression includes support for the right to expression of “particularly offensive” sentiments (though not support for the sentiments themselves). It would follow then, that Choudary and his friends should be allowed to march through Wooton Bassett without hindrance. But does this mean the residents of Cable Street were wrong?"
I entirely agree with Padraig about the demonstration. Wootton Bassett is not hallowed ground, and the right to assembly extends to those who hold obnoxious views, in the same way that the right to free speech extends to racists and Holocaust deniers. But I'll have a go at answering his question.
Yes, those who tried to stop the British Union of Fascists from marching in the East End in October 1936 were wrong. The BUF had a democratic right to march in peacetime, and the attempt to stop them did them a power of good. Mosley was looking for a way to call it off anyway, so that he could get to Berlin and secretly marry Diana Mitford Guinness in Goebbels's drawing room (which he managed to do two days later). Support for Mosley in the East End increased after the Battle of Cable Street, as did antisemitic violence. Thugs attacked Jews and their properties, in the so-called Pogrom of Mile End, a week later.
In the end, despite an appalling failure among leaders of the main parties in the 1930s (Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain, Herbert Samuel and the ineffably foolish George Lansbury) to recognise the threat from the dictators, it was democratic politics that defeated Mosley and secured economic recovery, not opposition on the streets. When he was interned in 1940, Mosley was a permanently discredited figure."
"Padraig Reidy of Index on Censorship, an invaluable free-speech pressure group, comments on the proposed march by an Islamist buffoon, Anjem Choudary, and his supporters in Wootton Bassett. He concludes:
"Support for free expression includes support for the right to expression of “particularly offensive” sentiments (though not support for the sentiments themselves). It would follow then, that Choudary and his friends should be allowed to march through Wooton Bassett without hindrance. But does this mean the residents of Cable Street were wrong?"
I entirely agree with Padraig about the demonstration. Wootton Bassett is not hallowed ground, and the right to assembly extends to those who hold obnoxious views, in the same way that the right to free speech extends to racists and Holocaust deniers. But I'll have a go at answering his question.
Yes, those who tried to stop the British Union of Fascists from marching in the East End in October 1936 were wrong. The BUF had a democratic right to march in peacetime, and the attempt to stop them did them a power of good. Mosley was looking for a way to call it off anyway, so that he could get to Berlin and secretly marry Diana Mitford Guinness in Goebbels's drawing room (which he managed to do two days later). Support for Mosley in the East End increased after the Battle of Cable Street, as did antisemitic violence. Thugs attacked Jews and their properties, in the so-called Pogrom of Mile End, a week later.
In the end, despite an appalling failure among leaders of the main parties in the 1930s (Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain, Herbert Samuel and the ineffably foolish George Lansbury) to recognise the threat from the dictators, it was democratic politics that defeated Mosley and secured economic recovery, not opposition on the streets. When he was interned in 1940, Mosley was a permanently discredited figure."
Anti-semitism vs anti-Zionism - Dershowitz
With the upcoming (12/01/10) documentary Defamation on Channel 4, featuring amongst others the charming Norman Finkelstein, the ever clear-thinking Alan Dershowitz provides a checklist for distinguishing anti-semitism and anti-Zionism:
When Legit Criticism Crosses the Anti-Semitism Line
Alan Dershowitz
Huffington Post
01/07/05
...
A CHECKLIST OF FACTORS THAT TEND TO INDICATE ANTI-SEMITISM
1. Employing stereotypes against Israel that have traditionally been directed against "the Jews." For example, portraying Israel as devouring the blood of children or characterizing Israeli leaders with long hook noses or rapacious looks.
2. Comparing Israel to the Nazis or its leaders to Hitler, the German army, or the Gestapo.
3. Characterizing Israel as “the worst,” when it is clear that this is not an accurate comparative assessment.
4. Invoking anti-Jewish religious symbols or caricaturing Jewish religious symbols.
5. Singling out only Israel for sanctions for policies that are widespread among other nations, or demanding that Jews be better or more moral than others because of their history as victims.
6. Discriminating against individuals only because they are Jewish Israelis, without regard to their individual views or actions.
7. Emphasizing and stereotyping certain characteristics among supporters of Israel that have traditionally been used in anti-Semitic attacks, for example, “pushy” American Jews, Jews “who control the media,” and Jews “who control financial markets.”
8. Blaming all Jews or “the Jews” for Israel’s policies or imperfections.
9. Physically or verbally attacking Jewish institutions, such as synagogues or cemeteries, as a means of protesting against Israel.
10. Stereotyping all Jews as fitting into a particular political configuration (such as “neo-conservatives,” Zionists, or supporters of Sharon).
11. Accusing Jews and only Jews of having dual loyalty.
12. Blaming Israel for the problems of the world and exaggerating the influence of the Jewish state on world affairs.
13. Denying, minimizing, or trivializing the Holocaust as part of a campaign against Israel.
14. Discriminating against only Israel in its qualification for certain positions or statuses, such as on the Security Council, the International Court of Justice, and the International Red Cross.
15. Blaming the Jews or Israel, rather than the anti-Semites, for anti-Semitism or for increases in anti-Jewish attitudes.
16. Taking extreme pleasure from Israeli failures, imperfections, or troubles.
17. Falsely claiming that all legitimate criticism of Israeli policies is immediately and widely condemned by Jewish leaders as anti-Semitic, despite any evidence to support this accusation.
18. Denying that even core anti-Semitism—racial stereotypes, Nazi comparisons, desecration of synagogues, Holocaust denial—qualifies as anti-Semitic.
19. Seeking to delegitimate Israel precisely as it moves toward peace.
20. Circulating wild charges against Israel and Jews, such as that they were responsible for the September 11 attacks, the anthrax attacks, and the 2005 tsunami.
A CHECKLIST OF FACTORS THAT TEND TO INDICATE LEGITIMATE CRITICISM OF ISRAEL
1. The criticism is directed at specific policies of Israel, rather than at the very legitimacy of the state.
2. The degree and level of criticism vary with changes in Israel’s policies.
3. The criticism is comparative and contextual.
4. The criticism is political, military, economic, and so forth, rather than ethnic or religious.
5. The criticism is similar to criticism being raised by mainstream Israeli dissidents.
6. The criticism is leveled by people who have a history of leveling comparable criticisms at other nations with comparable or worse records.
7. The criticism is designed to bring about positive changes in Israeli policies.
8. The criticism is part of a more general and comparative criticism of all other nations.
9. The criticism is based on objective facts rather than name calling or polemics.
10. The critic subjects his favorite nation to comparable criticism for comparable faults.
...
When Legit Criticism Crosses the Anti-Semitism Line
Alan Dershowitz
Huffington Post
01/07/05
...
A CHECKLIST OF FACTORS THAT TEND TO INDICATE ANTI-SEMITISM
1. Employing stereotypes against Israel that have traditionally been directed against "the Jews." For example, portraying Israel as devouring the blood of children or characterizing Israeli leaders with long hook noses or rapacious looks.
2. Comparing Israel to the Nazis or its leaders to Hitler, the German army, or the Gestapo.
3. Characterizing Israel as “the worst,” when it is clear that this is not an accurate comparative assessment.
4. Invoking anti-Jewish religious symbols or caricaturing Jewish religious symbols.
5. Singling out only Israel for sanctions for policies that are widespread among other nations, or demanding that Jews be better or more moral than others because of their history as victims.
6. Discriminating against individuals only because they are Jewish Israelis, without regard to their individual views or actions.
7. Emphasizing and stereotyping certain characteristics among supporters of Israel that have traditionally been used in anti-Semitic attacks, for example, “pushy” American Jews, Jews “who control the media,” and Jews “who control financial markets.”
8. Blaming all Jews or “the Jews” for Israel’s policies or imperfections.
9. Physically or verbally attacking Jewish institutions, such as synagogues or cemeteries, as a means of protesting against Israel.
10. Stereotyping all Jews as fitting into a particular political configuration (such as “neo-conservatives,” Zionists, or supporters of Sharon).
11. Accusing Jews and only Jews of having dual loyalty.
12. Blaming Israel for the problems of the world and exaggerating the influence of the Jewish state on world affairs.
13. Denying, minimizing, or trivializing the Holocaust as part of a campaign against Israel.
14. Discriminating against only Israel in its qualification for certain positions or statuses, such as on the Security Council, the International Court of Justice, and the International Red Cross.
15. Blaming the Jews or Israel, rather than the anti-Semites, for anti-Semitism or for increases in anti-Jewish attitudes.
16. Taking extreme pleasure from Israeli failures, imperfections, or troubles.
17. Falsely claiming that all legitimate criticism of Israeli policies is immediately and widely condemned by Jewish leaders as anti-Semitic, despite any evidence to support this accusation.
18. Denying that even core anti-Semitism—racial stereotypes, Nazi comparisons, desecration of synagogues, Holocaust denial—qualifies as anti-Semitic.
19. Seeking to delegitimate Israel precisely as it moves toward peace.
20. Circulating wild charges against Israel and Jews, such as that they were responsible for the September 11 attacks, the anthrax attacks, and the 2005 tsunami.
A CHECKLIST OF FACTORS THAT TEND TO INDICATE LEGITIMATE CRITICISM OF ISRAEL
1. The criticism is directed at specific policies of Israel, rather than at the very legitimacy of the state.
2. The degree and level of criticism vary with changes in Israel’s policies.
3. The criticism is comparative and contextual.
4. The criticism is political, military, economic, and so forth, rather than ethnic or religious.
5. The criticism is similar to criticism being raised by mainstream Israeli dissidents.
6. The criticism is leveled by people who have a history of leveling comparable criticisms at other nations with comparable or worse records.
7. The criticism is designed to bring about positive changes in Israeli policies.
8. The criticism is part of a more general and comparative criticism of all other nations.
9. The criticism is based on objective facts rather than name calling or polemics.
10. The critic subjects his favorite nation to comparable criticism for comparable faults.
...
Sunday, January 03, 2010
Guantanamo
Amazing we've never had a Guantánamo Bay thread, so am starting one now.
Why now? Well, in view of Obama's failure to close Guantanamo as promised, and the involvement of AQAP (Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) - some of whose leaders are ex-Guantanamo detainees - in Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab's failed attempt to blow up a Christmas Day flight from Amsterdam to Detroit, now seems as good a time as any.
I've posted a Stratfor article below on the difficulties of dealing with suspected al-Qaeda types apprehended in a war zone. They are neither soldiers nor normal criminals, hence the legal limbo. I wouldn't wanna be in Obama's shoes trying to decide what to do with these people.
------------
Obama admits Guantanamo won't close by Jan. deadline
Washington Post
November 18, 2009
------------
"I Had a Good Time at Guantánamo, Says Inmate"
by Daniel Pipes
February 8, 2004
------------
Freed by the U.S., Saudi Becomes a Qaeda Chief
New York Times
January 22, 2009
The emergence of a former Guantánamo Bay detainee as the deputy leader of Al Qaeda’s Yemeni branch has underscored the potential complications in carrying out the executive order President Obama signed Thursday that the detention center be shut down within a year.
The militant, Said Ali al-Shihri, is suspected of involvement in a deadly bombing of the United States Embassy in Yemen’s capital, Sana, in September. He was released to Saudi Arabia in 2007 and passed through a Saudi rehabilitation program for former jihadists before resurfacing with Al Qaeda in Yemen.
The new Al-Qaeda chiefs bringing terror to the world
The Sunday Times
January 3, 2010
Said Ali al-Shihri
Said Ali al-Shihri
Wikipedia
------------
Deciphering the Mohammed Trial
November 16, 2009
Stratfor Geopolitical Intelligence Reports
By George Friedman
U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder has decided that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed will be tried in federal court in New York. Holder’s decision was driven by the need for the U.S. government to decide how to dispose of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, a U.S. Naval base outside the boundaries of the United States selected as the camp in which to hold suspected al Qaeda members.
We very carefully use the word “camp” rather than prison or prisoner of war camp. This is because of an ongoing and profound ambiguity not only in U.S. government perceptions of how to define those held there, but also due to uncertainties in international law, particularly with regard to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Were the U.S. facility at Guantanamo a prison, then its residents would be criminals. If it were a POW camp, then they would be enemy soldiers being held under the rules of war. It has never really been decided which these men are, and therefore their legal standing has remained unclear.
WAR VS. CRIMINAL JUSTICE
The ambiguity began shortly after 9/11, when then-U.S. President George W. Bush defined two missions: waging a war on terror, and bringing Osama bin Laden and his followers to justice. Both made for good rhetoric. But they also were fundamentally contradictory. A war is not a judicial inquiry, and a criminal investigation is not part of war.
An analogy might be drawn from Pearl Harbor. Imagine that in addition to stating that the United States was at war with Japan, Franklin Roosevelt also called for bringing the individual Japanese pilots who struck Hawaii to justice under American law. This would make no sense. As an act of war, the Japanese action fell under the rules of war as provided for in international law, the U.S. Constitution and the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Japanese pilots could not be held individually responsible for the lawful order they received. In the same sense, trying to bring soldiers to trial in a civilian court in the United States would make no sense. Creating a mission in which individual Japanese airmen would be hunted down and tried under the rules of evidence not only would make no sense, it would be impossible. Building a case against them individually also would be impossible. Judges would rule on evidence, on whether an unprejudiced jury could be found, and so on. None of this happened, of course — World War II was a war, not a judicial inquiry.
It is important to consider how wars are conducted. Enemy soldiers are not shot or captured because of what they have done; they are shot and captured because of who they are — members of an enemy military force. War, once launched, is pre-emptive. Soldiers are killed or captured in the course of fighting enemy forces, or even before they have carried out hostile acts. Soldiers are not held responsible for their actions, but neither are they immune to attack just because they have not done anything. Guilt and innocence do not enter into the equation. Certainly, if war crimes are in question, charges may be brought; the UCMJ determines how they will be tried by U.S. forces. Soldiers are tried by courts-martial, not by civilian courts, because of their status as soldiers. Soldiers are tried by a jury of their peers, and their peers are held to be other soldiers.
International law is actually not particularly ambiguous about the status of the members of al Qaeda. The Geneva Conventions do not apply to them because they have not adhered to a fundamental requirement of the Geneva Conventions, namely, identifying themselves as soldiers of an army. Doing so does not mean they must wear a uniform. The postwar Geneva Conventions make room for partisans, something older versions of the conventions did not. A partisan is not a uniformed fighter, but he must wear some form of insignia identifying himself as a soldier to enjoy the conventions’ protections. As Article 4.1.6 puts it, prisoners of war include “Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war.” The Geneva Conventions of 1949 does not mention, nor provide protection to, civilians attacking foreign countries without openly carrying arms.
The reasoning behind this is important. During the Franco-Prussian war, French franc-tireurs fired on Prussian soldiers. Ununiformed and without insignia, they melded into the crowd. It was impossible for the Prussians to distinguish between civilians and soldiers, so they fired on both, and civilian casualties resulted. The framers of the Geneva Conventions held the franc-tireurs, not the Prussian soldiers, responsible for the casualties. Their failure to be in uniform forced the Prussians to defend themselves at the cost of civilian lives. The franc-tireurs were seen as using civilians as camouflage. This was regarded as outside the rules of war, and those who carried out such acts were seen as not protected by the conventions. They were not soldiers, and were not to be treated as such.
An Ambiguous Status
Extending protections to partisans following World War II was seen as a major concession. It was done with concerns that it not be extended so far that combatants of irregular forces could legally operate using their ability to blend in with surrounding civilians, and hence a requirement of wearing armbands. The status of purely covert operatives remained unchanged: They were not protected under the Geneva Conventions. Their status remained ambiguous.
During World War II, it was U.S. Army practice to hold perfunctory trials followed by executions. During the Battle of the Bulge, German commandos captured wearing U.S. uniforms — in violation of the Geneva Conventions — were summarily tried in field courts-martial and executed. The idea that such individuals were to be handed over to civilian courts was never considered. The actions of al Qaeda simply were not anticipated in the Geneva Conventions. And to the extent they were expected, they violated the conventions.
Holder’s decision to transfer Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to federal court makes it clear that Mohammed was not a soldier acting in time of war, but a criminal. While during times of war spies are tried as criminals, their status is precarious, particularly if they are members of an enemy army. Enemy soldiers out of uniform carrying out reconnaissance or espionage are subject to military, not civilian, justice, and frequently are executed. A spy captured in the course of collecting information is a civilian, particularly in peacetime, and normally is tried as a criminal with rules of evidence.
Which was Mohammed? Under the Geneva Conventions, his actions in organizing the Sept. 11 attacks, which were carried out without uniforms or other badges of a combatant, denies him status and protection as a POW. Logically, he is therefore a criminal, but if he is, consider the consequences.
Criminal law is focused on punishments meted out after the fact. They rarely have been preventive measures. In either case, they follow strict rules of evidence, require certain treatments of prisoners and so on. For example, prisoners have to be read the Miranda warning. Soldiers are not policeman. They are not trained or expected to protect the legal rights of captives save as POWs under the UCMJ, nor protect the chain of custody of evidence nor countless other things that are required in a civilian court. In criminal law, it is assumed that law enforcement has captured the prisoner and is well-versed in these rules. In this case, the capture was made without any consideration of these matters, nor would one expect such consideration.
Consider further the role of U.S. covert operations in these captures. The United States conducts covert operations in which operatives work out of uniform and are generally not members of the military. Operating outside the United States, they are not protected by U.S. law although they do operate under the laws and regulations promulgated by the U.S. government. Much of their operations run counter to international and national law. At the same time, their operations are accepted as best practices by the international system. Some operate under cover of diplomatic immunity but carry out operations incompatible with their status as diplomats. Others operate without official cover. Should those under unofficial cover be captured, their treatment falls under local law, if such exists. The Geneva Conventions do not apply to them, nor was it intended to.
Spies, saboteurs and terrorists fall outside the realm of international law. This class of actors falls under the category of national law, leaving open the question of their liability if they conduct acts inimical to a third country. Who has jurisdiction? The United States is claiming that Mohammed is to be tried under the criminal code of the United States for actions planned in Afghanistan but carried out by others in the United States. It is a defensible position, but where does this leave American intelligence planners working at CIA headquarters for actions carried out by others in a third country? Are they subject to prosecution in the third country? Those captured in the third country clearly are, but the claim here is that Mohammed is subject to prosecution under U.S. laws for actions carried out by others in the United States. And that creates an interesting reciprocal liability.
A FAILURE TO EVOLVE
The fact is that international law has not evolved to deal with persons like Mohammed. Or more precisely, most legal discussion under international law is moving counter to the Geneva Conventions’ intent, which was to treat the franc-tireurs as unworthy of legal protection because they were not soldiers and were violating the rules of war. International law wants to push Mohammed into a category where he doesn’t fit, providing protections that are not apparent under the Geneva Conventions. The United States has shoved him into U.S. criminal law, where he doesn’t fit either, unless the United States is prepared to accept reciprocal liability for CIA personnel based in the United States planning and supporting operations in third countries. The United States has never claimed, for example, that the KGB planners who operated agents in the United States on behalf of the Soviet Union were themselves subject to criminal prosecution.
A new variety of warfare has emerged in which treatment as a traditional POW doesn’t apply and criminal law doesn’t work. Criminal law creates liabilities the United States doesn’t want to incur, and it is not geared to deal with a terrorist like Mohammed. U.S. criminal law assumes that capture is in the hands of law enforcement officials. Rights are prescribed and demanded, including having lawyers present and so forth. Such protections are practically and theoretically absurd in this case: Mohammed is not a soldier and he is not a suspected criminal presumed innocent until proven guilty. Law enforcement is not a practical counter to al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. A nation cannot move from the rules of counterterrorism to an American courtroom; they are incompatible modes of operation. Nor can a nation use the code of criminal procedures against a terrorist organization operating transnationally. Instead, they must be stopped before they commit their action, and issuing search warrants and allowing attorneys present at questioning is not an option.
Therefore — and now we move to the political reality — it is difficult to imagine how the evidence accumulated against Mohammed could enter a courtroom. Ignoring the methods of questioning, which is a separate issue, how can one prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt without compromising sources and methods, and why should one? Mohammed was on a battlefield but not operating as a soldier. Imagine doing criminal forensics on a battlefield to prove the criminal liability of German commandos wearing American uniforms.
In our mind, there is a very real possibility that Mohammed could be found not guilty in a courtroom. The cases of O.J. Simpson and of Jewish Defense League head Rabbi Meir Kahane’s killer, El Sayyid Nosair — both found not guilty despite overwhelming evidence — come to mind. Juries do strange things, particularly amid what will be the greatest media circus imaginable in the media capital of the world.
But it may not be the jury that is the problem. A federal judge will have to ask the question of whether prejudicial publicity of such magnitude has occurred that Mohammed can’t receive a fair trial. (This is probably true.) Questions will be raised about whether he has received proper legal counsel, which undoubtedly he hasn’t. Issues about the chain of custody of evidence will be raised; given that he was held by troops and agents, and not by law enforcement, the chances of compromised evidence is likely. The issue of torture will, of course, also be raised but that really isn’t the main problem. How do you try a man under U.S. legal procedures who was captured in a third country by non-law enforcement personnel, and who has been in military custody for seven years?
There is a nontrivial possibility that he will be acquitted or have his case thrown out of court, which would be a foreign policy disaster for the United States. Some might view it as a sign of American adherence to the rule of law and be impressed, others might be convinced that Mohammed was not guilty in more than a legal sense and was held unjustly, and others might think the United States has bungled another matter.
The real problem here is international law, which does not address acts of war committed by non-state actors out of uniform. Or more precisely, it does, but leaves them deliberately in a state of legal limbo, with captors left free to deal with them as they wish. If the international legal community does not like the latter, it is time they did the hard work of defining precisely how a nation deals with an act of war carried out under these circumstances.
The international legal community has been quite vocal in condemning American treatment of POWs after 9/11, but it hasn’t evolved international law, even theoretically, to cope with this. Sept. 11 is not a crime in the proper sense of the term, and prosecuting the guilty is not the goal. Instead, it was an act of war carried out outside the confines of the Geneva Conventions. The U.S. goal is destroying al Qaeda so that it can no longer function, not punishing those who have acted. Similarly the goal in 1941 was not punishing the Japanese pilots at Pearl Harbor but destroying the Japanese Empire, and any Japanese soldier was a target who could be killed without trial in the course of combat. If it wishes to solve this problem, international law will have to recognize that al Qaeda committed an act of war, and its destruction has legal sanction without judicial review. And if some sort of protection is to be provided al Qaeda operatives out of uniform, then the Geneva Conventions must be changed, and with it the status of spies and saboteurs of all countries.
Holder has opened up an extraordinarily complex can of worms with this decision. As U.S. attorney general, he has committed himself to proving Mohammed’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt while guaranteeing that his constitutional rights (for a non-U.S. citizen captured and held outside the United States under extraordinary circumstances by individuals not trained as law enforcement personnel, no less) are protected. It is Holder’s duty to ensure Mohammed’s prosecution, conviction and fair treatment under the law. It is hard to see how he can.
Whatever the politics of this decision — and all such decisions have political dimensions — the real problem faced by both the Obama and Bush administrations has been the failure of international law to evolve to provide guidance on dealing with combatants such as al Qaeda. International law has clung to a model of law governing a very different type of warfare despite new realities. International law must therefore either reaffirm the doctrine that combatants who do not distinguish themselves from noncombatants are not due the protections of international law, or it must clearly define what those protections are. Otherwise, international law discredits itself.
Why now? Well, in view of Obama's failure to close Guantanamo as promised, and the involvement of AQAP (Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) - some of whose leaders are ex-Guantanamo detainees - in Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab's failed attempt to blow up a Christmas Day flight from Amsterdam to Detroit, now seems as good a time as any.
I've posted a Stratfor article below on the difficulties of dealing with suspected al-Qaeda types apprehended in a war zone. They are neither soldiers nor normal criminals, hence the legal limbo. I wouldn't wanna be in Obama's shoes trying to decide what to do with these people.
------------
Obama admits Guantanamo won't close by Jan. deadline
Washington Post
November 18, 2009
------------
"I Had a Good Time at Guantánamo, Says Inmate"
by Daniel Pipes
February 8, 2004
------------
Freed by the U.S., Saudi Becomes a Qaeda Chief
New York Times
January 22, 2009
The emergence of a former Guantánamo Bay detainee as the deputy leader of Al Qaeda’s Yemeni branch has underscored the potential complications in carrying out the executive order President Obama signed Thursday that the detention center be shut down within a year.
The militant, Said Ali al-Shihri, is suspected of involvement in a deadly bombing of the United States Embassy in Yemen’s capital, Sana, in September. He was released to Saudi Arabia in 2007 and passed through a Saudi rehabilitation program for former jihadists before resurfacing with Al Qaeda in Yemen.
The new Al-Qaeda chiefs bringing terror to the world
The Sunday Times
January 3, 2010
Said Ali al-Shihri
Said Ali al-Shihri
Wikipedia
------------
Deciphering the Mohammed Trial
November 16, 2009
Stratfor Geopolitical Intelligence Reports
By George Friedman
U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder has decided that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed will be tried in federal court in New York. Holder’s decision was driven by the need for the U.S. government to decide how to dispose of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, a U.S. Naval base outside the boundaries of the United States selected as the camp in which to hold suspected al Qaeda members.
We very carefully use the word “camp” rather than prison or prisoner of war camp. This is because of an ongoing and profound ambiguity not only in U.S. government perceptions of how to define those held there, but also due to uncertainties in international law, particularly with regard to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Were the U.S. facility at Guantanamo a prison, then its residents would be criminals. If it were a POW camp, then they would be enemy soldiers being held under the rules of war. It has never really been decided which these men are, and therefore their legal standing has remained unclear.
WAR VS. CRIMINAL JUSTICE
The ambiguity began shortly after 9/11, when then-U.S. President George W. Bush defined two missions: waging a war on terror, and bringing Osama bin Laden and his followers to justice. Both made for good rhetoric. But they also were fundamentally contradictory. A war is not a judicial inquiry, and a criminal investigation is not part of war.
An analogy might be drawn from Pearl Harbor. Imagine that in addition to stating that the United States was at war with Japan, Franklin Roosevelt also called for bringing the individual Japanese pilots who struck Hawaii to justice under American law. This would make no sense. As an act of war, the Japanese action fell under the rules of war as provided for in international law, the U.S. Constitution and the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Japanese pilots could not be held individually responsible for the lawful order they received. In the same sense, trying to bring soldiers to trial in a civilian court in the United States would make no sense. Creating a mission in which individual Japanese airmen would be hunted down and tried under the rules of evidence not only would make no sense, it would be impossible. Building a case against them individually also would be impossible. Judges would rule on evidence, on whether an unprejudiced jury could be found, and so on. None of this happened, of course — World War II was a war, not a judicial inquiry.
It is important to consider how wars are conducted. Enemy soldiers are not shot or captured because of what they have done; they are shot and captured because of who they are — members of an enemy military force. War, once launched, is pre-emptive. Soldiers are killed or captured in the course of fighting enemy forces, or even before they have carried out hostile acts. Soldiers are not held responsible for their actions, but neither are they immune to attack just because they have not done anything. Guilt and innocence do not enter into the equation. Certainly, if war crimes are in question, charges may be brought; the UCMJ determines how they will be tried by U.S. forces. Soldiers are tried by courts-martial, not by civilian courts, because of their status as soldiers. Soldiers are tried by a jury of their peers, and their peers are held to be other soldiers.
International law is actually not particularly ambiguous about the status of the members of al Qaeda. The Geneva Conventions do not apply to them because they have not adhered to a fundamental requirement of the Geneva Conventions, namely, identifying themselves as soldiers of an army. Doing so does not mean they must wear a uniform. The postwar Geneva Conventions make room for partisans, something older versions of the conventions did not. A partisan is not a uniformed fighter, but he must wear some form of insignia identifying himself as a soldier to enjoy the conventions’ protections. As Article 4.1.6 puts it, prisoners of war include “Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war.” The Geneva Conventions of 1949 does not mention, nor provide protection to, civilians attacking foreign countries without openly carrying arms.
The reasoning behind this is important. During the Franco-Prussian war, French franc-tireurs fired on Prussian soldiers. Ununiformed and without insignia, they melded into the crowd. It was impossible for the Prussians to distinguish between civilians and soldiers, so they fired on both, and civilian casualties resulted. The framers of the Geneva Conventions held the franc-tireurs, not the Prussian soldiers, responsible for the casualties. Their failure to be in uniform forced the Prussians to defend themselves at the cost of civilian lives. The franc-tireurs were seen as using civilians as camouflage. This was regarded as outside the rules of war, and those who carried out such acts were seen as not protected by the conventions. They were not soldiers, and were not to be treated as such.
An Ambiguous Status
Extending protections to partisans following World War II was seen as a major concession. It was done with concerns that it not be extended so far that combatants of irregular forces could legally operate using their ability to blend in with surrounding civilians, and hence a requirement of wearing armbands. The status of purely covert operatives remained unchanged: They were not protected under the Geneva Conventions. Their status remained ambiguous.
During World War II, it was U.S. Army practice to hold perfunctory trials followed by executions. During the Battle of the Bulge, German commandos captured wearing U.S. uniforms — in violation of the Geneva Conventions — were summarily tried in field courts-martial and executed. The idea that such individuals were to be handed over to civilian courts was never considered. The actions of al Qaeda simply were not anticipated in the Geneva Conventions. And to the extent they were expected, they violated the conventions.
Holder’s decision to transfer Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to federal court makes it clear that Mohammed was not a soldier acting in time of war, but a criminal. While during times of war spies are tried as criminals, their status is precarious, particularly if they are members of an enemy army. Enemy soldiers out of uniform carrying out reconnaissance or espionage are subject to military, not civilian, justice, and frequently are executed. A spy captured in the course of collecting information is a civilian, particularly in peacetime, and normally is tried as a criminal with rules of evidence.
Which was Mohammed? Under the Geneva Conventions, his actions in organizing the Sept. 11 attacks, which were carried out without uniforms or other badges of a combatant, denies him status and protection as a POW. Logically, he is therefore a criminal, but if he is, consider the consequences.
Criminal law is focused on punishments meted out after the fact. They rarely have been preventive measures. In either case, they follow strict rules of evidence, require certain treatments of prisoners and so on. For example, prisoners have to be read the Miranda warning. Soldiers are not policeman. They are not trained or expected to protect the legal rights of captives save as POWs under the UCMJ, nor protect the chain of custody of evidence nor countless other things that are required in a civilian court. In criminal law, it is assumed that law enforcement has captured the prisoner and is well-versed in these rules. In this case, the capture was made without any consideration of these matters, nor would one expect such consideration.
Consider further the role of U.S. covert operations in these captures. The United States conducts covert operations in which operatives work out of uniform and are generally not members of the military. Operating outside the United States, they are not protected by U.S. law although they do operate under the laws and regulations promulgated by the U.S. government. Much of their operations run counter to international and national law. At the same time, their operations are accepted as best practices by the international system. Some operate under cover of diplomatic immunity but carry out operations incompatible with their status as diplomats. Others operate without official cover. Should those under unofficial cover be captured, their treatment falls under local law, if such exists. The Geneva Conventions do not apply to them, nor was it intended to.
Spies, saboteurs and terrorists fall outside the realm of international law. This class of actors falls under the category of national law, leaving open the question of their liability if they conduct acts inimical to a third country. Who has jurisdiction? The United States is claiming that Mohammed is to be tried under the criminal code of the United States for actions planned in Afghanistan but carried out by others in the United States. It is a defensible position, but where does this leave American intelligence planners working at CIA headquarters for actions carried out by others in a third country? Are they subject to prosecution in the third country? Those captured in the third country clearly are, but the claim here is that Mohammed is subject to prosecution under U.S. laws for actions carried out by others in the United States. And that creates an interesting reciprocal liability.
A FAILURE TO EVOLVE
The fact is that international law has not evolved to deal with persons like Mohammed. Or more precisely, most legal discussion under international law is moving counter to the Geneva Conventions’ intent, which was to treat the franc-tireurs as unworthy of legal protection because they were not soldiers and were violating the rules of war. International law wants to push Mohammed into a category where he doesn’t fit, providing protections that are not apparent under the Geneva Conventions. The United States has shoved him into U.S. criminal law, where he doesn’t fit either, unless the United States is prepared to accept reciprocal liability for CIA personnel based in the United States planning and supporting operations in third countries. The United States has never claimed, for example, that the KGB planners who operated agents in the United States on behalf of the Soviet Union were themselves subject to criminal prosecution.
A new variety of warfare has emerged in which treatment as a traditional POW doesn’t apply and criminal law doesn’t work. Criminal law creates liabilities the United States doesn’t want to incur, and it is not geared to deal with a terrorist like Mohammed. U.S. criminal law assumes that capture is in the hands of law enforcement officials. Rights are prescribed and demanded, including having lawyers present and so forth. Such protections are practically and theoretically absurd in this case: Mohammed is not a soldier and he is not a suspected criminal presumed innocent until proven guilty. Law enforcement is not a practical counter to al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. A nation cannot move from the rules of counterterrorism to an American courtroom; they are incompatible modes of operation. Nor can a nation use the code of criminal procedures against a terrorist organization operating transnationally. Instead, they must be stopped before they commit their action, and issuing search warrants and allowing attorneys present at questioning is not an option.
Therefore — and now we move to the political reality — it is difficult to imagine how the evidence accumulated against Mohammed could enter a courtroom. Ignoring the methods of questioning, which is a separate issue, how can one prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt without compromising sources and methods, and why should one? Mohammed was on a battlefield but not operating as a soldier. Imagine doing criminal forensics on a battlefield to prove the criminal liability of German commandos wearing American uniforms.
In our mind, there is a very real possibility that Mohammed could be found not guilty in a courtroom. The cases of O.J. Simpson and of Jewish Defense League head Rabbi Meir Kahane’s killer, El Sayyid Nosair — both found not guilty despite overwhelming evidence — come to mind. Juries do strange things, particularly amid what will be the greatest media circus imaginable in the media capital of the world.
But it may not be the jury that is the problem. A federal judge will have to ask the question of whether prejudicial publicity of such magnitude has occurred that Mohammed can’t receive a fair trial. (This is probably true.) Questions will be raised about whether he has received proper legal counsel, which undoubtedly he hasn’t. Issues about the chain of custody of evidence will be raised; given that he was held by troops and agents, and not by law enforcement, the chances of compromised evidence is likely. The issue of torture will, of course, also be raised but that really isn’t the main problem. How do you try a man under U.S. legal procedures who was captured in a third country by non-law enforcement personnel, and who has been in military custody for seven years?
There is a nontrivial possibility that he will be acquitted or have his case thrown out of court, which would be a foreign policy disaster for the United States. Some might view it as a sign of American adherence to the rule of law and be impressed, others might be convinced that Mohammed was not guilty in more than a legal sense and was held unjustly, and others might think the United States has bungled another matter.
The real problem here is international law, which does not address acts of war committed by non-state actors out of uniform. Or more precisely, it does, but leaves them deliberately in a state of legal limbo, with captors left free to deal with them as they wish. If the international legal community does not like the latter, it is time they did the hard work of defining precisely how a nation deals with an act of war carried out under these circumstances.
The international legal community has been quite vocal in condemning American treatment of POWs after 9/11, but it hasn’t evolved international law, even theoretically, to cope with this. Sept. 11 is not a crime in the proper sense of the term, and prosecuting the guilty is not the goal. Instead, it was an act of war carried out outside the confines of the Geneva Conventions. The U.S. goal is destroying al Qaeda so that it can no longer function, not punishing those who have acted. Similarly the goal in 1941 was not punishing the Japanese pilots at Pearl Harbor but destroying the Japanese Empire, and any Japanese soldier was a target who could be killed without trial in the course of combat. If it wishes to solve this problem, international law will have to recognize that al Qaeda committed an act of war, and its destruction has legal sanction without judicial review. And if some sort of protection is to be provided al Qaeda operatives out of uniform, then the Geneva Conventions must be changed, and with it the status of spies and saboteurs of all countries.
Holder has opened up an extraordinarily complex can of worms with this decision. As U.S. attorney general, he has committed himself to proving Mohammed’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt while guaranteeing that his constitutional rights (for a non-U.S. citizen captured and held outside the United States under extraordinary circumstances by individuals not trained as law enforcement personnel, no less) are protected. It is Holder’s duty to ensure Mohammed’s prosecution, conviction and fair treatment under the law. It is hard to see how he can.
Whatever the politics of this decision — and all such decisions have political dimensions — the real problem faced by both the Obama and Bush administrations has been the failure of international law to evolve to provide guidance on dealing with combatants such as al Qaeda. International law has clung to a model of law governing a very different type of warfare despite new realities. International law must therefore either reaffirm the doctrine that combatants who do not distinguish themselves from noncombatants are not due the protections of international law, or it must clearly define what those protections are. Otherwise, international law discredits itself.
Thursday, December 31, 2009
The Geography of Recession
A geographical determinist & fascinating view of four political economies (US, Russia, China, Europe). It's supposedly about the recent recession, but is actually far deeper than that.
The Geography of Recession
Stratfor Geopolitical Intelligence Reports
June 2, 2009
By Peter Zeihan
The global recession is the biggest development in the global system in the year to date. In the United States, it has become almost dogma that the recession is the worst since the Great Depression. But this is only one of a wealth of misperceptions about whom the downturn is hurting most, and why.
Let’s begin with some simple numbers.
As one can see in the chart, the U.S. recession at this point is only the worst since 1982, not the 1930s, and it pales in comparison to what is occurring in the rest of the world. (Figures for China have not been included, in part because of the unreliability of Chinese statistics, but also because the country’s financial system is so radically different from the rest of the world as to make such comparisons misleading. For more, read the China section below.)
CHART - World GDP Change - April 2009
But didn’t the recession begin in the United States? That it did, but the American system is far more stable, durable and flexible than most of the other global economies, in large part thanks to the country’s geography. To understand how place shapes economics, we need to take a giant step back from the gloom and doom of the current moment and examine the long-term picture of why different regions follow different economic paths.
THE UNITED STATES AND THE FREE MARKET
The most important aspect of the United States is not simply its sheer size, but the size of its usable land. Russia and China may both be similar-sized in absolute terms, but the vast majority of Russian and Chinese land is useless for agriculture, habitation or development. In contrast, courtesy of the Midwest, the United States boasts the world’s largest contiguous mass of arable land — and that mass does not include the hardly inconsequential chunks of usable territory on both the West and East coasts.
Second is the American maritime transport system. The Mississippi River, linked as it is to the Red, Missouri, Ohio and Tennessee rivers, comprises the largest interconnected network of navigable rivers in the world. In the San Francisco Bay, Chesapeake Bay and Long Island Sound/New York Bay, the United States has three of the world’s largest and best natural harbors. The series of barrier islands a few miles off the shores of Texas and the East Coast form a water-based highway — an Intracoastal Waterway — that shields American coastal shipping from all but the worst that the elements can throw at ships and ports.
Map: North American agricultural regions
The real beauty is that the two overlap with near perfect symmetry. The Intracoastal Waterway and most of the bays link up with agricultural regions and their own local river systems (such as the series of rivers that descend from the Appalachians to the East Coast), while the Greater Mississippi river network is the circulatory system of the Midwest. Even without the addition of canals, it is possible for ships to reach nearly any part of the Midwest from nearly any part of the Gulf or East coasts. The result is not just a massive ability to grow a massive amount of crops — and not just the ability to easily and cheaply move the crops to local, regional and global markets — but also the ability to use that same transport network for any other economic purpose without having to worry about food supplies.
The implications of such a confluence are deep and sustained. Where most countries need to scrape together capital to build roads and rail to establish the very foundation of an economy — transport capability — geography granted the United States a near-perfect system at no cost. That frees up U.S. capital for other pursuits and almost condemns the United States to be capital-rich. Any additional infrastructure the United States constructs is icing on the cake. (The cake itself is free — and, incidentally, the United States had so much free capital that it was able to go on to build one of the best road-and-rail networks anyway, resulting in even greater economic advantages over competitors.)
Third, geography has also ensured that the United States has very little local competition. To the north, Canada is both much colder and much more mountainous than the United States. Canada’s only navigable maritime network — the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway —is shared with the United States, and most of its usable land is hard by the American border. Often this makes it more economically advantageous for Canadian provinces to integrate with their neighbor to the south than with their co-nationals to the east and west.
Similarly, Mexico has only small chunks of land, separated by deserts and mountains, that are useful for much more than subsistence agriculture; most of Mexican territory is either too dry, too tropical or too mountainous. And Mexico completely lacks any meaningful river system for maritime transport. Add in a largely desert border, and Mexico as a country is not a meaningful threat to American security (which hardly means that there are not serious and ongoing concerns in the American-Mexican relationship).
With geography empowering the United States and hindering Canada and Mexico, the United States does not need to maintain a large standing military force to counter either. The Canadian border is almost completely unguarded, and the Mexican border is no more than a fence in most locations — a far cry from the sort of military standoffs that have marked more adversarial borders in human history. Not only are Canada and Mexico not major threats, but the U.S. transport network allows the United States the luxury of being able to quickly move a smaller force to deal with occasional problems rather than requiring it to station large static forces on its borders.
Like the transport network, this also helps the U.S. focus its resources on other things.
Taken together, the integrated transport network, large tracts of usable land and lack of a need for a standing military have one critical implication: The U.S. government tends to take a hands-off approach to economic management, because geography has not cursed the United States with any endemic problems. This may mean that the United States — and especially its government — comes across as disorganized, but it shifts massive amounts of labor and capital to the private sector, which for the most part allows resources to flow to wherever they will achieve the most efficient and productive results.
Laissez-faire capitalism has its flaws. Inequality and social stress are just two of many less-than-desirable side effects. The side effects most relevant to the current situation are, of course, the speculative bubbles that cause recessions when they pop. But in terms of long-term economic efficiency and growth, a free capital system is unrivaled. For the United States, the end result has proved clear: The United States has exited each decade since post-Civil War Reconstruction more powerful than it was when it entered it. While there are many forces in the modern world that threaten various aspects of U.S. economic standing, there is not one that actually threatens the U.S. base geographic advantages.
Is the United States in recession? Of course. Will it be forever? Of course not. So long as U.S. geographic advantages remain intact, it takes no small amount of paranoia and pessimism to envision anything but long-term economic expansion for such a chunk of territory. In fact, there are a number of factors hinting that the United States may even be on the cusp of recovery.
RUSSIA AND THE STATE
If in economic terms the United States has everything going for it geographically, then Russia is just the opposite. The Russian steppe lies deep in the interior of the Eurasian landmass, and as such is subject to climatic conditions much more hostile to human habitation and agriculture than is the American Midwest. Even in those blessed good years when crops are abundant in Russia, it has no river network to allow for easy transport of products.
Russia has no good warm-water ports to facilitate international trade (and has spent much of its history seeking access to one). Russia does have long rivers, but they are not interconnected as the Mississippi is with its tributaries, instead flowing north to the Arctic Ocean, which can support no more than a token population. The one exception is the Volga, which is critical to Western Russian commerce but flows to the Caspian, a storm-wracked and landlocked sea whose delta freezes in the winter (along with the entire Volga itself). Developing such unforgiving lands requires a massive outlay of funds simply to build the road and rail networks necessary to achieve the most basic of economic development. The cost is so extreme that Russia’s first ever intercontinental road was not completed until the 21st century, and it is little more than a two-lane path for much of its length. Between the lack of ports and the relatively low population densities, little of Russia’s transport system beyond the St. Petersburg/Moscow corridor approaches anything that hints of economic rationality.
Russia also has no meaningful external borders. It sits on the eastern end of the North European Plain, which stretches all the way to Normandy, France, and Russia’s connections to the Asian steppe flow deep into China. Because Russia lacks a decent internal transport network that can rapidly move armies from place to place, geography forces Russia to defend itself following two strategies. First, it requires massive standing armies on all of its borders. Second, it dictates that Russia continually push its boundaries outward to buffer its core against external threats.
Both strategies compromise Russian economic development even further. The large standing armies are a continual drain on state coffers and the country’s labor pool; their cost was a critical economic factor in the Soviet fall. The expansionist strategy not only absorbs large populations that do not wish to be part of the Russian state and so must constantly be policed — the core rationale for Russia’s robust security services — but also inflates Russia’s infrastructure development costs by increasing the amount of relatively useless territory Moscow is responsible for.
Russia’s labor and capital resources are woefully inadequate to overcome the state’s needs and vulnerabilities, which are legion. These endemic problems force Russia toward central planning; the full harnessing of all economic resources available is required if Russia is to achieve even a modicum of security and stability. One of the many results of this is severe economic inefficiency and a general dearth of an internal consumer market. Because capital and other resources can be flung forcefully at problems, however, active management can achieve specific national goals more readily than a hands-off, American-style model. This often gives the impression of significant progress in areas the Kremlin chooses to highlight.
But such achievements are largely limited to wherever the state happens to be directing its attention. In all other sectors, the lack of attention results in atrophy or criminalization. This is particularly true in modern Russia, where the ruling elite comprises just a handful of people, starkly limiting the amount of planning and oversight possible. And unless management is perfect in perception and execution, any mistakes are quickly magnified into national catastrophes. It is therefore no surprise to STRATFOR that the Russian economy has now fallen the furthest of any major economy during the current recession.
CHINA AND SEPARATISM
China also faces significant hurdles, albeit none as daunting as Russia’s challenges. China’s core is the farmland of the Yellow River basin in the north of the country, a river that is not readily navigable and is remarkably flood prone. Simply avoiding periodic starvation requires a high level of state planning and coordination. (Wrestling a large river is not the easiest thing one can do.) Additionally, the southern half of the country has a subtropical climate, riddling it with diseases that the southerners are resistant to but the northerners are not. This compromises the north’s political control of the south.
Central control is also threatened by China’s maritime geography. China boasts two other rivers, but they do not link to each other or the Yellow naturally. And China’s best ports are at the mouths of these two rivers: Shanghai at the mouth of the Yangtze and Hong Kong/Macau/Guangzhou at the mouth of the Pearl. The Yellow boasts no significant ocean port. The end result is that other regional centers can and do develop economic means independent of Beijing.
MAP - China - River System
With geography complicating northern rule and supporting southern economic independence, Beijing’s age-old problem has been trying to keep China in one piece. Beijing has to underwrite massive (and expensive) development programs to stitch the country together with a common infrastructure, the most visible of which is the Grand Canal that links the Yellow and Yangtze rivers. The cost of such linkages instantly guarantees that while China may have a shot at being unified, it will always be capital-poor.
Beijing also has to provide its autonomy-minded regions with an economic incentive to remain part of Greater China, and “simple” infrastructure will not cut it. Modern China has turned to a state-centered finance model for this. Under the model, all of the scarce capital that is available is funneled to the state, which divvies it out via a handful of large state banks. These state banks then grant loans to various firms and local governments at below the cost of raising the capital. This provides a powerful economic stimulus that achieves maximum employment and growth — think of what you could do with a near-endless supply of loans at below 0 percent interest — but comes at the cost of encouraging projects that are loss-making, as no one is ever called to account for failures. (They can just get a new loan.) The resultant growth is rapid, but it is also unsustainable. It is no wonder, then, that the central government has chosen to keep its $2 trillion of currency reserves in dollar-based assets; the rate of return is greater, the value holds over a long period, and Beijing doesn’t have to worry about the United States seceding.
Because the domestic market is considerably limited by the poor-capital nature of the country, most producers choose to tap export markets to generate income. In times of plenty this works fairly well, but when Chinese goods are not needed, the entire Chinese system can seize up. Lack of exports reduces capital availability, which constrains loan availability. This in turn not only damages the ability of firms to employ China’s legions of citizens, but it also removes the primary reason the disparate Chinese regions pay homage to Beijing. China’s geography hardwires in a series of economic challenges that weaken the coherence of the state and make China dependent upon uninterrupted access to foreign markets to maintain state unity. As a result, China has not been a unified entity for the vast majority of its history, but instead a cauldron of competing regions that cleave along many different fault lines: coastal versus interior, Han versus minority, north versus south.
China’s survival technique for the current recession is simple. Because exports, which account for roughly half of China’s economic activity, have sunk by half, Beijing is throwing the equivalent of the financial kitchen sink at the problem. China has force-fed more loans through the banks in the first four months of 2009 than it did in the entirety of 2008. The long-term result could well bury China beneath a mountain of bad loans — a similar strategy resulted in Japan’s 1991 crash, from which Tokyo has yet to recover. But for now it is holding the country together. The bottom line remains, however: China’s recovery is completely dependent upon external demand for its production, and the most it can do on its own is tread water.
DISCORDANT EUROPE
Europe faces an imbroglio somewhat similar to China’s.
Europe has a number of rivers that are easily navigable, providing a wealth of trade and development opportunities. But none of them interlinks with the others, retarding political unification. Europe has even more good harbors than the United States, but they are not evenly spread throughout the Continent, making some states capital-rich and others capital-poor. Europe boasts one huge piece of arable land on the North European Plain, but it is long and thin, and so occupied by no fewer than seven distinct ethnic groups.
These groups have constantly struggled — as have the various groups up and down Europe’s seemingly endless list of river valleys — but none has been able to emerge dominant, due to the webwork of mountains and peninsulas that make it nigh impossible to fully root out any particular group. And Europe’s wealth of islands close to the Continent, with Great Britain being only the most obvious, guarantee constant intervention to ensure that mainland Europe never unifies under a single power.
Every part of Europe has a radically different geography than the other parts, and thus the economic models the Europeans have adopted have little in common. The United Kingdom, with few immediate security threats and decent rivers and ports, has an almost American-style laissez-faire system. France, with three unconnected rivers lying wholly in its own territory, is a somewhat self-contained world, making economic nationalism its credo. Not only do the rivers in Germany not connect, but Berlin has to share them with other states. The Jutland Peninsula interrupts the coastline of Germany, which finds its sea access limited by the Danes, the Swedes and the British. Germany must plan in great detail to maximize its resource use to build an infrastructure that can compensate for its geographic deficiencies and link together its good — but disparate — geographic blessings. The result is a state that somewhat favors free enterprise, but within the limits framed by national needs.
And the list of differences goes on: Spain has long coasts and is arid; Austria is landlocked and quite wet; most of Greece is almost too mountainous to build on; it doesn’t get flatter than the Netherlands; tiny Estonia faces frozen seas in the winter; mammoth Italy has never even seen an icebreaker. Even if there were a supranational authority in Europe that could tax or regulate the banking sector or plan transnational responses, the propriety of any singular policy would be questionable at best.
Such stark regional differences give rise to such variant policies that many European states have a severe (and understandable) trust deficit when it comes to any hint of anything supranational. We are not simply taking about the European Union here, but rather a general distrust of anything cross-border in nature. One of the many outcomes of this is a preference for using local banks rather than stock exchanges for raising capital. After all, local banks tend to use local capital and are subject to local regulations, while stock exchanges tend to be internationalized in all respects. Spain, Italy, Sweden, Greece and Austria get more than 90 percent of their financing from banks, the United Kingdom 84 percent and Germany 76 percent — while for the United States it is only 40 percent.
And this has proved unfortunate in the extreme for today’s Europe. The current recession has its roots in a financial crisis that has most dramatically impacted banks, and European banks have proved far from immune. Until Europe’s banks recover, Europe will remain mired in recession. And since there cannot be a Pan-European solution, Europe’s recession could well prove to be the worst of all this time around.
The Geography of Recession
Stratfor Geopolitical Intelligence Reports
June 2, 2009
By Peter Zeihan
The global recession is the biggest development in the global system in the year to date. In the United States, it has become almost dogma that the recession is the worst since the Great Depression. But this is only one of a wealth of misperceptions about whom the downturn is hurting most, and why.
Let’s begin with some simple numbers.
As one can see in the chart, the U.S. recession at this point is only the worst since 1982, not the 1930s, and it pales in comparison to what is occurring in the rest of the world. (Figures for China have not been included, in part because of the unreliability of Chinese statistics, but also because the country’s financial system is so radically different from the rest of the world as to make such comparisons misleading. For more, read the China section below.)
CHART - World GDP Change - April 2009
But didn’t the recession begin in the United States? That it did, but the American system is far more stable, durable and flexible than most of the other global economies, in large part thanks to the country’s geography. To understand how place shapes economics, we need to take a giant step back from the gloom and doom of the current moment and examine the long-term picture of why different regions follow different economic paths.
THE UNITED STATES AND THE FREE MARKET
The most important aspect of the United States is not simply its sheer size, but the size of its usable land. Russia and China may both be similar-sized in absolute terms, but the vast majority of Russian and Chinese land is useless for agriculture, habitation or development. In contrast, courtesy of the Midwest, the United States boasts the world’s largest contiguous mass of arable land — and that mass does not include the hardly inconsequential chunks of usable territory on both the West and East coasts.
Second is the American maritime transport system. The Mississippi River, linked as it is to the Red, Missouri, Ohio and Tennessee rivers, comprises the largest interconnected network of navigable rivers in the world. In the San Francisco Bay, Chesapeake Bay and Long Island Sound/New York Bay, the United States has three of the world’s largest and best natural harbors. The series of barrier islands a few miles off the shores of Texas and the East Coast form a water-based highway — an Intracoastal Waterway — that shields American coastal shipping from all but the worst that the elements can throw at ships and ports.
Map: North American agricultural regions
The real beauty is that the two overlap with near perfect symmetry. The Intracoastal Waterway and most of the bays link up with agricultural regions and their own local river systems (such as the series of rivers that descend from the Appalachians to the East Coast), while the Greater Mississippi river network is the circulatory system of the Midwest. Even without the addition of canals, it is possible for ships to reach nearly any part of the Midwest from nearly any part of the Gulf or East coasts. The result is not just a massive ability to grow a massive amount of crops — and not just the ability to easily and cheaply move the crops to local, regional and global markets — but also the ability to use that same transport network for any other economic purpose without having to worry about food supplies.
The implications of such a confluence are deep and sustained. Where most countries need to scrape together capital to build roads and rail to establish the very foundation of an economy — transport capability — geography granted the United States a near-perfect system at no cost. That frees up U.S. capital for other pursuits and almost condemns the United States to be capital-rich. Any additional infrastructure the United States constructs is icing on the cake. (The cake itself is free — and, incidentally, the United States had so much free capital that it was able to go on to build one of the best road-and-rail networks anyway, resulting in even greater economic advantages over competitors.)
Third, geography has also ensured that the United States has very little local competition. To the north, Canada is both much colder and much more mountainous than the United States. Canada’s only navigable maritime network — the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway —is shared with the United States, and most of its usable land is hard by the American border. Often this makes it more economically advantageous for Canadian provinces to integrate with their neighbor to the south than with their co-nationals to the east and west.
Similarly, Mexico has only small chunks of land, separated by deserts and mountains, that are useful for much more than subsistence agriculture; most of Mexican territory is either too dry, too tropical or too mountainous. And Mexico completely lacks any meaningful river system for maritime transport. Add in a largely desert border, and Mexico as a country is not a meaningful threat to American security (which hardly means that there are not serious and ongoing concerns in the American-Mexican relationship).
With geography empowering the United States and hindering Canada and Mexico, the United States does not need to maintain a large standing military force to counter either. The Canadian border is almost completely unguarded, and the Mexican border is no more than a fence in most locations — a far cry from the sort of military standoffs that have marked more adversarial borders in human history. Not only are Canada and Mexico not major threats, but the U.S. transport network allows the United States the luxury of being able to quickly move a smaller force to deal with occasional problems rather than requiring it to station large static forces on its borders.
Like the transport network, this also helps the U.S. focus its resources on other things.
Taken together, the integrated transport network, large tracts of usable land and lack of a need for a standing military have one critical implication: The U.S. government tends to take a hands-off approach to economic management, because geography has not cursed the United States with any endemic problems. This may mean that the United States — and especially its government — comes across as disorganized, but it shifts massive amounts of labor and capital to the private sector, which for the most part allows resources to flow to wherever they will achieve the most efficient and productive results.
Laissez-faire capitalism has its flaws. Inequality and social stress are just two of many less-than-desirable side effects. The side effects most relevant to the current situation are, of course, the speculative bubbles that cause recessions when they pop. But in terms of long-term economic efficiency and growth, a free capital system is unrivaled. For the United States, the end result has proved clear: The United States has exited each decade since post-Civil War Reconstruction more powerful than it was when it entered it. While there are many forces in the modern world that threaten various aspects of U.S. economic standing, there is not one that actually threatens the U.S. base geographic advantages.
Is the United States in recession? Of course. Will it be forever? Of course not. So long as U.S. geographic advantages remain intact, it takes no small amount of paranoia and pessimism to envision anything but long-term economic expansion for such a chunk of territory. In fact, there are a number of factors hinting that the United States may even be on the cusp of recovery.
RUSSIA AND THE STATE
If in economic terms the United States has everything going for it geographically, then Russia is just the opposite. The Russian steppe lies deep in the interior of the Eurasian landmass, and as such is subject to climatic conditions much more hostile to human habitation and agriculture than is the American Midwest. Even in those blessed good years when crops are abundant in Russia, it has no river network to allow for easy transport of products.
Russia has no good warm-water ports to facilitate international trade (and has spent much of its history seeking access to one). Russia does have long rivers, but they are not interconnected as the Mississippi is with its tributaries, instead flowing north to the Arctic Ocean, which can support no more than a token population. The one exception is the Volga, which is critical to Western Russian commerce but flows to the Caspian, a storm-wracked and landlocked sea whose delta freezes in the winter (along with the entire Volga itself). Developing such unforgiving lands requires a massive outlay of funds simply to build the road and rail networks necessary to achieve the most basic of economic development. The cost is so extreme that Russia’s first ever intercontinental road was not completed until the 21st century, and it is little more than a two-lane path for much of its length. Between the lack of ports and the relatively low population densities, little of Russia’s transport system beyond the St. Petersburg/Moscow corridor approaches anything that hints of economic rationality.
Russia also has no meaningful external borders. It sits on the eastern end of the North European Plain, which stretches all the way to Normandy, France, and Russia’s connections to the Asian steppe flow deep into China. Because Russia lacks a decent internal transport network that can rapidly move armies from place to place, geography forces Russia to defend itself following two strategies. First, it requires massive standing armies on all of its borders. Second, it dictates that Russia continually push its boundaries outward to buffer its core against external threats.
Both strategies compromise Russian economic development even further. The large standing armies are a continual drain on state coffers and the country’s labor pool; their cost was a critical economic factor in the Soviet fall. The expansionist strategy not only absorbs large populations that do not wish to be part of the Russian state and so must constantly be policed — the core rationale for Russia’s robust security services — but also inflates Russia’s infrastructure development costs by increasing the amount of relatively useless territory Moscow is responsible for.
Russia’s labor and capital resources are woefully inadequate to overcome the state’s needs and vulnerabilities, which are legion. These endemic problems force Russia toward central planning; the full harnessing of all economic resources available is required if Russia is to achieve even a modicum of security and stability. One of the many results of this is severe economic inefficiency and a general dearth of an internal consumer market. Because capital and other resources can be flung forcefully at problems, however, active management can achieve specific national goals more readily than a hands-off, American-style model. This often gives the impression of significant progress in areas the Kremlin chooses to highlight.
But such achievements are largely limited to wherever the state happens to be directing its attention. In all other sectors, the lack of attention results in atrophy or criminalization. This is particularly true in modern Russia, where the ruling elite comprises just a handful of people, starkly limiting the amount of planning and oversight possible. And unless management is perfect in perception and execution, any mistakes are quickly magnified into national catastrophes. It is therefore no surprise to STRATFOR that the Russian economy has now fallen the furthest of any major economy during the current recession.
CHINA AND SEPARATISM
China also faces significant hurdles, albeit none as daunting as Russia’s challenges. China’s core is the farmland of the Yellow River basin in the north of the country, a river that is not readily navigable and is remarkably flood prone. Simply avoiding periodic starvation requires a high level of state planning and coordination. (Wrestling a large river is not the easiest thing one can do.) Additionally, the southern half of the country has a subtropical climate, riddling it with diseases that the southerners are resistant to but the northerners are not. This compromises the north’s political control of the south.
Central control is also threatened by China’s maritime geography. China boasts two other rivers, but they do not link to each other or the Yellow naturally. And China’s best ports are at the mouths of these two rivers: Shanghai at the mouth of the Yangtze and Hong Kong/Macau/Guangzhou at the mouth of the Pearl. The Yellow boasts no significant ocean port. The end result is that other regional centers can and do develop economic means independent of Beijing.
MAP - China - River System
With geography complicating northern rule and supporting southern economic independence, Beijing’s age-old problem has been trying to keep China in one piece. Beijing has to underwrite massive (and expensive) development programs to stitch the country together with a common infrastructure, the most visible of which is the Grand Canal that links the Yellow and Yangtze rivers. The cost of such linkages instantly guarantees that while China may have a shot at being unified, it will always be capital-poor.
Beijing also has to provide its autonomy-minded regions with an economic incentive to remain part of Greater China, and “simple” infrastructure will not cut it. Modern China has turned to a state-centered finance model for this. Under the model, all of the scarce capital that is available is funneled to the state, which divvies it out via a handful of large state banks. These state banks then grant loans to various firms and local governments at below the cost of raising the capital. This provides a powerful economic stimulus that achieves maximum employment and growth — think of what you could do with a near-endless supply of loans at below 0 percent interest — but comes at the cost of encouraging projects that are loss-making, as no one is ever called to account for failures. (They can just get a new loan.) The resultant growth is rapid, but it is also unsustainable. It is no wonder, then, that the central government has chosen to keep its $2 trillion of currency reserves in dollar-based assets; the rate of return is greater, the value holds over a long period, and Beijing doesn’t have to worry about the United States seceding.
Because the domestic market is considerably limited by the poor-capital nature of the country, most producers choose to tap export markets to generate income. In times of plenty this works fairly well, but when Chinese goods are not needed, the entire Chinese system can seize up. Lack of exports reduces capital availability, which constrains loan availability. This in turn not only damages the ability of firms to employ China’s legions of citizens, but it also removes the primary reason the disparate Chinese regions pay homage to Beijing. China’s geography hardwires in a series of economic challenges that weaken the coherence of the state and make China dependent upon uninterrupted access to foreign markets to maintain state unity. As a result, China has not been a unified entity for the vast majority of its history, but instead a cauldron of competing regions that cleave along many different fault lines: coastal versus interior, Han versus minority, north versus south.
China’s survival technique for the current recession is simple. Because exports, which account for roughly half of China’s economic activity, have sunk by half, Beijing is throwing the equivalent of the financial kitchen sink at the problem. China has force-fed more loans through the banks in the first four months of 2009 than it did in the entirety of 2008. The long-term result could well bury China beneath a mountain of bad loans — a similar strategy resulted in Japan’s 1991 crash, from which Tokyo has yet to recover. But for now it is holding the country together. The bottom line remains, however: China’s recovery is completely dependent upon external demand for its production, and the most it can do on its own is tread water.
DISCORDANT EUROPE
Europe faces an imbroglio somewhat similar to China’s.
Europe has a number of rivers that are easily navigable, providing a wealth of trade and development opportunities. But none of them interlinks with the others, retarding political unification. Europe has even more good harbors than the United States, but they are not evenly spread throughout the Continent, making some states capital-rich and others capital-poor. Europe boasts one huge piece of arable land on the North European Plain, but it is long and thin, and so occupied by no fewer than seven distinct ethnic groups.
These groups have constantly struggled — as have the various groups up and down Europe’s seemingly endless list of river valleys — but none has been able to emerge dominant, due to the webwork of mountains and peninsulas that make it nigh impossible to fully root out any particular group. And Europe’s wealth of islands close to the Continent, with Great Britain being only the most obvious, guarantee constant intervention to ensure that mainland Europe never unifies under a single power.
Every part of Europe has a radically different geography than the other parts, and thus the economic models the Europeans have adopted have little in common. The United Kingdom, with few immediate security threats and decent rivers and ports, has an almost American-style laissez-faire system. France, with three unconnected rivers lying wholly in its own territory, is a somewhat self-contained world, making economic nationalism its credo. Not only do the rivers in Germany not connect, but Berlin has to share them with other states. The Jutland Peninsula interrupts the coastline of Germany, which finds its sea access limited by the Danes, the Swedes and the British. Germany must plan in great detail to maximize its resource use to build an infrastructure that can compensate for its geographic deficiencies and link together its good — but disparate — geographic blessings. The result is a state that somewhat favors free enterprise, but within the limits framed by national needs.
And the list of differences goes on: Spain has long coasts and is arid; Austria is landlocked and quite wet; most of Greece is almost too mountainous to build on; it doesn’t get flatter than the Netherlands; tiny Estonia faces frozen seas in the winter; mammoth Italy has never even seen an icebreaker. Even if there were a supranational authority in Europe that could tax or regulate the banking sector or plan transnational responses, the propriety of any singular policy would be questionable at best.
Such stark regional differences give rise to such variant policies that many European states have a severe (and understandable) trust deficit when it comes to any hint of anything supranational. We are not simply taking about the European Union here, but rather a general distrust of anything cross-border in nature. One of the many outcomes of this is a preference for using local banks rather than stock exchanges for raising capital. After all, local banks tend to use local capital and are subject to local regulations, while stock exchanges tend to be internationalized in all respects. Spain, Italy, Sweden, Greece and Austria get more than 90 percent of their financing from banks, the United Kingdom 84 percent and Germany 76 percent — while for the United States it is only 40 percent.
And this has proved unfortunate in the extreme for today’s Europe. The current recession has its roots in a financial crisis that has most dramatically impacted banks, and European banks have proved far from immune. Until Europe’s banks recover, Europe will remain mired in recession. And since there cannot be a Pan-European solution, Europe’s recession could well prove to be the worst of all this time around.
Tuesday, December 15, 2009
After the crunch...
Stefan Karlsson is an interesting economics blogger of what some would call the Austrian school (although he less dogmatic than that implies), here he makes an interesting point about the inherent contradictions in the Government's response (both US and UK's) to the credit crunch.
" Bankers Should Be Blamed-Both If the Make Risky Loans And If They Don't
I noted before that leftist analysis of the economy is very contradictory. They first of all claim that the financial crisis simply is the results of banks making too many risky loans-and that we need radical reform to prevent banks from again making risky loans. But at the same time they also attack bankers for abstaining from lending because new loans are perceived as too risky.
Now Obama is at this again. He first says that bankers caused the crisis by making risky loans-and that now they should approve more loans "to help the recovery" (which even if Obama tries to deny it can only mean loans for borrowers more risky than those who now get loans) because they previously caused a crisis by approving loans for risky borrowers......
Try to figure out the logic in that...
I can't see any "logic" except to blame bankers regardless of what they do and absolve government of any guilt regardless of what it do."
" Bankers Should Be Blamed-Both If the Make Risky Loans And If They Don't
I noted before that leftist analysis of the economy is very contradictory. They first of all claim that the financial crisis simply is the results of banks making too many risky loans-and that we need radical reform to prevent banks from again making risky loans. But at the same time they also attack bankers for abstaining from lending because new loans are perceived as too risky.
Now Obama is at this again. He first says that bankers caused the crisis by making risky loans-and that now they should approve more loans "to help the recovery" (which even if Obama tries to deny it can only mean loans for borrowers more risky than those who now get loans) because they previously caused a crisis by approving loans for risky borrowers......
Try to figure out the logic in that...
I can't see any "logic" except to blame bankers regardless of what they do and absolve government of any guilt regardless of what it do."
Saturday, December 12, 2009
Swiss vote to ban minarets
Excellent newsletter (dated 04/12/09) from Intelligence Squared, giving arguments both PRO and CON their debating topic: "The Swiss have voted to ban the building of minarets. We should applaud them"
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THIS IS A RARE EXAMPLE OF GENUINE DEMOCRACY
Unlike in most so-called democratic countries, where governments often sweep troublesome issues under the carpet, Switzerland is obliged to call a referendum on any subject if a petition with 100,000 signatures or more demands it. This particular subject attracted a turnout of 53%, so it is not as if the vote was only carried by a small core of fanatics. The issue touched a nerve with feminists and ordinary people concerned for their way of life, not just right-wingers. The result may not have been what the establishment wanted, but that’s the nature of real democracy. When governments are embarrassed by the results of voter participation, we should rejoice.
ITS BETTER TO AIR GRIEVANCES THAN SUPPRESS THEM
Europe has a fundamental problem to confront in dealing with its Muslims, and the politicians are going to have to pay attention to it sooner or later. So it’s a good thing the issue is being raised now. The flash points differ country by country: in Switzerland it’s the minaret; in France, the headscarf in school; in Denmark cartoons. But at least in Switzerland the people have confronted the issue and felt able to deal with it, whereas elsewhere the political classes just preach multiculturalism and hope the problem goes away. The French, Dutch or English would doubtless have made a similar decision if only they’d had the chance.
THERE’S GOOD REASON TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT MINARETS
Minarets are a way for Muslims to assert themselves. Their traditional function is to provide a platform and a vantage point for the call to prayer (now made unnecessary by microphones and speakers). They’re often built taller than local church spires for the express purpose of asserting the superiority of Islam. "The minaret, for its opponents, symbolizes Islam’s "arrival" in the Alps," writes the Algerian-American blogger, The Moor Next Door. "It stands to proclaim the Muslim presence above other faiths and peoples." But, quite apart from their symbolic threat, minarets do not fit or blend with the architecture and aesthetics of the country. The Swiss are rightly proud of their idyllic alpine landscape and Baroque spires – immortalised on chocolate boxes everywhere - and if they don’t think minarets fit into that, that is their prerogative. If they don’t want a skyline with more minarets in it – good luck to them.
IT’S UP TO THE MUSLIMS TO ADAPT
If Muslims want to be part of a modern Europe, everyone will have to compromise – and that includes Islamic architects. As Taj Hargey argues in The Times, European mosques should stop mindlessly mimicking Eastern design. It would be perfectly easy to create prayer halls that blend into the landscape. Look how the matter has been handled in Boston, says Christopher Hawthorne, the LA Times’s architecture critic. The two-year-old Islamic Society of Boston Cultural Centre combines a row of peaked arches, an Islamic trademark, with New England-style red brick, and was jointly designed by Saudi and American architects. “If that's not an assimilation-minded piece of architecture, I'm not sure what is.” The Swiss are right to demand the same.
THE SWISS HAVE STRUCK A BLOW AGAINST INTOLERANCE
Islam has been linked to violence, extremism, freedom of speech, gender discrimination, forced marriage and much more besides. Even if those problems are not essential to the faith, it remains an expansionist religion, and many Muslims are ideologically committed to spreading its laws, values and attitudes more widely. If those values are incompatible with modern Western ones of liberalism and tolerance, then the Swiss are perfectly entitled to make this symbolic gesture of rejection – tolerance cannot survive if it tolerates intolerance. As for the cries of objection from many Muslim countries, how false these sound when those countries themselves ban followers of other religions from building places of worship. The Grand Mufti of Egypt called the ban an "attack on freedom of belief”. That would have been more convincing had he also criticised the difficulty Egyptian Christians face in building churches in his own country, where they must obtain a permit even for basic repairs.
--------
DIRECT DEMOCRACY IS A BAD IDEA
To see the harm that results when issues are continually submitted to plebiscites you just have to look at California. There, the economy is in tatters, as referendum-driven laws make it impossible for it to balance its books. And all too often, the issues giving rise to the call for referenda are linked to some inflammatory incident that encourages stridency and extremism. A big influence in the minaret vote, for example, was the ongoing spat with Libya (Colonel Gaddafi's son was arrested in Geneva for maltreating a servant last year and Libya has been holding a pair of Swiss businessmen over some trivial offence). So an issue that should really have been a matter of human rights law was decided upon by an ill-tempered majority looking for a chance to gang up on an unpopular minority. As The Times put it: not a good case on which to base a referendum.
BANNING MINARETS MISSES THE POINT
There are fundamental problems with Islam in Europe – women's unequal status under sharia law, the Saudi sponsorship of Wahhabi mosques and more generally the threats from illiberal strands of Islam to the humanist traditions of Europe – but these have nothing to do with the building of minarets, which is a complete irrelevance. Inappropriate buildings can always be prevented by the planning system, and many minarets are anyway attractive and elegant. Banning minarets is populist window-dressing.
THE BAN IS JUST A BIGOTED ATTACK ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
It’s a disgrace that an initiative that singles out a single community, with a clear discriminatory purpose, has been approved. (It is far worse than the French ban on hijabs in schools, which is generalised and also forbids Christian crosses and Jewish yarmulkes.) Minarets are no more a sign of Muslim expansionism than Christian crosses are a sign of the Spanish Inquisition. The minaret ban is just an excuse for bullying Muslims. The right-wing parties behind the ban intially wanted to launch a campaign against Halal slaughter, says Tariq Ramadan in The Guardian, but then realised that this would entail banning Kosher slaughter and upset Swiss Jews – which they wanted to avoid. So they picked minarets as a target instead.
THE BAN IS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE
How can the Swiss expect Muslims to assimilate when decisions like this make them feel like second-class citizens? Muslims in Switzerland are generally tolerant and liberal. Many are Kosovans and Bosnians who have been European for centuries, and recently suffered ferocious persecution by the Serbs in the Balkans. Fewer than 13% practise their religion, and there has been no ugly violence in response to the ban – in fact, the violence has mostly come the other way, with a pot of paint hurled at the country's largest mosque in Geneva, which has also been hit with cobblestones. Islam is a European religion, and everyone is going to have to come to terms with that. “We face common challenges, such as unemployment, poverty and violence,” says Ramadan, and we are going to have to face those challenges together. That means tolerating differences, not trying to stamp them out.
THIS VOTE REPRESENTS TYPICAL SWISS BIGOTRY
The Swiss reputation for tolerance is ill-deserved. The country has a long history of xenophobia and anti-Semitism. Historian Jonathan Steinberg points out that Switzerland banned the 8,000 Jews living there from carrying out their traditional ritual slaugher in 1893. The excuse given then was animal welfare – aesthetics provides the same excuse today. Later, Switzerland refused to accept Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany. Even when Jews began to commit suicide at Swiss border posts, Federal Councillor von Steiger refused them refuge. “The boat is full”, he said. That ugly history of prejudice has now been transferred to the Muslims. The posters encouraging voters to endorse the ban displayed a threatening black-veiled Muslim woman and a forest of missile-like minarets imposed on the pure red and white of the Swiss flag. No one, as The Guardian noted, should mistake the provocative nature of a campaign fought in the Nazi colours of red, black and white. That campaign symbolises the shameful Swiss attitude to outsiders, and the fact it is backed by a vote makes it even more shameful, not less.
--------
THIS IS A RARE EXAMPLE OF GENUINE DEMOCRACY
Unlike in most so-called democratic countries, where governments often sweep troublesome issues under the carpet, Switzerland is obliged to call a referendum on any subject if a petition with 100,000 signatures or more demands it. This particular subject attracted a turnout of 53%, so it is not as if the vote was only carried by a small core of fanatics. The issue touched a nerve with feminists and ordinary people concerned for their way of life, not just right-wingers. The result may not have been what the establishment wanted, but that’s the nature of real democracy. When governments are embarrassed by the results of voter participation, we should rejoice.
ITS BETTER TO AIR GRIEVANCES THAN SUPPRESS THEM
Europe has a fundamental problem to confront in dealing with its Muslims, and the politicians are going to have to pay attention to it sooner or later. So it’s a good thing the issue is being raised now. The flash points differ country by country: in Switzerland it’s the minaret; in France, the headscarf in school; in Denmark cartoons. But at least in Switzerland the people have confronted the issue and felt able to deal with it, whereas elsewhere the political classes just preach multiculturalism and hope the problem goes away. The French, Dutch or English would doubtless have made a similar decision if only they’d had the chance.
THERE’S GOOD REASON TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT MINARETS
Minarets are a way for Muslims to assert themselves. Their traditional function is to provide a platform and a vantage point for the call to prayer (now made unnecessary by microphones and speakers). They’re often built taller than local church spires for the express purpose of asserting the superiority of Islam. "The minaret, for its opponents, symbolizes Islam’s "arrival" in the Alps," writes the Algerian-American blogger, The Moor Next Door. "It stands to proclaim the Muslim presence above other faiths and peoples." But, quite apart from their symbolic threat, minarets do not fit or blend with the architecture and aesthetics of the country. The Swiss are rightly proud of their idyllic alpine landscape and Baroque spires – immortalised on chocolate boxes everywhere - and if they don’t think minarets fit into that, that is their prerogative. If they don’t want a skyline with more minarets in it – good luck to them.
IT’S UP TO THE MUSLIMS TO ADAPT
If Muslims want to be part of a modern Europe, everyone will have to compromise – and that includes Islamic architects. As Taj Hargey argues in The Times, European mosques should stop mindlessly mimicking Eastern design. It would be perfectly easy to create prayer halls that blend into the landscape. Look how the matter has been handled in Boston, says Christopher Hawthorne, the LA Times’s architecture critic. The two-year-old Islamic Society of Boston Cultural Centre combines a row of peaked arches, an Islamic trademark, with New England-style red brick, and was jointly designed by Saudi and American architects. “If that's not an assimilation-minded piece of architecture, I'm not sure what is.” The Swiss are right to demand the same.
THE SWISS HAVE STRUCK A BLOW AGAINST INTOLERANCE
Islam has been linked to violence, extremism, freedom of speech, gender discrimination, forced marriage and much more besides. Even if those problems are not essential to the faith, it remains an expansionist religion, and many Muslims are ideologically committed to spreading its laws, values and attitudes more widely. If those values are incompatible with modern Western ones of liberalism and tolerance, then the Swiss are perfectly entitled to make this symbolic gesture of rejection – tolerance cannot survive if it tolerates intolerance. As for the cries of objection from many Muslim countries, how false these sound when those countries themselves ban followers of other religions from building places of worship. The Grand Mufti of Egypt called the ban an "attack on freedom of belief”. That would have been more convincing had he also criticised the difficulty Egyptian Christians face in building churches in his own country, where they must obtain a permit even for basic repairs.
--------
DIRECT DEMOCRACY IS A BAD IDEA
To see the harm that results when issues are continually submitted to plebiscites you just have to look at California. There, the economy is in tatters, as referendum-driven laws make it impossible for it to balance its books. And all too often, the issues giving rise to the call for referenda are linked to some inflammatory incident that encourages stridency and extremism. A big influence in the minaret vote, for example, was the ongoing spat with Libya (Colonel Gaddafi's son was arrested in Geneva for maltreating a servant last year and Libya has been holding a pair of Swiss businessmen over some trivial offence). So an issue that should really have been a matter of human rights law was decided upon by an ill-tempered majority looking for a chance to gang up on an unpopular minority. As The Times put it: not a good case on which to base a referendum.
BANNING MINARETS MISSES THE POINT
There are fundamental problems with Islam in Europe – women's unequal status under sharia law, the Saudi sponsorship of Wahhabi mosques and more generally the threats from illiberal strands of Islam to the humanist traditions of Europe – but these have nothing to do with the building of minarets, which is a complete irrelevance. Inappropriate buildings can always be prevented by the planning system, and many minarets are anyway attractive and elegant. Banning minarets is populist window-dressing.
THE BAN IS JUST A BIGOTED ATTACK ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
It’s a disgrace that an initiative that singles out a single community, with a clear discriminatory purpose, has been approved. (It is far worse than the French ban on hijabs in schools, which is generalised and also forbids Christian crosses and Jewish yarmulkes.) Minarets are no more a sign of Muslim expansionism than Christian crosses are a sign of the Spanish Inquisition. The minaret ban is just an excuse for bullying Muslims. The right-wing parties behind the ban intially wanted to launch a campaign against Halal slaughter, says Tariq Ramadan in The Guardian, but then realised that this would entail banning Kosher slaughter and upset Swiss Jews – which they wanted to avoid. So they picked minarets as a target instead.
THE BAN IS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE
How can the Swiss expect Muslims to assimilate when decisions like this make them feel like second-class citizens? Muslims in Switzerland are generally tolerant and liberal. Many are Kosovans and Bosnians who have been European for centuries, and recently suffered ferocious persecution by the Serbs in the Balkans. Fewer than 13% practise their religion, and there has been no ugly violence in response to the ban – in fact, the violence has mostly come the other way, with a pot of paint hurled at the country's largest mosque in Geneva, which has also been hit with cobblestones. Islam is a European religion, and everyone is going to have to come to terms with that. “We face common challenges, such as unemployment, poverty and violence,” says Ramadan, and we are going to have to face those challenges together. That means tolerating differences, not trying to stamp them out.
THIS VOTE REPRESENTS TYPICAL SWISS BIGOTRY
The Swiss reputation for tolerance is ill-deserved. The country has a long history of xenophobia and anti-Semitism. Historian Jonathan Steinberg points out that Switzerland banned the 8,000 Jews living there from carrying out their traditional ritual slaugher in 1893. The excuse given then was animal welfare – aesthetics provides the same excuse today. Later, Switzerland refused to accept Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany. Even when Jews began to commit suicide at Swiss border posts, Federal Councillor von Steiger refused them refuge. “The boat is full”, he said. That ugly history of prejudice has now been transferred to the Muslims. The posters encouraging voters to endorse the ban displayed a threatening black-veiled Muslim woman and a forest of missile-like minarets imposed on the pure red and white of the Swiss flag. No one, as The Guardian noted, should mistake the provocative nature of a campaign fought in the Nazi colours of red, black and white. That campaign symbolises the shameful Swiss attitude to outsiders, and the fact it is backed by a vote makes it even more shameful, not less.
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