Tony Blair has posted an article on public service reform on the Euston Manifesto site. It's an interesting piece. But for my money Daniel Finkelstein completely demolishes Blair's case in this post:
'...[the Prime Minister's article] demonstrates the confusion that has bedevilled his public service reform programme.
Here, for instance, is the way he describes the phases of his policy:
"Our strategy for public services has been through three phases. The first phase was a zero tolerance approach to failure, with strong central direction and public targets, to ensure that under-investment could not be used as an excuse for endemic failure. This was then followed by a correction of the long period of under-investment. We are now into the third phase: progressive reform."
This is a good description, but a terrible strategy.
Surely the right way to reform, would have been the other way round entirely. You start with the reform, put the money in as the reforms begin to bite and finish by correcting any serious political problems caused by deregulation.
The piece also contains an important contradiction. Mr Blair advocates much greater consumer choice (that is what he means by progressive reform) and then says:
"A service can and must be designed to ensure that access is equitable. The content of what is provided, the ways that staff work, the outcomes expected for citizens: all these are subject to stringent regulation. These regulations apply to all sectors and the claims that the reforms lead to two-tier services are quite wrong."
But if all these things are going to be equal, what would consumers be choosing between? You would be imposing a cost (making a choice) without providing a benefit (the access to a better service).
Altogether, I thought this article very important. It illustrates that the Blair public service reform agenda (which I'd always rather unthinkingly supported because it seemed to point in the right direction) is totally incoherent.'
Monday, October 30, 2006
Thursday, October 26, 2006
Tory stupidity
A majority of Conservative Euro MPs have voted for the UK to join the Euro. Dumb move. The Tories supporting the Euro now would be like the investment managers who resisted buying into internet companies for years before finally deciding to buy big just as the dot com crash arrived. Stupid. Stupid. Stupid.
Political Correctness, Multi-Culturalism and Moral Relativism
Here you go, I thought this topic deserved it's own thread at last.
To start it off here's a rather grim story on racially motivated murders (nearly half of the victims are white):
Racial murders: nearly half the victims are white
Home Office release official figures as police claim that political correctness is stifling the debate.
The Observer
Nearly half of all victims of racially motivated murders in the last decade have been white, according to official figures released by the Home Office.
The data, released under Freedom of Information legislation, shows that between 1995 and 2004 there have been 58 murders where the police consider a racial element played a key part. Out of these, 24 have been where the murder victim was white.
The disclosure will add to the intense debate over multiculturalism in British society. The figures also overturn the assumption that almost all racial murders are committed against ethnic minority victims.
(hat tip Spiked)
To start it off here's a rather grim story on racially motivated murders (nearly half of the victims are white):
Racial murders: nearly half the victims are white
Home Office release official figures as police claim that political correctness is stifling the debate.
The Observer
Nearly half of all victims of racially motivated murders in the last decade have been white, according to official figures released by the Home Office.
The data, released under Freedom of Information legislation, shows that between 1995 and 2004 there have been 58 murders where the police consider a racial element played a key part. Out of these, 24 have been where the murder victim was white.
The disclosure will add to the intense debate over multiculturalism in British society. The figures also overturn the assumption that almost all racial murders are committed against ethnic minority victims.
(hat tip Spiked)
Spiked
I've just been looking at an online magazine that I thought might be of interest to other impdecers.
It's called Spiked and describes itself thusly:
Spiked is an independent online phenomenon dedicated to raising the horizons of humanity by waging a culture war of words against misanthropy, priggishness, prejudice, luddism, illiberalism and irrationalism in all their ancient and modern forms. spiked is endorsed by free-thinkers such as John Stuart Mill and Karl Marx, and hated by the narrow-minded such as Torquemada and Stalin. Or it would be, if they were lucky enough to be around to read it.
I can't vouch for all its contents - I've glanced at a couple of articles on Free Speech that I quite liked the look of - but I think it's worth checking out. As I understand it, spiked is a descendant of Living Marxism, its founders being former members of the Revolutionary Communist Party, who have since metamorphosed into pro-corporate libertarians. (They seem to oppose a lot of the conventional wisdom on climate change, which at the very least suggests they are willing to march to the beat of their own drum. Or more specifically, that they'd like to march up and down on George Monbiot.) Frank Furedi is one of their regulars.
On a personal note, I like them because they oppose the band on junk food advertising to kids. (It's a TV thing.)
Anyhoo, see what you think.
It's called Spiked and describes itself thusly:
Spiked is an independent online phenomenon dedicated to raising the horizons of humanity by waging a culture war of words against misanthropy, priggishness, prejudice, luddism, illiberalism and irrationalism in all their ancient and modern forms. spiked is endorsed by free-thinkers such as John Stuart Mill and Karl Marx, and hated by the narrow-minded such as Torquemada and Stalin. Or it would be, if they were lucky enough to be around to read it.
I can't vouch for all its contents - I've glanced at a couple of articles on Free Speech that I quite liked the look of - but I think it's worth checking out. As I understand it, spiked is a descendant of Living Marxism, its founders being former members of the Revolutionary Communist Party, who have since metamorphosed into pro-corporate libertarians. (They seem to oppose a lot of the conventional wisdom on climate change, which at the very least suggests they are willing to march to the beat of their own drum. Or more specifically, that they'd like to march up and down on George Monbiot.) Frank Furedi is one of their regulars.
On a personal note, I like them because they oppose the band on junk food advertising to kids. (It's a TV thing.)
Anyhoo, see what you think.
Tuesday, October 24, 2006
Irwin Stelzer on immigration
Irwin Stelzer's answer to the immigration dilema:
'The solution to all these problems lies in a four-phase policy. First, limit those allowed in to those most likely to enrich the nation. Secondly, allocate the available places to those who will be the largest net contributors to British economic life. Thirdly, require the beneficiaries of immigration to share their gains with those who bear the costs. Fourthly, bar immigration from countries noted for producing terrorists.'
But wouldn't that include the UK? The 7/7 bombers were British citizens after all. Is Stelzer suggesting baring British imigrants from other countries too?
'The solution to all these problems lies in a four-phase policy. First, limit those allowed in to those most likely to enrich the nation. Secondly, allocate the available places to those who will be the largest net contributors to British economic life. Thirdly, require the beneficiaries of immigration to share their gains with those who bear the costs. Fourthly, bar immigration from countries noted for producing terrorists.'
But wouldn't that include the UK? The 7/7 bombers were British citizens after all. Is Stelzer suggesting baring British imigrants from other countries too?
Monday, October 23, 2006
Lets talk about Tax
There's been a lot of nonsense in the press about the recent Tax proposals recommended by a Tory Party policy group. The Times reports that if all the proposed cuts where implemented they would amount to £21 Billion in tax cuts.
The thing is that isn't a lot of money.
I know that sounds insane, how can £21 Billion not be a lot of money? Well for a start and just to be absolutely clear it wouldn't mean cutting public spending. I repeat, it wouldn't mean cutting public spending. The £21 Billion would imply slowing the growth of public spending (i.e public spending would grow by about 1.2% a year compared to the 1.7% Gordon Brown is pencilling). Secondly, and I think this is more important, this is really taking off only about 1.5% of GDP. To put it another way, the Tax burden is set to rise further under the current Government, so if it evolves as the Treasury expects and the Tories won the election and implemented all of these proposals they would be slashing the tax burden back to the level of ... 2005/2006. Hardly radical.
The thing is that isn't a lot of money.
I know that sounds insane, how can £21 Billion not be a lot of money? Well for a start and just to be absolutely clear it wouldn't mean cutting public spending. I repeat, it wouldn't mean cutting public spending. The £21 Billion would imply slowing the growth of public spending (i.e public spending would grow by about 1.2% a year compared to the 1.7% Gordon Brown is pencilling). Secondly, and I think this is more important, this is really taking off only about 1.5% of GDP. To put it another way, the Tax burden is set to rise further under the current Government, so if it evolves as the Treasury expects and the Tories won the election and implemented all of these proposals they would be slashing the tax burden back to the level of ... 2005/2006. Hardly radical.
Sunday, October 22, 2006
Matthew Parris vs the Neo Cons
Matthew Parris in The Saturday Times attacks the Neo Cons. He argues that the excuse that the strategy was awful won't wash. The vision was fatally flawed from the beginning.
'It is no small thing to find oneself on the wrong side of an argument when the debate is about the biggest disaster in British foreign policy since Suez; no small thing to have handed Iran a final, undreamt-of victory in an Iran-Iraq war that we thought had ended in the 1980s; no small thing to have lost Britain her credit in half the world; no small thing — in the name of Atlanticism — to have shackled our own good name to a doomed US presidency and crazed foreign-policy adventure that the next political generation in America will remember only with an embarrassed shudder.
[...]
Our British neocons have invested heavily in this ill-fated craft, and the wreck is total. How shall they be saved? Never fear. They’ve been working on the elements of a rescue plan. By Christmas all will be singing from the same sheet. All together, now, warrior-columnists and soon-to-be-former Cabinet ministers: one, two three . . .
“The principle was good but the Americans screwed up the execution.”
[...]
Funny, because I don’t quite recall most of you saying it at the time — some of you wrote columns and some of you delivered speeches declaring that Iraq was making giant strides; most of you blamed the difficulties on “Saddam loyalists and foreign fighters”, and some of you actually visited and returned rejoicing at the progress — but let’s overlook that. Let’s for the sake of argument grant that you worried from the start that the US just didn’t have the hang of this nation-building business. Now, you declare, we know that’s the reason the whole strategy hit the rocks.
Crap. The strategy failed because of one big, bad idea at its very root. Your idea that we kick the door in. Everything has flowed from that.
We were not invited. We had no mandate. There were no “good” Iraqis to hand over to. We had nothing to latch on to, no legitimacy. It wasn’t a question of being tactful, respectful, munificent, or handing sweets to children. We were impostors, and that is all.'
Well, I don't consider myself a Neo-Con but I must admit I did think some good might have come out of the invasion. Now, well I'm not so sure. I also believe the strategy was flawed and far too naive about the challenge of establishing a functioning democracy. I still think that. Parris dismisses the suggestion that there weren't enough troops saying that more than 100,000 troops is hardly derisory as a military presence but historically it really isn't many soldiers. As Naill Ferguson writes in the Telegraph 'The number of troops currently in Iraq is less than 140,000. That's roughly as many soldiers as Britain sent to the same country to defeat an insurgency in 1920 — at a time when the population of Iraq was a tenth of what it is today.'
Parris is right about one thing though, things don't look good for Neo-Cons. Both the UK and the US have made signals that they will be looking to start handing over sooner rather than later. The US Iraq Study Group, headed by Republican grandee James Baker, is recommending the US military withdraws to bases outside Iraq and seeks Iranian and Syrian help. And if the Democrats win both House and Senate (which is a possibility, partly due to the growing unpopularity of the war) the US will attempt to get out of Iraq even quicker.
'It is no small thing to find oneself on the wrong side of an argument when the debate is about the biggest disaster in British foreign policy since Suez; no small thing to have handed Iran a final, undreamt-of victory in an Iran-Iraq war that we thought had ended in the 1980s; no small thing to have lost Britain her credit in half the world; no small thing — in the name of Atlanticism — to have shackled our own good name to a doomed US presidency and crazed foreign-policy adventure that the next political generation in America will remember only with an embarrassed shudder.
[...]
Our British neocons have invested heavily in this ill-fated craft, and the wreck is total. How shall they be saved? Never fear. They’ve been working on the elements of a rescue plan. By Christmas all will be singing from the same sheet. All together, now, warrior-columnists and soon-to-be-former Cabinet ministers: one, two three . . .
“The principle was good but the Americans screwed up the execution.”
[...]
Funny, because I don’t quite recall most of you saying it at the time — some of you wrote columns and some of you delivered speeches declaring that Iraq was making giant strides; most of you blamed the difficulties on “Saddam loyalists and foreign fighters”, and some of you actually visited and returned rejoicing at the progress — but let’s overlook that. Let’s for the sake of argument grant that you worried from the start that the US just didn’t have the hang of this nation-building business. Now, you declare, we know that’s the reason the whole strategy hit the rocks.
Crap. The strategy failed because of one big, bad idea at its very root. Your idea that we kick the door in. Everything has flowed from that.
We were not invited. We had no mandate. There were no “good” Iraqis to hand over to. We had nothing to latch on to, no legitimacy. It wasn’t a question of being tactful, respectful, munificent, or handing sweets to children. We were impostors, and that is all.'
Well, I don't consider myself a Neo-Con but I must admit I did think some good might have come out of the invasion. Now, well I'm not so sure. I also believe the strategy was flawed and far too naive about the challenge of establishing a functioning democracy. I still think that. Parris dismisses the suggestion that there weren't enough troops saying that more than 100,000 troops is hardly derisory as a military presence but historically it really isn't many soldiers. As Naill Ferguson writes in the Telegraph 'The number of troops currently in Iraq is less than 140,000. That's roughly as many soldiers as Britain sent to the same country to defeat an insurgency in 1920 — at a time when the population of Iraq was a tenth of what it is today.'
Parris is right about one thing though, things don't look good for Neo-Cons. Both the UK and the US have made signals that they will be looking to start handing over sooner rather than later. The US Iraq Study Group, headed by Republican grandee James Baker, is recommending the US military withdraws to bases outside Iraq and seeks Iranian and Syrian help. And if the Democrats win both House and Senate (which is a possibility, partly due to the growing unpopularity of the war) the US will attempt to get out of Iraq even quicker.
Should Britain separate Church and State?
An excellent long article from the estimable Bryan Appleyard.
Is it time to take God out of the state?
The Sunday Times
October 22, 2006
Bryan Appleyard
Faith groups are increasingly demanding new rights or complaining of being wronged. Some say the time has come for Britain to create a clear divide between state and religion. Are they right?
Is it time to take God out of the state?
The Sunday Times
October 22, 2006
Bryan Appleyard
Faith groups are increasingly demanding new rights or complaining of being wronged. Some say the time has come for Britain to create a clear divide between state and religion. Are they right?
Thursday, October 19, 2006
Detainee Rights
I've blogged quite a bit about the erosion of our civil liberties by the UK government in Labour's Authoritaranism. Well, if Gordon Brown's recent promise to push for 90 day detention is anything to go by these erosions look set to continue apace. With all this in mind, I found this article comparing detainee rights in Israel with America particularly interesting. The article suggests that Israel, which is under constant terrorist threat appears to operate with a greater deference to human rights standards than the USA.
[...]
BEFORE ENACTING the ``Detainee Bill " (otherwise known as the Military Commissions Act) two weeks ago, Congress should have spent more time learning from the Israeli experience. Compared with Israel's security measures during a long and difficult experience with terrorism, the US Congress has gone too far in its willingness to compromise human rights and civil liberties. Security considerations, as legitimate and forceful as they are, do not justify such excessive measures, as the Israeli practice demonstrates.
[...]
The article compares the US Military Commissions Act and the Unlawful Combatants Law passed by the Knesset in 2002. Read it here.
(via TNR's blog The Spine)
[...]
BEFORE ENACTING the ``Detainee Bill " (otherwise known as the Military Commissions Act) two weeks ago, Congress should have spent more time learning from the Israeli experience. Compared with Israel's security measures during a long and difficult experience with terrorism, the US Congress has gone too far in its willingness to compromise human rights and civil liberties. Security considerations, as legitimate and forceful as they are, do not justify such excessive measures, as the Israeli practice demonstrates.
[...]
The article compares the US Military Commissions Act and the Unlawful Combatants Law passed by the Knesset in 2002. Read it here.
(via TNR's blog The Spine)
Old fashioned British Multiculturalism
(courtesy of Mark Steyn)
'In a culturally confident age, the British in India were faced with the practice of “suttee” — the tradition of burning widows on the funeral pyres of their husbands. General Sir Charles Napier was impeccably multicultural: “You say that it is your custom to burn widows. Very well. We also have a custom: when men burn a woman alive, we tie a rope around their necks and we hang them. Build your funeral pyre; beside it, my carpenters will build a gallows. You may follow your custom. And then we will follow ours.”
India today is better off without suttee. If you don’t agree with that, if you think that’s just dead-white-male Eurocentrism, fine. But I don’t think you really believe that. Non-judgmental multiculturalism is an obvious fraud, and was subliminally accepted on that basis . . . . But if you think that suttee is just an example of the rich, vibrant tapestry of indigenous cultures, you ought to consider what your pleasant suburb would be like if 25, 30, 48 percent of the people around you really believed in it too. Multiculturalism was conceived by the Western elites not to celebrate all cultures but to deny their own: it is, thus, the real suicide bomb ..'
'In a culturally confident age, the British in India were faced with the practice of “suttee” — the tradition of burning widows on the funeral pyres of their husbands. General Sir Charles Napier was impeccably multicultural: “You say that it is your custom to burn widows. Very well. We also have a custom: when men burn a woman alive, we tie a rope around their necks and we hang them. Build your funeral pyre; beside it, my carpenters will build a gallows. You may follow your custom. And then we will follow ours.”
India today is better off without suttee. If you don’t agree with that, if you think that’s just dead-white-male Eurocentrism, fine. But I don’t think you really believe that. Non-judgmental multiculturalism is an obvious fraud, and was subliminally accepted on that basis . . . . But if you think that suttee is just an example of the rich, vibrant tapestry of indigenous cultures, you ought to consider what your pleasant suburb would be like if 25, 30, 48 percent of the people around you really believed in it too. Multiculturalism was conceived by the Western elites not to celebrate all cultures but to deny their own: it is, thus, the real suicide bomb ..'
Iraqi Bloggers on the War
13 Iraqi bloggers were asked the question 'Do you think the War was worth it or not?' Their answers are a must read for anyone interested in what Iraqis really think about the War.
Here are just two of the responses given to that question:
'Yes. The war was totally worth it. Why? Because I now decide what I want to do with my life, not the dictator'
and
"It was worth it from the side.. that we are over with Saddam dictatorship..(even though the situation now is incomparable with the situation when Saddam was is power.. it was way better)..and its not worth it from the side that we lost our safety.. now criminals, gangsters and kidnappers.. roam in the streets.. do whatever they want.. and there is no law to stop them.. as well as for the Islamic militias.'
Read the whole thing here.
Here are just two of the responses given to that question:
'Yes. The war was totally worth it. Why? Because I now decide what I want to do with my life, not the dictator'
and
"It was worth it from the side.. that we are over with Saddam dictatorship..(even though the situation now is incomparable with the situation when Saddam was is power.. it was way better)..and its not worth it from the side that we lost our safety.. now criminals, gangsters and kidnappers.. roam in the streets.. do whatever they want.. and there is no law to stop them.. as well as for the Islamic militias.'
Read the whole thing here.
Tuesday, October 17, 2006
Steven Pinker
Steven Pinker is one of my favourite science writers right now, and he has been mentioned in the blog before, for example:
A Natural History of Jewish Intelligence
Top Public Intellectuals
and
Labour's Authoritarianism
I just read about a debate, encompassing the political, philosophical and the scientific, between Pinker and George Lakoff, a rival linguistics professor, who wrote an anti-Republican book Freedom?: The Battle Over America's Most Important Idea, which Pinker castigated in a review. Lakoff fought back, and you can follow the intellectual ding-dong in the links below.
--------------
Pinker's actual review (scroll down a bit)
--------------
Lakoff's response: Defending Freedom
--------------
Some blog comments:
Pinker v. Lakoff
ScienceBlogs.com
October 7, 2006
George Lakoff has published two new political books, Whose Freedom?: The Battle Over America's Most Important Idea, and Thinking Points: Communicating Our American Values and Vision, as follow ups to his Moral Politics and Don't Think of an Elephant. Steven Pinker's review of Whose Freedom? in the New Republic has sparked a reply from Lakoff, and a debate is born.
I don't really know where to start on this. Lakoff's reply is one of the most intellectually dishonest pieces of writing I've seen from a cognitive scientist, and if anyone other than Lakoff had written it, I'd probably just ignore it. But Lakoff is not only famous, he's influential, and more than a few liberal bloggers take him seriously. So I feel compelled to say something. I guess the best way to go about this is to detail their disagreements, and show where Lakoff sinks to all new lows in defense of his position.
--------------
Fight! Fight! Pinker vs. Lakoff
A Natural History of Jewish Intelligence
Top Public Intellectuals
and
Labour's Authoritarianism
I just read about a debate, encompassing the political, philosophical and the scientific, between Pinker and George Lakoff, a rival linguistics professor, who wrote an anti-Republican book Freedom?: The Battle Over America's Most Important Idea, which Pinker castigated in a review. Lakoff fought back, and you can follow the intellectual ding-dong in the links below.
--------------
Pinker's actual review (scroll down a bit)
--------------
Lakoff's response: Defending Freedom
--------------
Some blog comments:
Pinker v. Lakoff
ScienceBlogs.com
October 7, 2006
George Lakoff has published two new political books, Whose Freedom?: The Battle Over America's Most Important Idea, and Thinking Points: Communicating Our American Values and Vision, as follow ups to his Moral Politics and Don't Think of an Elephant. Steven Pinker's review of Whose Freedom? in the New Republic has sparked a reply from Lakoff, and a debate is born.
I don't really know where to start on this. Lakoff's reply is one of the most intellectually dishonest pieces of writing I've seen from a cognitive scientist, and if anyone other than Lakoff had written it, I'd probably just ignore it. But Lakoff is not only famous, he's influential, and more than a few liberal bloggers take him seriously. So I feel compelled to say something. I guess the best way to go about this is to detail their disagreements, and show where Lakoff sinks to all new lows in defense of his position.
--------------
Fight! Fight! Pinker vs. Lakoff
Monday, October 16, 2006
Parenting
A placeholder for "parenting" discussions (obviously). Since I'm not a parent, I'll defer to impdecers who are!
What do those parents think of this? One of the interviewees, Annette Mountford of the charity Family Links, thinks that a parent should never call a child 'naughty', as it's bad for the child's self-confidence.
BBC Radio 4
Today Program
16/10/06
0837 Should we call our children naughty?
Listen | Permalink
What do those parents think of this? One of the interviewees, Annette Mountford of the charity Family Links, thinks that a parent should never call a child 'naughty', as it's bad for the child's self-confidence.
BBC Radio 4
Today Program
16/10/06
0837 Should we call our children naughty?
Listen | Permalink
At last, some weapons found!
Andy alerted me to this:
A large cache of bombs, chemicals and rocket launchers has been found in two houses in North West England. Both houses were owned by men with links to an extremist group... but it's not an Islamist one.
Read the story here and here.
Comment from bloggers here and here, pondering why the story hasn't had more coverage.
A large cache of bombs, chemicals and rocket launchers has been found in two houses in North West England. Both houses were owned by men with links to an extremist group... but it's not an Islamist one.
Read the story here and here.
Comment from bloggers here and here, pondering why the story hasn't had more coverage.
Friday, October 13, 2006
You Al Qud'nt Make it Up
Alright, it is a VERY weak pun, but the story (I think) is serious.
Please follow the link below to Harry's Place and read more about Al Quds day, what it commemorates, who's speaking and so on. The nice people at HP are thinking that it might be worth organising a counter demo (like German anti-fascists have successfully done) but acknowledge that they've probably left it a bit late this year.
Anyway, please read all about it here:
http://hurryupharry.bloghouse.net/archives/2006/10/11/against_al_quds_day.php
Please follow the link below to Harry's Place and read more about Al Quds day, what it commemorates, who's speaking and so on. The nice people at HP are thinking that it might be worth organising a counter demo (like German anti-fascists have successfully done) but acknowledge that they've probably left it a bit late this year.
Anyway, please read all about it here:
http://hurryupharry.bloghouse.net/archives/2006/10/11/against_al_quds_day.php
Thursday, October 12, 2006
The BBC - where facts are expensive and comments run far too free
Nick Cohen on the BBC:
Although it is impossible to generalise about such a vast organisation, the bias charge has enough truth in it to stick. If you doubt me, research one opinion outside the liberal consensus. Read up on the arguments for making Britain a fairer country by giving trade unionists more rights, for instance, or saying that abortion is murder or that Tony Blair’s foreign policy is correct in its essentials.
You don’t have to believe it, you just have to convince yourself that serious people can hold it for good reasons. You will then notice something disconcerting about most BBC presenters. Although they subject opponents of, say, abortion to rigorous cross-examination, their lust for ferocious questioning deserts them when supporters of abortion come on air. Far from being tested, they treat upholders of the liberal consensus as purveyors of an incontestable truth.
The way out for the BBC is not to swing to the right - it is not an advance to replace soft interviews for Menzies Campbell with soft interviews for John Reid - but make a tactical withdrawal from the opinion business. Less airtime should be given to talking heads and celebrity interviewers in London studios and more to reporters who leave Television Centre to find out what is happening in the world.
Read the full article here.
Although it is impossible to generalise about such a vast organisation, the bias charge has enough truth in it to stick. If you doubt me, research one opinion outside the liberal consensus. Read up on the arguments for making Britain a fairer country by giving trade unionists more rights, for instance, or saying that abortion is murder or that Tony Blair’s foreign policy is correct in its essentials.
You don’t have to believe it, you just have to convince yourself that serious people can hold it for good reasons. You will then notice something disconcerting about most BBC presenters. Although they subject opponents of, say, abortion to rigorous cross-examination, their lust for ferocious questioning deserts them when supporters of abortion come on air. Far from being tested, they treat upholders of the liberal consensus as purveyors of an incontestable truth.
The way out for the BBC is not to swing to the right - it is not an advance to replace soft interviews for Menzies Campbell with soft interviews for John Reid - but make a tactical withdrawal from the opinion business. Less airtime should be given to talking heads and celebrity interviewers in London studios and more to reporters who leave Television Centre to find out what is happening in the world.
Read the full article here.
Wednesday, October 11, 2006
Republicans - Fuck, Yeah!
Follow the link to Dizzy Thinks for the most unbelievable political ad I've ever seen. It was directed by David Zucker of Airplane / Naked Gun but has been pulled in the wake of the N. Korea nuclear test.
Makes our own party political broadcasts look a tad tame.
Watch it. Now! (Regardless of what you think of the actual message,)
http://dizzythinks.blogspot.com/2006/10/gop-pulls-prescient-electoral-ad.html
(This should perhaps have gone in JP's N. Korea thread, but then I couldn't have had my groovy headline.)
Makes our own party political broadcasts look a tad tame.
Watch it. Now! (Regardless of what you think of the actual message,)
http://dizzythinks.blogspot.com/2006/10/gop-pulls-prescient-electoral-ad.html
(This should perhaps have gone in JP's N. Korea thread, but then I couldn't have had my groovy headline.)
Monday, October 09, 2006
North Korea
Stratfor Intelligence Report
10/09/06
Red Alert: North Korea: Underground Nuclear Test Reported
Reports spread Oct. 9 that North Korea tested a nuclear device in the eastern part of North Hamgyong province at 10:35 a.m. local time. China has indicated it did detect a small underground test, although the South Korean military has not raised its alert level. Australian Prime Minister John Howard said his government has confirmed there has been seismic activity from North Korea, although he has not received reports on its magnitude.
The U.S. Geological Survey detected a 4.2 tremor in North Korea, which is smaller than expected and not big enough to make North Korea an unequivocal nuclear power.
If a test did occur, the most immediate U.S. response will likely be a strong condemnation and a call for a U.N. mandate for sanctions. If there is no U.S. military response, Pyongyang will see that as an acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear power.
Many questions remain, however. Even if this were a nuclear test, it is not clear that it was a weapon rather than a device. A nuclear device produces an in-place blast from a mechanism of indeterminate size and structure. A weapon can be fitted on a missile or on an aircraft, and is therefore highly compact and ruggedized.
China's response will be hesitant. China does not seem ready to cut off food or fuel to North Korea, particularly before winter sets in. Beijing has deployed additional troops to the border, but that is to seal the frontier. Beijing will be angry, but its primary concern is to keep the North Korean people from spilling across the border into northeast China.
South Korea will, of course, suspend cooperation in Kaesong and Kumkang and will probably put its forces on alert. With the drawdown of U.S. troops in South Korea, the South Korean army is now the border patrol. U.S. military units remaining will have to go on heightened alert and rush Patriot surface-to-air missile batteries to the peninsula. South Korea could deploy high-level officials to North Korea
Japan will work for U.N. for sanctions and Chapter 7 invocation. Japan also will heighten its military posture and increase diplomacy with China and South Korea in an attempt to show a united front against North Korea
North Korea will go on high alert nationwide. The military will assume a high-readiness posture, and the North Koreans will proclaim their entry into the nuclear club, using sanctions to tighten control and rally domestic backing. Pyongyang might quickly invite the International Atomic Energy Agency in to make its nuclear status "legitimate." It will petition international bodies to accept the new reality.
In any event, North Korea will view the test as a victory. It will mark the acceptance of the government as a nuclear state. Further negotiations will have to take place under this new reality. North Korea cannot be isolated forever. North Korea has bet that anything less than a complete military invasion is a capitulation. Pyongyang will press for acceptance, similar to Pakistan. China and South Korea will be key; both desperately want to avoid any military action. They will end up negotiating with North Korea, finding a way to make the North comply with international regulations.
----------------------
Red Alert: North Korea -- Is There a Military Solution?
Summary
Whatever the political realities may seem to dictate after a North Korean nuclear test, an overt military strike -- even one limited to cruise missiles -- is not in the cards. The consequences of even the most restrained attack could be devastating.
Analysis
The reported detonation of a nuclear device by North Korea on Oct. 9 raises the question of potential military action against North Korea. The rationale for such a strike would be simple. North Korea, given its rhetoric, cannot be allowed to have nuclear weapons. Therefore, an attack to deny them the facilities with which to convert their device into a weapon and deploy it is essential. If such an attack were to take place, it is assumed, the United States would play the dominant or even sole role.
This scenario assumes that North Korea is as aggressive as its rhetoric.
But what about North Korea's well-armed neighbors -- Russia, China, South Korea, Japan? Would they not be willing to assume the major burden of an attack against North Korea? Is the United States really willing to go it alone, even while engaged in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Leaving these obvious political questions aside for the moment, let's reverse the issue by posing it in military terms: What would a U.S. strike against North Korea look like?
The USS Kitty Hawk is currently sitting in port at Yokosuka Naval Base, Japan. The USS Enterprise is operating in the Arabian Sea, while the Nimitz and the Stennis are conducting exercises off the coast of California. All are an ocean away, and none is less than a week's transit from the region. Nevertheless, naval cruise missiles are readily available, as are long-range strikes by B-2A Spirit stealth bombers and B-52H Stratofortresses and B-1B Lancers currently supporting NATO operations in Afghanistan out of Diego Garcia. A more robust strike package would take longer to deploy.
When U.S. military planners have nightmares, they have nightmares about war with North Korea. Even the idea of limited strikes against the isolated nation is fraught with potential escalations. The problem is the mission. A limited attack against nuclear facilities might destabilize North Korea or lead North Korea to the conclusion that the United States would intend regime change.
Regime preservation is the entire point of its nuclear capability. Therefore, it is quite conceivable that Kim Jong-Il and his advisors -- or other factions --might construe even the most limited military strikes against targets directly related to missile development or a nuclear program as an act threatening the regime, and therefore one that necessitates a fierce response. Regime survival could very easily entail a full, unlimited reprisal by the Korean People's Army (KPA) to any military strike whatsoever on North Korean soil.
North Korea has some 10,000 fortified artillery pieces trained on Seoul. It is essential to understand that South Korea's capital city, a major population center and the industrial heartland of South Korea, is within range of conventional artillery. The United States has been moving its forces out of range of these guns, but the South Koreans cannot move their capital.
Add to this the fact that North Korea has more than 100 No-Dong missiles that can reach deep into South Korea, as well as to Japan, and we can see that the possibility for retaliation is very real. Although the No-Dong has not always been the most reliable weapon, just the possibility of dozens of strikes against U.S. forces in Korea and other cities in Korea and Japan presents a daunting scenario.
North Korea has cultivated a reputation for unpredictability. Although it has been fairly conservative in its actions compared to its rhetoric, the fact is that no one can predict North Korea's response to strikes against its nuclear facilities. And with Seoul at risk -- a city of 20 million people -- the ability to take risks is limited.
The United States must assume, for the sake of planning, that U.S. airstrikes would be followed by massed artillery fire on Seoul. Now, massed artillery is itself not immune to countermeasures. But North Korea's artillery lies deep inside caves and fortifications all along the western section of the demilitarized zone (DMZ). An air campaign against these guns would take a long time, during which enormous damage would be done to Seoul and the South Korean economy -- perhaps on the order of several hundred thousand high-explosive rounds per hour. Even using tactical nuclear weapons against this artillery would pose serious threats to Seoul. The radiation from even low-yield weapons could force the evacuation of the city.
The option of moving north into the North Korean defensive belt is an option, but an enormously costly one. North Korea has a huge army and, on the defensive, it can be formidable. Fifty years of concerted military fortification would make Hezbollah's preparations in southern Lebanon look like child's play. Moving U.S. and South Korean armor into this defensive belt could break it, but only with substantial casualties and without the certainty of success. A massive stalemate along the DMZ, if it developed, would work in favor of the larger, defensive force.
Moreover, the North Koreans would have the option of moving south. Now, in U.S. thinking, this is the ideal scenario. The North Korean force on the move, outside of its fortifications, would be vulnerable to U.S. and South Korean airstrikes and superior ground maneuver and fire capabilities. In most war games, the defeat of North Korea requires the KPA to move south, exposing itself to counterstrikes.
However, the same war-gaming has also supposed at least 30 days for the activation and mobilization of U.S. forces for a counterattack. U.S. and South Korean forces would maintain an elastic defense against the North; as in the first war, forces would be rushed into the region, stabilizing the front, and then a counterattack would develop, breaking the North Korean army and allowing a move north.
There are three problems with this strategy. The first is that the elastic strategy would inevitably lead to the fall of Seoul and, if the 1950 model were a guide, a much deeper withdrawal along the Korean Peninsula. Second, the ability of the U.S. Army to deploy substantial forces to Korea within a 30-day window is highly dubious. Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom both required much longer periods of time.
Finally, the U.S. Army is already fighting two major ground wars and is stretched to the breaking point. The rotation schedule is now so tight that units are already spending more time in Iraq than they are home between rotations. The idea that the U.S. Army has a multidivisional force available for deployment in South Korea would require a national mobilization not seen since the last Korean War.
It comes down to this: If the United States strikes at North Korea's nuclear capabilities, it does so placing a bet. And that bet is that North Korea will not respond. That might be true, but if it is not true, it poses a battlefield problem to which neither South Korea nor the United States will be able to respond. In one scenario, the North Koreans bombard Seoul and the United States makes a doomed attempt at shutting down the massive artillery barrage. By the time the guns are silenced -- even in the best-case scenarios -- Seoul will be a mess. In another scenario, the North Korean army executes an offensive of even minimal competence, which costs South Korea its capital and industrial heartland. The third is a guerrilla onslaught from the elite of the North Korean Army, deployed by mini-subs and tunnels under the DMZ. The guerrillas pour into the south and wreak havoc on U.S. military installations.
That is how a U.S. strike -- and its outcome -- might look. Now, what about the Chinese and Russians? They are, of course, not likely to support such a U.S. attack (and could even supply North Korea in an extended war). Add in the fact that South Korea would not be willing to risk destroying Seoul and you arrive at a situation where even a U.S. nuclear strike against nuclear and non-nuclear targets would pose an unacceptable threat to South Korea.
There are two advantages the United States has. The first is time. There is a huge difference between a nuclear device and a deployable nuclear weapon. The latter has to be shaped into a small, rugged package able to be launched on a missile or dropped from a plane. Causing atomic fission is not the same as having a weapon.
The second advantage is distance. The United States is safe and far away from North Korea. Four other powers -- Russia, China, South Korea and Japan -- have much more to fear from North Korea than the United States does. The United States will always act unilaterally if it feels that it has no other way to protect its national interest. As it is, however, U.S. national interest is not at stake.
South Korea faces nothing less than national destruction in an all-out war. South Korea knows this and it will vigorously oppose any overt military action. Nor does China profit from a destabilized North Korea and a heavy-handed U.S. military move in its backyard. Nevertheless, if North Korea is a threat, it is first a threat to its immediate neighbors, one or more of whom can deal with North Korea.
In the end, North Korea wants regime survival. In the end, allowing the North Koran regime to survive is something that has been acceptable for over half a century. When you play out the options, the acquisition of a nuclear device -- especially one neither robust nor deployable -- does not, by itself, compel the United States to act, nor does it give the United States a militarily satisfactory option. The most important issue is the transfer of North Korean nuclear technology to other countries and groups. That is something the six-party talk participants have an equal interest in and might have the leverage to prevent.
Every situation does not have a satisfactory military solution. This seems to be one of them.
10/09/06
Red Alert: North Korea: Underground Nuclear Test Reported
Reports spread Oct. 9 that North Korea tested a nuclear device in the eastern part of North Hamgyong province at 10:35 a.m. local time. China has indicated it did detect a small underground test, although the South Korean military has not raised its alert level. Australian Prime Minister John Howard said his government has confirmed there has been seismic activity from North Korea, although he has not received reports on its magnitude.
The U.S. Geological Survey detected a 4.2 tremor in North Korea, which is smaller than expected and not big enough to make North Korea an unequivocal nuclear power.
If a test did occur, the most immediate U.S. response will likely be a strong condemnation and a call for a U.N. mandate for sanctions. If there is no U.S. military response, Pyongyang will see that as an acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear power.
Many questions remain, however. Even if this were a nuclear test, it is not clear that it was a weapon rather than a device. A nuclear device produces an in-place blast from a mechanism of indeterminate size and structure. A weapon can be fitted on a missile or on an aircraft, and is therefore highly compact and ruggedized.
China's response will be hesitant. China does not seem ready to cut off food or fuel to North Korea, particularly before winter sets in. Beijing has deployed additional troops to the border, but that is to seal the frontier. Beijing will be angry, but its primary concern is to keep the North Korean people from spilling across the border into northeast China.
South Korea will, of course, suspend cooperation in Kaesong and Kumkang and will probably put its forces on alert. With the drawdown of U.S. troops in South Korea, the South Korean army is now the border patrol. U.S. military units remaining will have to go on heightened alert and rush Patriot surface-to-air missile batteries to the peninsula. South Korea could deploy high-level officials to North Korea
Japan will work for U.N. for sanctions and Chapter 7 invocation. Japan also will heighten its military posture and increase diplomacy with China and South Korea in an attempt to show a united front against North Korea
North Korea will go on high alert nationwide. The military will assume a high-readiness posture, and the North Koreans will proclaim their entry into the nuclear club, using sanctions to tighten control and rally domestic backing. Pyongyang might quickly invite the International Atomic Energy Agency in to make its nuclear status "legitimate." It will petition international bodies to accept the new reality.
In any event, North Korea will view the test as a victory. It will mark the acceptance of the government as a nuclear state. Further negotiations will have to take place under this new reality. North Korea cannot be isolated forever. North Korea has bet that anything less than a complete military invasion is a capitulation. Pyongyang will press for acceptance, similar to Pakistan. China and South Korea will be key; both desperately want to avoid any military action. They will end up negotiating with North Korea, finding a way to make the North comply with international regulations.
----------------------
Red Alert: North Korea -- Is There a Military Solution?
Summary
Whatever the political realities may seem to dictate after a North Korean nuclear test, an overt military strike -- even one limited to cruise missiles -- is not in the cards. The consequences of even the most restrained attack could be devastating.
Analysis
The reported detonation of a nuclear device by North Korea on Oct. 9 raises the question of potential military action against North Korea. The rationale for such a strike would be simple. North Korea, given its rhetoric, cannot be allowed to have nuclear weapons. Therefore, an attack to deny them the facilities with which to convert their device into a weapon and deploy it is essential. If such an attack were to take place, it is assumed, the United States would play the dominant or even sole role.
This scenario assumes that North Korea is as aggressive as its rhetoric.
But what about North Korea's well-armed neighbors -- Russia, China, South Korea, Japan? Would they not be willing to assume the major burden of an attack against North Korea? Is the United States really willing to go it alone, even while engaged in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Leaving these obvious political questions aside for the moment, let's reverse the issue by posing it in military terms: What would a U.S. strike against North Korea look like?
The USS Kitty Hawk is currently sitting in port at Yokosuka Naval Base, Japan. The USS Enterprise is operating in the Arabian Sea, while the Nimitz and the Stennis are conducting exercises off the coast of California. All are an ocean away, and none is less than a week's transit from the region. Nevertheless, naval cruise missiles are readily available, as are long-range strikes by B-2A Spirit stealth bombers and B-52H Stratofortresses and B-1B Lancers currently supporting NATO operations in Afghanistan out of Diego Garcia. A more robust strike package would take longer to deploy.
When U.S. military planners have nightmares, they have nightmares about war with North Korea. Even the idea of limited strikes against the isolated nation is fraught with potential escalations. The problem is the mission. A limited attack against nuclear facilities might destabilize North Korea or lead North Korea to the conclusion that the United States would intend regime change.
Regime preservation is the entire point of its nuclear capability. Therefore, it is quite conceivable that Kim Jong-Il and his advisors -- or other factions --might construe even the most limited military strikes against targets directly related to missile development or a nuclear program as an act threatening the regime, and therefore one that necessitates a fierce response. Regime survival could very easily entail a full, unlimited reprisal by the Korean People's Army (KPA) to any military strike whatsoever on North Korean soil.
North Korea has some 10,000 fortified artillery pieces trained on Seoul. It is essential to understand that South Korea's capital city, a major population center and the industrial heartland of South Korea, is within range of conventional artillery. The United States has been moving its forces out of range of these guns, but the South Koreans cannot move their capital.
Add to this the fact that North Korea has more than 100 No-Dong missiles that can reach deep into South Korea, as well as to Japan, and we can see that the possibility for retaliation is very real. Although the No-Dong has not always been the most reliable weapon, just the possibility of dozens of strikes against U.S. forces in Korea and other cities in Korea and Japan presents a daunting scenario.
North Korea has cultivated a reputation for unpredictability. Although it has been fairly conservative in its actions compared to its rhetoric, the fact is that no one can predict North Korea's response to strikes against its nuclear facilities. And with Seoul at risk -- a city of 20 million people -- the ability to take risks is limited.
The United States must assume, for the sake of planning, that U.S. airstrikes would be followed by massed artillery fire on Seoul. Now, massed artillery is itself not immune to countermeasures. But North Korea's artillery lies deep inside caves and fortifications all along the western section of the demilitarized zone (DMZ). An air campaign against these guns would take a long time, during which enormous damage would be done to Seoul and the South Korean economy -- perhaps on the order of several hundred thousand high-explosive rounds per hour. Even using tactical nuclear weapons against this artillery would pose serious threats to Seoul. The radiation from even low-yield weapons could force the evacuation of the city.
The option of moving north into the North Korean defensive belt is an option, but an enormously costly one. North Korea has a huge army and, on the defensive, it can be formidable. Fifty years of concerted military fortification would make Hezbollah's preparations in southern Lebanon look like child's play. Moving U.S. and South Korean armor into this defensive belt could break it, but only with substantial casualties and without the certainty of success. A massive stalemate along the DMZ, if it developed, would work in favor of the larger, defensive force.
Moreover, the North Koreans would have the option of moving south. Now, in U.S. thinking, this is the ideal scenario. The North Korean force on the move, outside of its fortifications, would be vulnerable to U.S. and South Korean airstrikes and superior ground maneuver and fire capabilities. In most war games, the defeat of North Korea requires the KPA to move south, exposing itself to counterstrikes.
However, the same war-gaming has also supposed at least 30 days for the activation and mobilization of U.S. forces for a counterattack. U.S. and South Korean forces would maintain an elastic defense against the North; as in the first war, forces would be rushed into the region, stabilizing the front, and then a counterattack would develop, breaking the North Korean army and allowing a move north.
There are three problems with this strategy. The first is that the elastic strategy would inevitably lead to the fall of Seoul and, if the 1950 model were a guide, a much deeper withdrawal along the Korean Peninsula. Second, the ability of the U.S. Army to deploy substantial forces to Korea within a 30-day window is highly dubious. Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom both required much longer periods of time.
Finally, the U.S. Army is already fighting two major ground wars and is stretched to the breaking point. The rotation schedule is now so tight that units are already spending more time in Iraq than they are home between rotations. The idea that the U.S. Army has a multidivisional force available for deployment in South Korea would require a national mobilization not seen since the last Korean War.
It comes down to this: If the United States strikes at North Korea's nuclear capabilities, it does so placing a bet. And that bet is that North Korea will not respond. That might be true, but if it is not true, it poses a battlefield problem to which neither South Korea nor the United States will be able to respond. In one scenario, the North Koreans bombard Seoul and the United States makes a doomed attempt at shutting down the massive artillery barrage. By the time the guns are silenced -- even in the best-case scenarios -- Seoul will be a mess. In another scenario, the North Korean army executes an offensive of even minimal competence, which costs South Korea its capital and industrial heartland. The third is a guerrilla onslaught from the elite of the North Korean Army, deployed by mini-subs and tunnels under the DMZ. The guerrillas pour into the south and wreak havoc on U.S. military installations.
That is how a U.S. strike -- and its outcome -- might look. Now, what about the Chinese and Russians? They are, of course, not likely to support such a U.S. attack (and could even supply North Korea in an extended war). Add in the fact that South Korea would not be willing to risk destroying Seoul and you arrive at a situation where even a U.S. nuclear strike against nuclear and non-nuclear targets would pose an unacceptable threat to South Korea.
There are two advantages the United States has. The first is time. There is a huge difference between a nuclear device and a deployable nuclear weapon. The latter has to be shaped into a small, rugged package able to be launched on a missile or dropped from a plane. Causing atomic fission is not the same as having a weapon.
The second advantage is distance. The United States is safe and far away from North Korea. Four other powers -- Russia, China, South Korea and Japan -- have much more to fear from North Korea than the United States does. The United States will always act unilaterally if it feels that it has no other way to protect its national interest. As it is, however, U.S. national interest is not at stake.
South Korea faces nothing less than national destruction in an all-out war. South Korea knows this and it will vigorously oppose any overt military action. Nor does China profit from a destabilized North Korea and a heavy-handed U.S. military move in its backyard. Nevertheless, if North Korea is a threat, it is first a threat to its immediate neighbors, one or more of whom can deal with North Korea.
In the end, North Korea wants regime survival. In the end, allowing the North Koran regime to survive is something that has been acceptable for over half a century. When you play out the options, the acquisition of a nuclear device -- especially one neither robust nor deployable -- does not, by itself, compel the United States to act, nor does it give the United States a militarily satisfactory option. The most important issue is the transfer of North Korean nuclear technology to other countries and groups. That is something the six-party talk participants have an equal interest in and might have the leverage to prevent.
Every situation does not have a satisfactory military solution. This seems to be one of them.
Friday, October 06, 2006
Jack Straw Talks Sense Shock!
I don't have time to this justice, but basically Jack Straw has said he prefers Muslim women to remove their veils when they meet him as he thinks it's quite nice to see people's faces. You can read the story here and here (if you're worried that the Telegraph is making the whole thing up) and get the Harry's Place view here (includes Galloway's risible response.)
Worth looking at the reactions from the Muslim community. Those hostile to Straw display a predictable disparity between what he actually said and what they are condemning. The response of the Tories and LibDems (quoted in the Telegraph piece) range from disappointing and banal to frankly vomit inducing (Simon Hughes.)
It's also worth quickly noting the extent to which 'assimilation' has become a dirty word because it "is saying that one culture or one way of life is superior to another". Uh, yeah. It is. Deal with it. My dad (an immigrant) used to use 'assimilated' as a term of high praise for anyone who had successfully adapted to the customs of the host country and was able to fully participate in it. But he was an apostate, so what did he know anyway?
Worth looking at the reactions from the Muslim community. Those hostile to Straw display a predictable disparity between what he actually said and what they are condemning. The response of the Tories and LibDems (quoted in the Telegraph piece) range from disappointing and banal to frankly vomit inducing (Simon Hughes.)
It's also worth quickly noting the extent to which 'assimilation' has become a dirty word because it "is saying that one culture or one way of life is superior to another". Uh, yeah. It is. Deal with it. My dad (an immigrant) used to use 'assimilated' as a term of high praise for anyone who had successfully adapted to the customs of the host country and was able to fully participate in it. But he was an apostate, so what did he know anyway?
Wednesday, October 04, 2006
Thatcher on Tax Cuts
This quote came from an interview with Brian Walden in January 1983.
Brian Walden: You used to say "Let's have the tax cuts and then we shall get the growth".
Margaret Thatcher: No. Not always. That was a Laffer-ism you know, and I remember having arguments with Laffer and saying "Yes, but there's probably a three year gap and how are we going to get back that three years, how are we to survive that three years?" And also, I've been in politics a long time—you know that, we were in it together—and I've watched many many years reductions in public spending as an objective… If you actually hold it, you're doing very well, and then you take the growth to reduce your personal taxation. Once or twice one's been able to do certain reductions because one's found inefficiencies.
(hat tip Daniel Finkelstein)
Brian Walden: You used to say "Let's have the tax cuts and then we shall get the growth".
Margaret Thatcher: No. Not always. That was a Laffer-ism you know, and I remember having arguments with Laffer and saying "Yes, but there's probably a three year gap and how are we going to get back that three years, how are we to survive that three years?" And also, I've been in politics a long time—you know that, we were in it together—and I've watched many many years reductions in public spending as an objective… If you actually hold it, you're doing very well, and then you take the growth to reduce your personal taxation. Once or twice one's been able to do certain reductions because one's found inefficiencies.
(hat tip Daniel Finkelstein)
Monday, October 02, 2006
Funding the Threat: Dr Liam Fox Speech
Shadow Defence Secretary, Dr Liam Fox's Speech on the link between oil and national security:
We are all too familiar with the fact that recent years have seen substantial rises in the price of crude. What is seldom discussed is the cumulative wealth shift that this represents, how it is being spent and the foreign and security policy implications that flow from it.
Let me begin with a few numbers. In the past five years Europe alone has pumped $49bn into the economy of Iran and an astonishing $232bn into the former Soviet Union, mainly Russia- and this for crude oil alone. This does not include the financial transfers resulting from gas or petroleum product sales. Of these two examples, at a national level, Germany has contributed $54bn to Russia while Italy handed $10.1bn to Iran. The global figures are, of course, much greater still.
In both Russia and Iran this windfall has been used to finance military buildup. In other words we in the West find ourselves in a security Catch-22. Our dependence on oil means that we cannot avoid paying whatever price is demanded of us. That in turn produces huge financial flows out of our economies into those oil producers, some of whom may be hostile to us. They in turn use this to finance a defence build up. In other words, our addiction to oil results in us funding the potential threat against us and our interests.
There is, in addition, the consequence that there is little incentive for a state like Iran to reduce international tension as greater uncertainty will inflate the oil price and keep revenues high.
You can read the whole article here.
We are all too familiar with the fact that recent years have seen substantial rises in the price of crude. What is seldom discussed is the cumulative wealth shift that this represents, how it is being spent and the foreign and security policy implications that flow from it.
Let me begin with a few numbers. In the past five years Europe alone has pumped $49bn into the economy of Iran and an astonishing $232bn into the former Soviet Union, mainly Russia- and this for crude oil alone. This does not include the financial transfers resulting from gas or petroleum product sales. Of these two examples, at a national level, Germany has contributed $54bn to Russia while Italy handed $10.1bn to Iran. The global figures are, of course, much greater still.
In both Russia and Iran this windfall has been used to finance military buildup. In other words we in the West find ourselves in a security Catch-22. Our dependence on oil means that we cannot avoid paying whatever price is demanded of us. That in turn produces huge financial flows out of our economies into those oil producers, some of whom may be hostile to us. They in turn use this to finance a defence build up. In other words, our addiction to oil results in us funding the potential threat against us and our interests.
There is, in addition, the consequence that there is little incentive for a state like Iran to reduce international tension as greater uncertainty will inflate the oil price and keep revenues high.
You can read the whole article here.
Health Matters
A placeholder for any discussions we might want to have about Health matters. Here's one on the Brits and their awful diets for starters.
-------------------
Given that I consumed two bananas while blogging this, my mind is currently boggling: One in five [Brits interviewed] claimed that it was just "impossible" to eat the Government's recommended five portions of fruit and vegetables a day.
Ready-made excuses put Britons off healthy food
Telegraph
02/10/2006
Reducing obesity may be the aim of doctors, Government ministers and health campaigners but most people lack the discipline to change their eating habits and are brilliant at making excuses, a survey has found. Researchers identified 10 common excuses used by people to justify their consumption of unhealthy food.
...read on...
-------------------
Given that I consumed two bananas while blogging this, my mind is currently boggling: One in five [Brits interviewed] claimed that it was just "impossible" to eat the Government's recommended five portions of fruit and vegetables a day.
Ready-made excuses put Britons off healthy food
Telegraph
02/10/2006
Reducing obesity may be the aim of doctors, Government ministers and health campaigners but most people lack the discipline to change their eating habits and are brilliant at making excuses, a survey has found. Researchers identified 10 common excuses used by people to justify their consumption of unhealthy food.
...read on...
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